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CHAPTER FOUR - DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
4.1 Introduction 
The fourth chapter of this study provides a descriptive summary of the CyberNotes data set, 
and provides the basis for testing the research hypotheses detailed in Chapter Three. Also 
included in this chapter is a presentation of the secondary data that will be incorporated in the 
detailed statistical testing that will be carried out in Chapter Five. 
Due to the large volume of data over the study period, it was agreed that the most efficient 
presentation method would be yearly and quarterly data. More detailed analyses on a 
monthly and newsletter level were also developed. This information is presented in various 
supplemental appendices associated with this chapter, and is referenced internally within the 
appropriate section herein. 
In total, six categories of data are presented, five of which are from the CyberNotes 
Newsletters and one is a compendium of the secondary data sources used in this study. The 
first category of data is Bugs, Holes and Patches. This covers such items as: vulnerability 
type, vendor, risk classification, availability of remediation tools, footnote source, number of 
footnotes, date reported, operating system type, and date variance/lag time. During the study 
period, the NIPC reported a total of 6,698 Bugs, Holes and Patches items. 
The second category of data is Exploit Scripts. This category provided information about the 
name of the exploit script, availability of a workaround, and related file type. During the 
study period, the NIPC reported 3,040 total Exploit Scripts items. 
V iruses are the third category of newsletter data. It includes a variety of information about 
computer viruses, specifically: virus name, virus type, virus date, and aliases. During the 
study period, the NIPC reported a total of 2,431 Viruses items. 
The fourth category of data is Trojans. In this section, the related data elements include: 
name text. alias availability, alias name information. and alias quantity. During the study 
period. the NIPC reported a total of 15,145 Trojan items. 
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Trends are the fifth category of data, and this category was sub-divided into two discrete sub-
sections. The first sub-section deals with probes, and the second sub-section discusses scans. 
These sub-areas were specifically segregated in the newsletters. During the study period. the 
NIPC reported a total of 200 Trend items. 
Lastly, the Secondary Data components are described in the sixth data set. This is broken 
down into five sub-areas, as follows: (1) Other NIPC information sources, (2) Macro-
economic data, (3) E-Commerce, (4) Information Technology Utilisation Data. and (5) 
Political and Military Events. 
4.1.1 Data Accumulation Techniques 
In order aggregate the data for this study, it was necessary to compute the data statistics at a 
reasonable level for the reader to understand, and for which sufficient testing could be 
employed. After ample discussion, it was agreed that the major portions of this study would 
best be illustrated on a quarterly basis, as this would provide for an easily presentable set of 
analyses. 
To begin the initial data organisation, all individual CyberNotes newsletters were first 
aggregated and classified into yearly periods, as shown below: 
Table 4.1 - CyberNotes Newsletter Aggregation Summary by Year: 2000-2003 
Beginning Issue Ending Issue Number of 
Calendar Year Number Number Newsletters 
2000 2000-01 2000-25 25 
2001 2001-01 2001-25 25 
2002 2002-01 2002-25 25 
2003 2003-01 2003-25 25 
Total 100 
It is noted that beginning in 2000. the NIPC began publishing a Yearly Summary Report that 
is made available to the public. The related issue numbers for calendar years 2000, 2001. 
2002 and 2003 are 2000-26, 2001-26, 2002-26. and 2003-26 respectively. Furthermore. since 
this is a summary of previously reported information these summaries are properly excluded 
from the data collection and analysis. 
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After this stage, the CyberNotes newsletters were then classified on a quarterly basis. as 
shown in the following table: 
Table 4.2 - CyberNotes Newsletter Aggregation Summary by Quarter: 2000-2003 
Beginning Issue Ending Issue Number of 
Study Period Number Number Newsletters 
01 - 2000 2000-01 2000-06 6 
Q2 - 2000 2000-07 2000-12 6 
03 - 2000 2000-13 2000-19 7 
Q4 - 2000 2000-20 2000-25 6 
Ql - 2001 2001-01 2001-06 6 
02 - 2001 2001-07 2001-12 6 
03 - 2001 2001-13 2001-18 6 
Q4 - 2001 2001-19 2001-25 7 
01 - 2002 2002-01 2002-06 6 
02 - 2002 2002-07 2002-12 6 
Q3 - 2002 2002-13 2002-19 7 
04 - 2002 2002-20 2002-25 6 
QI - 2003 2003-01 2003-06 6 
Q2 - 2003 2003-07 2003-13 7 
03 - 2003 2003-14 2003-19 6 
Q4 - 2003 2003-20 2003-25 6 
Total 100 
The issue date was the sole criteria used to classify the newsletters into the sixteen quarterly 
periods used in this research project. For example, eN Issue Number 2002-04; with an issue 
date of February 18,2004 was classified in the QI-2002 study period. 
4.1.2 Assumptions Acknowledged 
During this study the researcher has acknowledged various assumptions and constraints. The 
overall assumptions have been previously discussed in earlier chapters, most notably in 
Chapters One and Three. 
Additionally, it is further acknowledged that no modifications of NIPC data were made 
during this chapter where the descriptive qualities of the data are presented. The data was 
preserved in its original presentation and used solely for statistical analyses. The researcher 
did not attempt to modify, correct or alter the data elements in any fashion. 
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Lastly, in order to complete this study in a rigorous yet efficient fashion vanous time 
constraints influenced the amount of data that could be analysed. First of which was the data 
set for 1999 was de-selected from this study because of the fact that it was less relevant to the 
project timetable and also because it was not as well structured. Second. the number of data 
elements from each newsletter was quite large and this required a tremendous amount of time 
of the researcher to obtain the data, input it into MS-Excel, migrate it to SPSS and finally run 
the statistical analyses for presentation in this chapter. Furthermore, when adding 2003 data 
to this study, it took three months to receive the data from the FBI and then another three 
months of effort to complete the analyses. 
4.2 Descriptive Characteristics of the Secondary Data 
The total population of 100 CyberNotes Newsletters for 2000 to 2003 were incorporated into 
this study. Therefore, statistical sampling techniques were not necessary and many inherent 
assumptions and potential errors would be avoided. In essence, the advantage of this testing 
method allows for a one hundred percent census testing approach. 
4.2.1 CyberNotes Data Summary Information 
The summary of all CyberNotes data is presented in Table 4.3 to provide a general context 
for the overall frequency distribution of each reporting category on a yearly basis. Then it is 
decomposed to show similar information on a quarterly basis in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.3 - Summary of Total CyberNotes Data by Year: 2000-2003 
-- --
Bugs Etc. Exploit Scripts Viruses Tro'ans Trends Totals 
Year Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. 
2000 1,049 15.66 1,108 36.40 427 17.60 1,187 7.84 260 36.57 4,031 14.38 
2001 1,114 16.64 532 17.60 461 19.00 3,007 19.85 170 23.91 5,284 18.85 
2002 1,965 29.33 617 20.30 760 31.20 2,821 18.63 143 20.11 6,306 22.50 
2003 2,589 38.66 783 25.70 783 32.20 8,160 53.88 138 19.13 12,453 44.44 
Total 6,698 100.00 3,040 100.00 2,431 100.00 15,145 100.00 711 100.00 28,025 100.00 
Percent of 
Total 23.90% 10.45% 8.67% 54.04% 2.54% 100.00% 
In this presentation, it is important to be aware that these frequencies present all reported items according to the guidelines established 
by the NIPC. More details of these guidelines are discussed in Chapter Two - Literature Review. In this frequency analysis, Bugs 
remain have a nearly identical level of reporting from 2000 to 2001 and then an approximate 50% increase is seen from 200 I to 2002 
and additional substantial increase from 2002 to 2003. Exploit Scripts see a large decline in its frequency from 2000 to 200 I and then 
a relatively small increase in each of the following two years. The frequency distribution for Viruses is relatively constant for the first 
two years of the research study. Then in 2002, a noticeable increase of 65% per annum is recorded in 2003 with a minor increase to 
following in 2003. Trojans exhibit an usual frequency trend in that there was a tremendous growth in the reported items from 2000 to 
2001, then the following year saw a minor decline; only to see a large upsurge in last year of the study. Trends which is a general 
reporting category for Probes, Scans and other general information sees a significant decline from 2000 to 2001 and then modest 
declines in each of the subsequent years. 
A more detailed analysis on a quarterly basis was developed on the next table, as follows: 
11 
Table 4.4 - Summary of Total CyberNotes Data by Quarter: 2000-2003 
c-
Bugs Etc. Exploit Scripts Viruses Tro·ans Trends Totals 
Study Period Freq. Perc. F~. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. 
QI - 2000 230 3.43 283 9.31 72 2.96 90 0.59 47 6.61 687 2.45 
Q2 - 2000 237 3.54 331 10.89 99 4.07 275 1.82 81 11.39 955 3.41 
Q3 - 2000 296 4.42 300 9.87 116 4.77 371 2.45 88 12.38 1,081 3.86 
Q4 - 2000 286 1.89 194 6.38 139 5.72 451 2.98 44 6.19 1,098 3.92 
QI - 2001 272 1.80 155 5.10 119 4.90 245 1.62 34 4.78 803 2.87 
Q2 - 2001 296 1.95 157 5.16 132 5.43 623 4.11 50 7.03 1,219 4.35 
Q3 - 2001 325 2.16 154 5.07 118 4.85 1,194 7.88 43 6.05 1,772 6.32 
Q4 - 2001 221 1.45 66 2.17 93 3.83 945 6.24 43 6.05 1,370 4.89 
Ql - 2002 455 3.00 129 4.24 165 6.79 165 1.09 22 3.09 926 3.30 
Q2 - 2002 465 3.07 108 3.55 171 7.03 396 2.61 28 3.94 1,152 4.11 
Q3 - 2002 526 3.48 215 7.07 251 10.32 901 5.95 37 5.20 1,906 6.80 
Q4 - 2002 519 3.43 165 5.43 173 7.12 1,359 8.97 56 7.88 2,229 7.95 
Ql - 2003 597 3.94 133 4.38 200 8.23 652 4.31 34 4.78 1,616 5.77 
Q2-2003 780 5.15 243 7.99 174 7.16 1,869 12.34 40 5.63 3,106 11.08 
Q3-2003 601 3.97 211 6.94 212 8.72 2,382 15.73 39 5.49 2,633 9.40 
Q4 - 2003 591 3.90 196 6.45 197 8.10 3,252 21.47 25 3.52 4,261 15.20 
Sub-Total 6,698 100.00 3,040 100.00 2,431 100.00 15,145 100.00 711 100.00 28,025 100.00 
Percent of 
Total 23.90% 10.45% 8.67% 54.04% 2.54% 100.00% 
_ .. 
The quarterly analysis illustrates a variety of interesting frequency observations. Bugs remains fairly consistent in 2000 then begins to 
decrease in Q4 of 200 1, consistent once again throughout 2001 with a noticeable ongoing increase through the end of the study period. 
Exploit Scripts has a similar frequency as seen in the prior yearly analysis where the highest reported cases are in 2000. Viruses 
exhibit an increase in 2002 and forward. The reporting of Trojans on a quarterly basis indicates that the largest frequencies occur in 
12 
the second two quarters of each study year. Finally, the quarterly Trends frequency is consistent with the yearly frequencies discussed 
m the previous sub-section. 
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4.3 Bugs, Holes and Patches 
The first section of the CyberNotes newsletters provides detailed infonnation about the 
weaknesses identified in different types of computer software and infonnation technologies. 
4.3.1 Yearly and Quarterly Frequency Distributions 
The volume of software weaknesses has increased each year, as evidenced by the data in the 
following table. 
Table 4.5 - Bugs, Holes and Patches by Year: 2000-2003 
Cumulative 
Year Frequency Percentage Percentage 
2000 1,049 15.66% 15.66% 
2001 1,114 16.64 32.30 
2002 1,965 29.33 61.63 
2003 2,589 38.66 100.00% 
Total 6,698 100.00% 
While this yearly infonnation indicates a general increase in the trend of Bugs, Holes and 
Patches, further analysis on a quarterly basis was more revealing. Therefore, the researcher 
developed a more detailed frequency distribution. In Table 4.6 below, the total quarterly 
frequency distribution of Bugs, Holes and Patches is illustrated. From this presentation, we can 
see that there is a regular and continuous increase in the total number of Bugs, Holes and Patches 
items reported by the NIPC. The only exception to this trend is Q 1 - 2002; where there was a 
decline in the number of reported items. It is interesting to note, that at this time the NIPC was 
being re-organised into one of the four directorates of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). As part of the communication process with NIPCIDHS personnel, the researcher 
presented a fonnal briefing in the summer of 2005. This opportunity provided necessary 
feedback, suggestions and other comments from the data owners. After these meetings. further 
analysis and commentary was incorporated into Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
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Table 4.6 - Bugs, Holes and Patches: Types of Information Reported - Frequency 
Distribution by Quarter: 2000-2003 
New Items Updated Items Total 
Study Period Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. Freg. Percent. 
Ql - 2000 217 3.65% 13 1.72% 230 3.43% 
Q2-2000 228 3.84 9 1.19 237 3.54 
Q3 - 2000 282 4.75 14 1.85 296 4.42 
Q4 - 2000 270 4.55 16 2.11 286 4.27 
Ql - 2001 259 4.36 13 1.72 272 4.06 
02 - 2001 285 4.80 10 1.32 296 4.42 
03 - 2001 323 5.44 5 0.66 325 4.85 
04 - 2001 217 3.65 2 0.26 221 3.30 
01 - 2002 406 6.84 49 6.46 455 6.79 
02 - 2002 430 7.24 35 4.62 465 6.94 
03 - 2002 461 7.76 66 8.71 526 7.85 
Q4 - 2002 434 7.31 85 11.21 519 7.75 
Ql - 2003 517 8.71 80 10.55 597 8.91 
Q2 - 2003 632 10.64 148 19.53 780 11.65 
Q3 - 2003 509 8.57 92 12.14 601 8.97 
04 - 2003 468 7.88 123 16.23 591 8.82 
Total 5,938 88.650/0 758 11.35% 6,698 100.00% 
Based on the above frequency distribution, it appears that three major conclusions can be drawn. 
First, there is an overall increasing trend to the Bugs, Holes and Patches over the time period. 
Second, the number of updated items is increasing over time. According to NIPC personnel, this 
is related to two underlying factors: improved relationships with vendors and other security 
organisations (i.e. CERT, research laboratories etc.) and the fact that major vendors have worked 
to improve the speed at which they produce patches, 'hotfixes', other upgrade solutions and tools 
for systems administrators and network managers. 
4.3.2 Risk Levels 
This area of the study examines the different risk levels of the Bugs, Holes and Patches. The 
researcher used the risk classifications detailed by the NIPC and was able to generate frequency 
analysis of these items, as shown on the following table. 
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Table 4.7 - Bugs, Holes and Patches: Risk Rating Frequency Distribution by Quarter: 2000-2003 
Hig!l_ Medium Low All Other Total 
Study Period Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. 
Ql - 2000 122 4.50% 45 2.13% 56 5.19% 7 0.89% 230 3.44% 
Q2 -2000 94 3.47 73 3.45 51 4.73 19 2.41 237 3.54 
Q3 -2000 127 4.68 90 4.25 54 5.00 25 3.18 296 4.42 
04-2000 119 4.39 105 4.96 49 4.54 13 1.65 286 4.27 
Ql - 2001 114 4.20 84 3.97 54 5.00 19 2.41 271 4.05 
Q2 - 2001 116 4.28 106 5.01 50 4.63 24 3.05 296 4.42 
Q3-2001 134 4.94 127 6.00 40 3.71 25 3.18 326 4.87 
Q4 - 2001 81 2.99 87 4.11 39 3.61 12 1.52 219 3.27 
Ql - 2002 173 6.38 169 7.98 77 7.14 36 4.57 455 6.80 
Q2-2002 188 6.93 168 7.94 61 5.65 48 6.10 465 6.95 
Q3 - 2002 206 7.60 158 7.46 85 7.88 78 9.91 527 7.87 
Q4 - 2002 188 6.93 172 8.12 76 7.04 83 10.55 519 7.75 
Ql - 2003 241 8.89 175 8.27 75 6.95 106 13.47 597 8.92 
Q2-2003 300 11.06 233 11.01 120 11.12 127 16.14 780 11.65 
Q3-2003 255 9.40 169 7.98 98 9.08 78 9.91 600 8.96 
Q4 - 2003 254 9.37 156 7.37 94 8.71 87 11.05 591 8.83 
Total 2,712 100.00% 2,117 100.00% 1,079 100.00% 787 100.00% 6,698 100.00% 
Percent of Total 40.50% 31.62% 16.12% 
-
'----___ 11.76% ___ 100.00% 
--- --
----_.-
-
-_.-
--
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From the above table, nearly half or 40.50% of the reported items are high risk. 31.62% are 
medium risk, 16.12% are low risk, and 11.76% relate to other items. This was accomplished by 
grouping the detailed classification into the higher classification category of the original items. 
For instance, items with a risk classification of HighlMedium, in the summary tabulation this 
group were classified as high. Similarly, items given a LowlMedium risk rating were grouped 
into the Medium category for this analysis. 
Although all related threats are considered by the NIPC's Watch and Warning Unit when 
developing their information, the majority of information in this section is related to computer 
software. 
The next sub-section discusses the types of vulnerabilities within Bugs, Holes and Patches. This 
is a critical area since it describes the specific flaw/weakness identified by the NIPC. 
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Table 4.8 - Bugs, Holes and Patches: Top Vulnerabilities in Rank Order: 2000-2003 
Vulnerability Ranking 
Buffer Overflow 1 
Denial of Service 2 
Multiple Vulnerabilities 3 
General Security 4 
Password 5 
Unauthorised Access 6 
Remote Access 7 
Directory Transversal 8 
Race Condition 9 
Web Server - lIS 10 
Root Access 11 
E-Mail 12 
Format String 13 
As discussed in Chapter Two, buffer overflows causes memory processing errors where by an 
extra portion of programming code is running such that the program results in the program 
extending beyond its pre-defined buffers. Denial of service is a vulnerability where the 
organization's IT systems are flooded with packets and unable to process transactions. Multiple 
vulnerabilities is an inclusive category for two or more vulnerabilities existing within the same 
Issue. 
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Table 4.9 - Bugs, Holes and Patches: Attack Code Summary in Rank Order: 2000-2003 
Attack Code Category Ranking Frequency Percentage 
Bug Discussed in Newsgroup and Web 1 2,538 37.90% 
Site; Exploit Script Has Been 
Published 
Bug Discussed in Newsgroup; Exploit 2 2,113 31.60 
Has Not Been Published 
Bug Discussed in Newsgroup and Web 3 1,119 16.70 
Site; No Exploit Required 
Bug Discussed in Newsgroup and Web 4 346 5.20 
Site; Exploit Has Been Published 
Bug Discussed in Newsgroup and Web 5 309 4.60 
Site; Common Software Tools 
Required to Execute 
Bug Discussed in Newsgroup and Web 6 208 3.10 
Site, Vulnerability Appeared in Press 
Subtotal 6,633 99.03% 
All Others 65 0.07 
Grand Total 6,698 100.00% 
From this analysis, the main three types of information about attack codes are apparent. Firstly, 
the majority of Bugs are discussed in Newsgroups and/or Web Sites. This is important because 
it signifies that this information is accessible particularly to FBI personnel in the Watch and 
Warning Section of the NIPC. Secondly, approximately 47% of the attack codes have no exploit 
script published or required which in turn makes the Bug more likely to be exploited. This is 
because the Bug is known, but only in some cases is the attack method used to compromise the 
vulnerability easily available (e.g. web sharing or otherwise). Lastly, this area is to be 
considered in the last chapter as a suggestion for future research. 
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Table 4.10 - Bugs, Holes and Patches: Workaround Availability High Level Classification Ranking: 2000-2003 
Workaround Category Ranking Frequency Percentage 
No Work around Known at Publishing 1 2,821 42.10% 
Upgrade Available - Specific URL Provided 2 1,897 28.30 
Patch Available - Specific URL Provided 3 1,159 17.30 
Subtotal 5,877 87.74% 
All Others 821 12.26 
_Total ___ 6,698 100.00% 
--- - - -- - --
-_.-
-- --
From this analysis it was determined that 42.10% of the Bugs have no workaround known at the time of the CyberNotes newsletter 
being published. However, 45.60% of the workarounds are available when the newsletters are made available. Finally, another 
12.26% have been classified as all others. This is associated with the immediately previous sub-section since each Bug has both an 
attack code and the NIPC is able to recommend workarounds (e.g. countermeasures, fixes etc.) in this component of the newsletter for 
each reported item. The next section of descriptive statistics examines the vendor distribution for Bugs, Holes and Patches. 
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Table 4.10 - Bugs, Holes and Patches: Vendor Frequency Distribution - Top 20 Vendors: 2000-2003 
Vendor Name Ranking Frequency Percentage 
Microsoft 1 610 9.11% 
Multiple Vendors 2 267 3.99 
Rsoft 3 139 2.08 
Sun Microsystems 4 139 2.08 
Hewlett-Packard 5 104 1.55 
Cisco Systems 6 91 1.34 
Active State 7 90 1.34 
FreeBSD 8 76 1.13 
IBM 9 65 0.97 
Linux 10 64 0.97 
Redhat 11 50 0.75 
Oracle 12 49 0.73 
Netscape 13 44 0.66 
Novell 14 33 0.49 
Allaire 15 33 0.49 
SCO 16 31 0.46 I 
Trend Micro 17 29 0.43 I 
SuSe 18 28 0.42 I 
Apple 19 28 0.42 
Symantec 20 27 0.40 I 
Sub-Total 1,997 29.81% 
All Others 4,701 70.19 
! Grand Total 6,698 100.00% i ~ -
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This analysis provides evidence for two very interesting findings. First, it corroborates some 
of the publicly debated issues about Microsoft Corporation being a risk to U.S. national 
security since slightly more than nine percent of the total population of Bugs, Holes and 
Patches are associated with this company's products (Schnier Et. AI. 2003). The second 
major finding is that of the Top 20 Vendors only represent approximately 30% of all the 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, the remaining 70% of the reported Bugs, Holes and Patches are 
attributable to the remaining number of vendors which is documented to be 1,975 or an 
average of 2.38 items per vendor. In other words, while the Top 20 Vendors are 1 % of the 
entire vendor population they are responsible for 30% of the Bugs, Holes and Patch incidents. 
Likewise the remaining 990/0 of the vendors are accountable for 70% of these reported items. 
Additionally, the source of the information provided to the NIPC is also analysed. The next 
sub-section presents a frequency analysis of the information sources for Bugs, Holes and 
Patches. 
.,., 
_ .... 
Table 4.12 - Bugs, Holes and Patches: Top 20 Reference Information Sources: 2000-
2003 
Organisation Name Ranking Frequency 
Bugtraq 1 1,675 
Multiple 2 750 
Securiteam 3 722 
Securifocus 4 472 
Microsoft Security Bulletin 5 290 
Security Tracker 6 172 
No. 382 7 138 
Debian Security Advisory 8 128 
Hewlett-Packard Security Advisory 9 119 
Cisco Security Advisory 10 82 
FreeBSD Security Advisory 11 77 
iDefense Security Advisor OpenPKG 
Security Advisory 12 47 
RedHat Security Advisory 13 47 
No. 362 14 45 
eSecurity Online Free Vulnerability 15 45 
NTBugtraq 16 42 
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research 
Advisory 17 40 
SGI Security Advisor 18 38 
Georgi Guninski Security Advisory 19 37 
CER T Advisory 20 35 
Sub-Total 5,001 
All Others 1,697 
Grand Total 6,698 
Percentage 
25.01°'0 
11.20 
10.78 
7.05 
-+.33 
2.57 
2.06 
1.91 
1.78 
1.22 
1.15 
0.70 
0.70 
0.67 
0.67 
0.63 
0.60 
0.58 
0.55 
0.52 
74.66% 
25.34 
100.00% 
From this analysis is it clearly evident that a popular IT industry web site, Bugtraq is the most 
common source of Bug information followed by Multiple sources and Securiteam, respectively. 
In addition, the shear quantity of information sources is very large which can be considered as a 
complexity in the information gathering and verification function of the NIPC. 
Detailed graphs for the frequency distributions for this category of data have been developed and 
included in the following supplements: 
• Monthly Frequency Distribution Analysis: Bugs, Holes and Patches - Supplement 2 
• CN Issue Level Frequency Distribution Analysis: Bugs, Holes and Patches - Supplement 
2 
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4.4 Exploit Scripts 
From 2000-2003, a total of 3,040 Exploit Scripts items were reported by the NIPC. The next 
section describes the yearly and quarterly frequency distributions of this data. 
4.4.1 Yearly and Quarterly Frequency Distributions 
Both yearly and quarterly frequency distributions were calculated in order to analyse this portion 
of the data. Table 4.13 below summarises the frequencies of the Exploit Scripts on a yearly 
basis. 
Table 4.13 - Exploit Scripts Frequency Distribution by Year: 2000-2003 
Cumulative 
Year Frequency Percentage Percentage 
2000 1,108 36.40% 36.50% 
2001 532 17.60 54.00 
2002 617 20.30 74.30 
2003 783 25.70 100.00% 
Total 3,040 100.00% 
This has been further broken-down by quarterly period in Figure 4.1 below, as follows: 
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Figure 4.1 - Exploit Scripts Frequency Distribution by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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Ba ed on thi frequency distribution it i intere ting to note that the quarter with th h1 ... h l 
frequency is Q2 - 2000 with 331 items and the lowe t frequency of 66 item wa r p rt d III -l 
- 2001. Furthennore, the mean number of Exploit Scripts per quarter ha been calcul ted t b 
190. 
4.4.2 Types of Exploit Scripts 
Another frequency distribution to investigate about Exploit cript \ a th fil type. Thi 
important since it will provide a breakdown of the file exten ion \ hi h can b u eful III 
creening potential malicious files. This is illu trated in th Figure 4.2, blow: 
Figure 4.2 - Exploit Scripts - Most Common File Types: 2000-2003 
5% 
3% 
4% 
6% 3% 4% 
f pI jt ript ha eben cla ifi d into e en major cat gori 
most comm n p f ploit cript file a follow: C, Z/ IT, TX 
and II ther . Th foll \ mg 1 a bri f d ription f ach typ f 
\\\:bop din. m (, 
pr gr l11ming language fil 
Z I mpn.;~ t:d fil ar hi\ created b ZIP 
TX Te l fil 
. Th 
.c 
. Gz 
OTxt 
OZip 
. PI 
Sit 
. Opl 
OTgz 
. 1zip 
. 4 beta 3 
OOther 
rankmg fth\; 
, ZIP, T Z. PL. II 
pI it ripl fi Ie fr In 
ZIP - Compressed file archive created by PKZIP 
PL - PERL source code file 
SH - UNIX shell script 
While these types of files are interesting to make reference to, future related research 
opportunities are highlighted in Chapter six. 
4.4.3 Workaround Availability 
Another important study area of the Exploit Scripts data is the availability of remediation (e.g. 
workaround techniques). This is very important because it provides basic information to the 
Information Assurance community about the tools that are available to prevent and/or react to 
this type of attack. 
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Figure 4.3 - Exploit Scripts Workaround Availability: 2000-2003 
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This graph highlights three interesting findings. First, during 2000 and 2001 the number of 
Exploit Scripts without a workaround available greatly surpassed the Exploits Scripts with a 
workaround available. Second, during 2002 there was a greater abundance of workarounds 
available then for those Exploit Scripts without a workaround available. According to Mr. Vince 
Rowe of the NIPC, this might be due to the fact that software and hardware vendors began to 
respond to the vulnerabilities in a quicker period of time (e.g. by producing a workaround at the 
same time or nearly simultaneous to the Exploit Script being publicised). Third, the 2003 data 
indicates a return to the 2000-2001 trend; whereby the Exploit Scripts without workarounds are 
noticeably less than for those with a workaround available. In fact, 67% of the total population 
did not have a workaround available at time of publication and the remainder (only 33%) had 
workarounds available. Another interesting point is that for each quarter in the first three years 
of the study period there is a greater percentage of incidents with workarounds available. But, 
then beginning in Q 1-2002 and continuing through the end of 2002 there are more Exploit 
Scripts reported with workarounds available then for those without. 
4.4.4 Further Information 
Detailed graphs depicting the frequency distributions of the reported Exploit Scripts have also 
been developed. These have been included in the following supplements: 
o Monthly Frequency Distribution Analysis: Exploit Scripts - Supplement 2. 
o CN Issue Level Frequency Distribution Analysis: Exploit Scripts - Supplement 2. 
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4.5 Viruses 
During the study period a total of 2,431 virus cases were reported. The following sections 
provide yearly and quarterly frequency distribution information, as well as details about the types 
of viruses reported and the number of aliases associated with each virus. 
4.5.1 Yearly and Quarterly Frequency Distributions 
In order to develop some preliminary frequency distribution information, this information is first 
presented on a yearly basis in Table 4.14 below. 
Table 4.14 - Total Virus Cases by Year: 2000-2003 
Cumulative 
Year Frequency Percentage Percentage 
2000 427 17.60% 17.60% 
2001 461 19.00 36.60 
2002 760 31.20 77.80 
2003 783 32.20 100.00% 
Total 2,431 100.00% 
To subject this data to a more efficient analysis, the following figure details the virus frequency 
information on a quarterly basis. 
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Figu re 4.4 - Viruses Cases by Quarter: 2000-2003 
300 ~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------r 12 
250 I .a. -l 10 
1/1 
E 
~ 200 I / - \ ~ ~ ~ + 8 
"'0 
aI ... <11 t Ol r Frequency I 0 ,fI g. 150 6 c: <11 cr: 0 ~Percent 
-
~ , 
0 <11 a.. 
~ 
~ 100 4 
E 
:l 
Z 
50 I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12 
0 I - 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-" N W ~ -" N W ~ ........ N W ~ ........ N W ~ 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 -" ........ ........ ........ N N N N W W W w 
Study Quarter 
32 
4.5.2 Types of Viruses 
In addition to the preceding frequency analysis, a con olidated cla ificati n f 1h" mo t 
popular type of viru es reported was developed. This information i pr nt d in Figurt:: -t.: 
below: 
Figure 4.5 - Viruses Major Types Reported: 2000-2003 
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Thi analy i highlights the fact that the rno t common type of iru rclated to ritical 
infra tructure protection ranked in order of prc alence are: Win32 (34%), Word97 (20%), 
ther (17%) Vi uaJ Basic Script WOffi1 (11%), Intern t Wom1 (10%), Fil (5% and Worm 
(3%). The following i a general description of each of the major typ of iru e d cribed 
111 thi analy j obtained from a ariety of ource (Adapted from Webop dia, 2006 
B w rth and Kabay, 2002): 
1. Win3 - th 1ru file infect th WindO\ operating y tern, 
2. W rd97 - thi typ of lfU infl ct the Micro oft Word V r ion 97 file , 
3. th r - denot (appro imatel 22) type of 1ru e , 
4. Vi . unl Ba ic ript Worm - p cifically u e th i ual 8a ie ad\3n d 
pr gramming languag f atur to infect file with a rm, 
[nt met W rm - thi lru 1 a w nn fil that ha be n pe ifi all d ign d t 
p pulate and migrate vcr th Int met, 
6. ~ ile - Ihi t pc [viru inti t the main fil u d b th per, ling \ km n 3 
mputer, and 
7. rm thi . j. a general de ripti n heading [or \\ mlS . 
This type of infonnation is very useful to systems administrators and infonnation security 
officers who need to monitor their networks and understand the major types of viruses that 
might infect their systems. 
4.5.3 Further Information 
Detailed graphs depicting the frequency distributions of the viruses reported by the NIPC 
have also been developed and included in the following supplements: 
o Monthly Frequency Distribution Analysis of Viruses: Supplement 2. 
o eN Issue Level Frequency Distribution Analysis of Viruses: Supplement 2. 
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4.6 Trojans 
The Trojans section is the fourth category of data reported in the CyberNotes newsletters. In 
particular, the frequency distributions for yearly and quarterly periods are highlighted in the 
first sub-section. Lastly, the Trojans types and alias infonnation is presented. 
4.6.1 Yearly and Quarterly Frequency Distributions 
The first stage of analysis involved a yearly frequency distribution of all Trojans. Table 4.15 
below, provides the high-level yearly frequency distribution infonnation. 
Table 4.15 - Trojans Frequency Distribution by Year: 2000-2003 
Cumulative 
Year Frequency Percentage Percentage 
2000 1,187 7.84% 7.84% 
2001 3,007 19.85 25.69 
2002 2,821 18.63 44.32 
2003 8,160 53.88 100.00% 
Total 15,145 100.00% 
The above analysis indicates a dramatic rise in the number of Trojans from 2000 to 2001, and 
then a minor decrease from 2001 to 2002. This was then followed by a very large yearly 
increase of 289 percent from 2002 to 2003. 
35 
Figure 4.6 - Trojans Cases Frequency Distribution by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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From this analysis we can see that there is a regular and significant increase in the total 
number of reported Trojan cases; with one outlying yearly period of 2002. Another 
observation is that that the first quarter of each year contains the lowest number of reported 
cases, whereas the fourth quarter of each year reports the largest number of Trojans. 
An additional analysis was made in order to segregate the newly reported incidents from 
those items that were previously reported by the NIPC and then remained in future 
newsletters to re-emphasise the most popular types of Trojans. 
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Figure 4.7 - 1\'ew Versus Previously Reported Trojans by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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Another intere ting ob ervation from thi figure highlights the fact that the number of ne\\ 
Trojans is relatively mall: 130 in 2000,260 in 2001 324 in 2002 and 59 in 2003 . Thi an 1 -i 
a1 0 how that the vast majority of total items reported are a sociated with infonnati n that \Va 
di cu sed in earlier is ues of the CyberNotes publications including those from 1999 which i n t 
included in the researcher's data period. 
4.6.2 Types of Trojans 
This ection details the various types of Trojans reported by the NIPC. Figure 4. bel 
highlights the breakdown of this infonnation: 
Figure 4.8 - Major Types of Trojans: 2000-2003 
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rom thi analy i ,w can ee that the ast majority of Trojan are Backdoor at 35%. The 
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\: nl ,d r at 17%. Tog ther the e three categorie compn e 79% of the total Tr jan 
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allow the attacking party to obtain full administrator access to the computer and is a high leyel 
security risk. 
4.6.3 Aliases 
When Trojans have aliases it adds additional complexity to the tracking and reporting of these 
items. Table 4.16 below illustrates how many Trojans have reported aliases. 
Table 4.16 - Reported Trojan Aliases by Quarter: 2000-2003 
Yes No Total 
Study Period Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. 
01 - 2000 - 0.00% 90 0.62% 90 0.59% 
02 - 2000 - 0.00 275 1.89 275 1.82 
03 - 2000 7 1.25 364 2.50 371 2.45 
04 - 2000 24 4.29 427 2.93 451 2.98 
Ql - 2001 23 4.11 222 1.52 245 1.62 
Q2 - 2001 28 5.01 595 4.08 623 4.11 
Q3 - 2001 57 10.20 1,137 7.80 1,194 7.88 
Q4 - 2001 18 3.22 927 6.36 945 6.24 
Ql - 2002 14 2.50 151 1.04 165 1.09 
Q2 - 2002 18 3.22 378 2.59 396 2.61 
Q3 - 2002 54 9.66 847 5.81 901 5.95 
04 - 2002 60 10.73 1,299 8.91 1,359 8.97 
01 - 2003 74 13.24 578 3.96 652 4.31 
Q2 - 2003 64 11.45 1,805 12.38 1,869 12.34 
Q3 - 2003 55 9.84 2,327 15.95 2,382 15.73 
Q4 - 2003 63 11.27 3,189 21.86 3,252 21.47 
Totals 559 14,585 15,144 
Percent of Total 3.69% 96.31% 100.00% 
This frequency distribution indicates that the NIPC began to identify aliases for Trojans in the 
third quarter of 2000. From that point forward, the percentage of Trojans aliases remained very 
small at less than four percent of total over the entire period from 2000 to 2002. We can also see 
from this presentation that 96.31 % all reported Trojans have no alias and the remaining 3.69% 
have aliases. 
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Further analysis indicates that one primary Trojan can have a multiple number of aliases. This is 
illustrated on a quarterly basis in Figure 4.9 below: 
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Figure 4.9 - Number of Trojan Aliases by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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Finally, from the composite listing of Trojans with aliases 46.00% have just one alias, 26.64% 
have two aliases, 15.99% have three aliases, and 11.37% have four or more aliases. 
4.6.4 Further Information 
Detailed graphs depicting the frequency distributions of the Trojans reported by the NIPC have 
also been developed and included in the following supplements: 
o Monthly Frequency Distribution Analysis: Trojans - Supplement 2. 
o CN Issue Level Frequency Distribution Analysis: Trojans - Supplement 2. 
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4.7 Trends 
The NIPC provides two specific types of trend infonnation in the CyberNotes newsletters. The 
two specific types of trends reported are: 1) Probes and Scans discuss these two types of specific 
network security threats and 2) Other Items which are more diverse and cover a variety of other 
(e.g. more general) infonnation assurance observations made by government analysts during the 
bi-weekly reporting period. 
4.7.1 Yearly and Quarterly Frequency Distributions 
The frequency distributions for Trends were developed on both a yearly and quarterly basis. 
First, Table 4.17 provides a general frequency distribution of all trend infonnation on a yearly 
basis below. 
Table 4.17 - Frequency Distribution of All Trends Information by Year: 2000-2003 
Probes and Scans Other Items 
Cumulative Cumulative 
Year Frequency Percentage Percentage Frequency Percentage Percentage 
2000 129 68.98% 68.98% 131 25.00% 25.00% 
2001 43 23.00 92.98 127 24.24 49.24 
2002 15 8.02 100.00% 128 24.24 73.48 
2003 - 0.00 138 26.52 100.00% 
Totals 187 100.00% 524 100.00% 
From this frequency analysis we can see that the number of Probes and Scans decreased 
dramatically from 2000 to 2001 and each year thereafter. In contrast, the Other Items remain 
very consistent throughout the study period. 
While the NIPC segregated this infonnation into two categories from 2000 through 2002, there 
was a change in reporting fonnat beginning in 2003. At that time, the separation of probes and 
other infonnation was eliminated and all infonnation need to be considered as Other. For the 
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purposes of further evaluating this infonnation on a quarterly basis the researcher generated a 
quarterly frequency distribution which is shown below in Figure 4.10: 
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Based on the table above, the NIPC changed the reporting scheme for trend information in Q4 -
2002 by eliminating the Probes and Scans category. Prior to this, both Probes and Scans and 
Other items were reported and the respective frequencies are noted. 
4.7.2 Further Information 
Detailed graphs depicting the frequency distributions of Trends activity has been developed and 
included in the following supplements: 
o Monthly Frequency Distribution Analysis: Trends - Supplement 2. 
o CN Issue Level Frequency Distribution Analysis: Trends - Supplement 2. 
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4.8 Secondary Data Items 
Based on the detailed testing planned for Chapter Five, the researcher obtained a variety of data 
from secondary information sources. Wherever possible, U.S. government sources were utilised 
and all other cases the sources of information were public databases and websites. 
4.8.1 An Overview 
According to the research methodology outlined in Chapter Three; the related research questions 
require a series of secondary data elements was needed to test individual hypotheses. The 
secondary data has been segregated into five primary categories: 
1. Other NIPC information reports and disclosures; 
2. Macro-economic data; 
3. E-commerce data; 
4. Information technology data; and 
5. Political and military event information. 
Each of these sub-categories is addressed separately in the subsequent sub-sections hereto. 
4.8.2 Other NIPC Information Reports and Disclosures 
The NIPC also generated a variety of other information about Information Security during the 
study period. This type of information ranges from material on high-level threats to critical 
infrastructures and computer software and operating systems. 
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Table 4.18 - Other NIPC Information Reports by Year: 2000-2003 
Cumulative 
Year Frequency Percentage Percentage 
2000 40 31.50% 31.50% 
2001 55 43.31 74.81 
2002 19 14.96 89.77 
2003 13 10.23 100.00% 
Total 127 100.00% 
This has been further broken down on a quarterly basis by each type of other NIPC information 
in the following table: 
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Table 4.19 - Other NIPC Information Reports Frequency Distribution by Quarter: 2000-2003 
Study Alerts Advisories Assessments Info. Highlights Press Releases Total 
Period Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. Fre~. Percent. Freq. Percent. Freq. Percent. 
QI - 2000 - 0.00% I 2.22% - 0.00% - 0.00% - 0.00% 1 0.80% 
Q2 - 2000 8 50.00 6 13.33 2 12.50 - 0.00 3 13.04 19 16.66 
Q3 - 2000 1 6.25 1 2.22 4 25.00 - 0.00 2 8.70 8 7.00 
Q4 - 2000 - 0.00 5 11.11 4 25.00 - 0.00 3 13.04 12 10.52 
QI - 2001 - 0.00 4 8.88 1 6.25 3 21.43 8 34.78 16 14.04 
Q2 - 2001 I 6.25 6 13.33 - 0.00 3 21.43 - 0.00 10 8.77 
Q3 - 2001 1 6.25 5 11.11 2 12.50 2 14.29 7 30.43 17 14.91 
Q4 - 2001 2 12.50 6 13.33 1 6.25 3 21.43 - 0.00 12 10.52 
Ql - 2002 I 6.25 2 4.44 - 0.00 1 7.14 - 0.00 4 3.51 
Q2 - 2002 I 6.25 5 11.11 - 0.00 2 14.29 - 0.00 8 7.00 
Q3 - 2002 I 6.25 2 4.44 2 12.50 - 0.00 - 0.00 5 4.39 
Q4 - 2002 - 0.00 2 4.44 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 2 1.75 
Ql - 2003 - 0.00 2 4.44 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 2 1.75 
Q2 - 2003 - 0.00 5 11.11 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 5 4.39 
Q3 - 2003 - 0.00 2 4.44 2 12.50 - 0.00 - 0.00 4 3.51 
Q4 - 2003 - 0.00 2 4.44 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 2 1.75 
Total 16 100.00% 45 100.00% 16 100.00% 14 100.00% 23 20.75% 114 100.00% 
Percentage 
of Total 14.04% 39.47% 14.04% 12.28% 20.75% 100.00% , 
----------
The table below indicates that the Advisories are the most common type of Other NIPC Information. This is followed in rank order by 
Press Releases, Alerts, Assessments, and Information Highlights. For each category it is noteworthy that the first occurrence of such 
information is as follows: Alerts in Q2 - 2000, Advisories in Q 1 - 2000, Assessments in Q2 - 2000, Information Highlights in Q 1 
200 I and Press Releases in Q I - 2000. 
50 
, 
4.8.3 Macro-Economic Data 
Macro-economic data has been obtained from u.s. government databases to test specific 
research questions previously stated in Chapter Three. This information is further broken down 
into five sub-categories: 
1. Stock market indices; 
2. Interest rates; 
3. Inflation rates and consumer pricing; 
4. Unemployment; and 
5. Gross domestic product. 
The following sub-sections present analyses of each of the individual categories detailed above. 
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Figure 4.12 - Major U.S. Stock Market Indexes by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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This information shows the rising value of the NASDAQ Composite Index from Q 1 - 2000 to 
Q3 - 2000 and a significant decline beginning immediately thereafter. 
There are two major types of interest rates in the field of consumer finance in the USA. These 
are the Prime Interest Rate and the Federal Funds Rate; both of which are plotted on the 
subsequent figure. 
53 
Figure 4.13 - Major U.S. Interest Rate Percentages by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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From this analysis, the two major U.S. interest rates declined over the study period. In fact, they 
reached a 40-year low point in Q4 - 2003; this measure was part of the President's economic 
package to stimulate growth and hold off inflation. 
The next category of macro-economic data incorporates Inflation and the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). 
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Figure 4.14 - U.S. Inflation Rate and Consumer Price Index by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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From the analysis above, the researcher is able to make two major observations. First. the 
inflation rate declined significantly from Ql -2000 (at nearly 4%) to just above 1% in QI -
2002. Only then to rise throughout 2002 and then decline once again in 2003. Second, the CPI 
rose marginally throughout the study period with a total increase of approximately ten percent. 
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Figure 4.15 - U.S. GDP and Unemployment by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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As we can see from the above figure, u.s. GDP remained flat during the first eight quarters and 
then began to increase in QI - 2001. This continued through Q4 - 2001 after which time it 
remained fairly constant through Q4 - 2003 subject to minor fluctuations. The Unemployment 
Rate grew marginally throughout the study period closing at 6.375% at the end of 2003. 
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4.8.4 E-Commerce Data 
E-commerce has changed the way businesses and individuals do business in the last part of the 
20th century. Today, we continue to see new consumer and business buying habits, many of 
which are greatly influenced by the technological tools and systems that emerge. This section 
provides infonnation about the E-Commerce data. 
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Figure 4.16 - United States E-Commerce Figures by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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From this analysis we can see that E-Commerce continues to evolve as an acceptable business 
model for both corporate entities and individual consumers. Yet, the vast majority of E-
Commerce transactions remain to be Business-to-Business. This is further emphasised in the 
next figure that shows the percentage of sales attributable to E-Commerce during 2000-2003. 
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Figure 4.17 - U.S. E-Commerce as a Percent of Total Sales by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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Based on the analysis above we can see that E-commerce as a percent of total sales in the U.S. is 
increasing at a steady rate, nearly doubling from QI - 2000 to Q4 - 2003. 
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4.8.5 Information Technology Data 
Various types of information technologies are used today in order to access and store data on the 
Internet. This includes personal computers, telephone lines and mobile devices (i.e. phones and 
personal digital assistants). 
For this section, three sub-categories were established in order to effective organise the research 
testing: 
1. U.S. Internet utilisation; 
2. U.S. telephony utilisation; and 
3. U.S. host and personal computers 
The first sub-category provides utilisation information about U.S. and worldwide Internet usage 
during the study period. As expected, all related figures point to a growing use of the Internet. 
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Figure 4.18 - U.S. Internet Utilisation by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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From thi s ana lysis , we can see that the number of Internet Users in the U.S . continues to grow throughout the study period. The next 
fi gure illustrates the overall use of telephone access in the United States. 
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Figure 4.19 - U.S. Telephony Utilisation by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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The figure above shows a relatively equal increase in the utili sation of both land lines and cellular lines during 2000 through 2003. 
67 
Figure 4.20 - Total Global WWW Pages and U.S. Host Computers by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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During 2000 through 2003, the number of total global web pages and the number of U.S. Host Computers continued to ri se. The most 
notIceable increase in the number of U.S. Host Computers is between Q4 2000 and QJ - 200], perhaps this is due to the Millennium 
Bug. 
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The following figure details wireless and Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) user frequencies 
during the course of the research study period. 
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Figure 4.21 - U.S. Wireless and PDA Users by Quarter: 2000-2003 
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' ~hc abo\ e figure provides evidence about two items . First, it shows that users in the U.S. have quickly adoptcd the usc of PDAs since thc end or 
_001 Second, the samc group of consumers have also adopted wireless devices, but at a less dramatic rate of increase. J lowevcr, the overa ll 
II1Crca ... e during the study pcriod is still significant. 
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4.8.6 Political and Military Event Information 
In order to develop sufficient material to test research question number three, the researcher 
developed a collection of political and military event information. This was done in 
consultation with colleagues in the fields of media studies and government relations at 
Towson University. 
Quite obviously, the major political and military event of this period was the terrorist attacks 
against the United States on the 11 th of September 2001. 
Table 4.20 - Major National U.S. Political Events and Crises: 2000-2003 
Brief Description Time Period 
Presidential Election 4 November 2000 
Major Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. II September 2001 
Energy Crisis in California and Other Western States July thru August 2002 
Severe Winter Weather Conditions January 2003 
Northeast Blackout 14 August 2003 
While this category is subjective in nature; it nevertheless provides a basis for further study in 
Chapter Five. All of the related limitations and applicable assumptions have been previously 
discussed by the researcher in Chapters One and Three. 
According to the U.S. Constitution, the electoral process to select a President is held once 
every four years. The only national election held during the research study was on 4 
November 2000. Under scrutiny of various ballots cast in different states, and legal 
challenges which were taken to the U.S. Supreme Court; George Bush of the Republican 
Party defeated Albert Gore, Jr. of the Democratic Party. 
The historic terrorist attacks on 11 th of September 2001 will be discussed in the history books 
for future generations to study. It involved a series of four airline incidents that targeted the 
World Tradc Centre in New York City and the capitol, Washington, D.C. The nation was 
severely traumatised from this event and various states of emergency were declared on the 
federal. state and local levels. The nation witnessed a shocking event. much like the previous 
generation did when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1967. 
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The other category of events that was used in this study relates to military events and 
conflicts. This period of time has been very challenging for the U.S. President, George W. 
Bush. In particular, the war on terrorism and major, active conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have caused considerably heighten fears of additional, major terrorist incidents including 
biological, nuclear, chemical and infonnation warfare attacks. Table 4.21 below highlights 
the major U.S. military events and conflicts that occurred during the research study. 
Table 4.21 - U.S. Military Events and Conflicts: 2000-2003 
Military Event Time Period 
U.S.S. Cole Bombing 12 October 2000 
Invasion of Afghanistan 7 October 2001 through 31 December 2003 
War on Terrorism - Iraq Conflict 20 March 2003 through 31 December 2003 
Liberia Peacekeeping Mission 11 August through 30 September 2003 
On 12 October 2000, the U.S.S. Cole battleship was bombed by terrorists while in docked in 
Yemen. A small, high speed boat loaded with explosives rammed into the side of this ship 
causing fourteen fatalities and extensive damage. This incident sensitised U.S. military 
divisions to the need for increased maritime security measures at home and overseas. It also 
signalled a 'wake-up call' about the global threat of terrorist groups and their sympathisers. 
The U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan began in October 2001 to attack the ruling Taliban and 
to begin a massive manhunt for the leaders of Al Queda, especially Osama bin Laden. This 
conflict was apparent for some time, but was more pressing due to political fallout after the 
September 11 th terrorist attacks. Today, the U.S. maintains a leadership position in this war 
theatre where it is assisted by British and other coalition forces. 
During this period of time there has been a growmg threat portfolio against the U.S. 
government. This is true for U.S. interests both domestically and internationally. After the 
September 11th attacks, the world is a markedly changed society. The current U.S. President. 
George W. Bush, has positioned the U.S. as something akin to a global police force; which 
has often brought national and international criticism to these events. Also. this position 
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Increases the risks to U.S. military, intelligence, law enforcement and emergency 
preparedness agencies. They remain at various levels of alert as related information warrants. 
According to the U.S. State Department, the government responded to increased international 
pressure to maintain peace in the African country of Liberia in August of 2003. President 
Taylor resigned his post and departed into exile in Nigeria. This move paved the way for the 
deployment by Economic Committee of Western African States (ECOW AS) of what became 
a 3,600-strong peacekeeping mission in Liberia. Since then, the United States has provided 
limited direct military support and $26 million in logistical assistance to ECOMIL and 
another $40 million in humanitarian assistance to Liberia (U.S. State Department, 2003). 
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4.9 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, a detailed analysis has been made of all descriptin:- statistics for thi~ study. 
This included analyses of the five categories of primary data included in the Cyber~otes 
newsletters and the four categories of secondary data obtained by the researcher. The 
summary analysis of each data set included frequency distributions on a yearly and quarterly 
basis. Additional analyses on both a month and issue level are presented in a series of 
supplements. 
The results of the descriptive statistical analysis indicated that there is sufficient data to 
develop and test the detailed statistics in Chapter Five. These various descriptive analyses 
have provided a variety of interesting observations. First, is the on~rall increasing trend 
within each category of the CyberNotes. Second. within each of these groups a variety of 
generalisations as to the: frequency, types, names, risk levels, reporting sources, dates and 
other information has been highlighted. Third, the secondary data set shO\\ed a variety of 
general economic and IT trends, as well as a summary of the key U.S. political and military 
events from January 2000 through December 2003. 
In ('hapter Five. the above findings will be elaborated upon in order to completely test each 
of the hypotheses developed in the Chapter Three. This will allow the researcher to make 
specific testing of the quantitative analysis that was described in this chapter. After which the 
researcher will be able to provide some conclusions about the research project. 
74 
75 
Chapter Five - Hypothesis Testing 
5.1 An Introduction 
This section builds on the descriptive statistical analysis presented in Chapter Four. It b\?gins 
with a detailed analysis of the research findings which are then be described in detail in ord\?f 
to statistically validate the research questions developed specifically for this project. 
This section discusses the parametric and non-parametric tests perform cd by the researchcr to 
identify, explore and analyse the potential linear relationships between the fiyc primary 
variables (e.g. included as categories) in the CyberNotes: I) Bugs. 2) \'irus\?s, 3) Trojans, .f) 
Exploit Scripts, and 5) Probes/Scans and a variety of secondary variables from non-
CyberNotes sources. 
All of this work was necessary in order to perform the hypothesis testing outlined in an 
earlier chapter. Some of these variables include: general computer bugs from NIST and 
CERT/CC and computer viruses found in the wild (e.g. public domain). Additional variables 
included items for: Internet utilisation, electronic commerce, CPI, GOP and other macro-
economic factors. 
Finally, for the military and political events that occurred during the study pcriod this 
information was obtained from various sources. These major events \\ere discussed 
prc\iously in an Chapters Two and Four. 
5.2 Statistical Tests Performed 
In order to conduct detailed statistical testing the researcher conformed to the assumption~ 
outlined in Chapter Three. Specifically, these are: (l) the primary data is accurate since it 
comes from a large U.S. government agency with a vested interest in supporting the research 
study; (2) secondary data was similarly accurate since these sources were from other L .S. 
government agencies and well-respected organisations. and (3) the primary data set 
represents a complete census evaluation for the study period. 
The first major area of testing involved correlation coefficients. The Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients, a well known and highly accepted parametric test and the Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficients which is a standard non-parametric test were the basic tools for 
cvaluating scven of the nine hypotheses. Specifically, this testing \\as pcrfonned on 
Hypotheses One through Seven; which, in tum allowed the researcher to explore potential 
linear relationships between various variables. Throughout this phase of the hypothesis 
testing, a five percent significance level (e.g. Type I Error Rate) was used consistently as the 
statistical premise throughout the study. These tests were made using the SAS l' and SPSS (' 
software packages; Version 9 and 13 respectively. 
The second major testing area involved an event window analysis. This series of testing was 
carried out on Ilypotheses Eight and Nine. and Vias done using the popular MS-Excel(' 
software package and its standard mathematical formulas! functions. Specifically, these 
parameters included the: 
I) Mean; 
2) Variance; 
J) Standard Deviation; 
--l) Minimum; and 
5) Maximum. 
It is critical to rl'-state that this exploratory research project imohes a complete four year 
(e.g. 2000 through 2003) population of NIPC data. Most importantly, this approach allowed 
for a compklL' census testing from which absolute mathematical figures were calculated. 
Finally, these tests were perfonned on Hypothesis Eight and Nine using a standard event 
window methodology. For one time events, the event window is defined as the month of the 
event plus and minus one month. This was necessary for two significant reasons. First. the 
inclusion of the preceding month was necessary in order to properly account for any 
infonnation leakage related to the event. Second, the subsequent month was included to 
capture any lag in reaction time. Additionally, for those events that were ongoing during the 
study period the data in its totality is presented. 
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5.3 Hypothesis Testing 
This section outlines the nine specific hypotheses that were tested. Furthennore, this section 
presents the individual hypotheses, detailed testing analysis of each hypothesis and respective 
conclusions. The level of hypothesis testing confonns to the overall approach that the 
researcher outlined and received approval for this project. 
HI: There is a defined correlation between the new 'critical' software bugs detailed in the 
NIPC's CyberNotes newsletters and the general number of new software bugs identified by 
the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Centre (CERT/CC) and the 
U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
Table 5.1- Software Bugs Correlation Analysis 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
CERT/CC BUGS NIST BUGS 
BUGS 0.2499 0.0685 
p = 0.0868 p = 0.6435 
Panel B: Speannan Rank Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
CERT/CC BUGS NISTBUGS 
BUGS 0.3222 0.0314 
p = 0.0256 p = 0.8320 
In the Pearson Correlation and Speannan Rank Correlation coefficients, it is observed that the 
critical software bugs infonnation communicated by the National Infrastructure Protection 
Centre is weakly and positively correlated to the general software bug infonnation published 
by the CERT/CC. While neither of the relationships are statistically significant. only the 
correlation between the CERT bugs variable is approaching significance p = 0.0868 for the 
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Pearson Correlation Coefficient and p = 0.0256 for the Speannan Rank Correlation 
Coefficient. These results suggested a need for further testing. 
Therefore, the researcher executed a Shapiro Wilk Goodness of Fit Test to test the nonnalcy 
of the data. The result of this test was a w = 0.9397 and a p-value = 0.0157 which signifies 
that the data is not nonnally distributed. Therefore, the non-parametric test (e.g. Speannan) 
is most relevant, and it is concluded that there is no association with the NIST software bugs. 
In summary, the results of the first hypothesis are that the new 'critical' software bugs are 
correlated to the CERT/CC Bugs and there is no association of these same bugs to the NlST 
software bugs. 
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H2: There is a defined correlation between the number of critical computer viruses detailed in 
the NIPC's CyberNotes newsletters and the general number of computer viruses found 'in the 
wild' . 
Table 5.2 - Computer Viruses Correlation Analysis 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
VIRUSES 
IN THE 
WILD 
VIRUSES 0.1082 
p = 0.4643 
Panel B: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
VIRUSES 
IN THE 
WILD 
VIRUSES 0.0549 
p = 0.7108 
For this correlation, no linear relationship is observed. This is counter-intuitive to the 
researcher's practical experience it is noted that both statistical tests indicated that these 
relationships are not statistically significant. While this test looked to associate the general 
popUlation of computer viruses with the critical viruses reported by the NIPC, the hypothesis 
must be rejected. 
From the testing of the first two hypotheses, a reflection can be made on the critical reports of 
software bugs and computer viruses. Firstly, there is generally a weak, positive correlation 
between the new critical software bugs reported by the NIPC and the general software bugs 
reported by CERT/CC. Secondly, there is no relationship between the NIPC's new critical 
software bugs and NIST's general software bugs. Thirdly, the NIPC's reporting of critical 
computer viruses is not relatcd to the gencral popUlation of computer viruses. 
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H3: There is a positive correlation between the total number of U.S. Internet users and the 
critical cyber security infrastructure infonnation reported by the NIPC. 
Table 5.3 - U.S. Internet Users Correlation Analysis 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
U.S. U.S. 
INTERNET RESIDENTS 
USERS ONLINE 
BUGS 0.7798 0.8134 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.6426 0.6406 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.3539 -0.2441 
p = 0.0136 P = 0.0945 
TROJANS 0.7332 0.7813 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.8596 -0.8032 
p = <.0001 P =<.0001 
Panel B: Speannan Rank Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
U.S. U.S. 
INTERNET RESIDENTS 
USERS ONLINE 
BUGS 0.8322 0.8322 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.70566 0.70566 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.19230 -0.19230 
p = 0.1904 p = 0.1904 
TROJANS 0.75894 0.75894 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.92735 -0.92735 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
These secondary variables were obtained from two different sources as a means of variation. 
Specifically. the U.S. Internet Users figure is based on OECD reporting and the U.S. 
Residents Online figure is based on U.S. Department of Commerce statistics. When 
analysing the relationship between U.S. Internet Users and the number of U.S. Residents 
Online there is a variety of interesting observations that can be made. First. there is a strong. 
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positive relationship between both of these variables and the critical software bugs, viruses. 
and Trojans. For all three of these variables, the statistical significance is very strong. 
Second, the Exploit Scripts appear to be negatively correlated to the number of U.S. Internet 
Users and U.S. Residents Online. However, there are mixed results with the non-parametric 
and parametric tests performed. To further evaluate the potential correlation a Shapiro Wilk 
Goodness of Fit Test was performed. The results of this test were: a w = 0.9029 and p-value 
= 0.0008. Therefore, the dispersion of the data appears to be highly abnormal and it must be 
concluded that the relationship cannot be relied upon. 
Third, the Probes/Scans variable has a very strong, negative correlation with the number of 
U.S. Internet Users and U.S. Residents Online. Both tests indicate that this correlation is very 
statistically significant with a p-value = <.0001. 
In summary, Hypothesis Three is partially accepted by the researcher with the exception of 
Exploits. This data element has produced an intriguing set of interpretations and will be 
discussed later in this chapter as a potential area for future research. Nevertheless, there are a 
variety of implications of the results thus far. First, the more the Internet is used by 
individuals the greater the growth of various types of computer malware. Perhaps this is 
simply explained as a rudimentary method of network centric warfare where malevolent 
parties see the rich opportunities on the Information Superhighway. Another major 
implication is the need for users to increase their protective internal controls while they 
increase their use and reliance on Internet technologies. Individually and as a collective 
group of computer software applications: anti-virus, anti-spyware, anti-phi sing, patch 
management, automatic updates and other user tools are increasingly important. 
Hypothesis Four expands the testing to looks at a similar type of potential relationship 
between the NIPC primary data variables and a key U.S. Internet hardware statistic. In this 
case, the variable of U.S. host computers is used to perform similar correlation testing. 
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84: There is a positive correlation between the number of U.S. based Internet host computers 
and the cyber security critical infrastructure information reported by the NIPC. 
Table 5.4 - U.S. Based Internet Host Computers Correlation Analysis 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
U.S. BASED 
INTERNET 
HOST 
COMPUTERS 
BUGS 0.7742 
p = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.6452 
p = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.3766 
p = 0.0083 
TROJANS 0.7013 
p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.8682 
p = <.0001 
Panel B: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
U.S. BASED 
INTERNET 
HOST 
COMPUTERS 
BUGS 0.8322 
p = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.7057 
p = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.1923 
p = 0.1904 
TROJANS 0.7589 
p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.9274 
p = <.0001 
The number of U.S. based Internet host computers is found to have a strong, positive 
correlation with the NlPC's reporting of critical Bugs, Viruses and Trojans. Additionally. 
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there is a strong, negative correlation between the U.S. based Internet host computers and the 
Probes/Scans. For Exploit Scripts, there is no relationship. 
These results are similar to the researcher's fmdings for Hypothesis Three and the researcher 
must only partially accept this hypothesis. In terms of implications, this reinforces the 
presumption that Internet Hosts are a key variable when measuring Internet growth. 
Furthermore, this growth can be viewed as an expansion of the electronic battlefield for a 
variety of organised criminal and terrorist activities such as SP AM attacks, phishing schemes 
and Botnets. 
After follow-up discussions with vanous government security experts, they believe that 
Exploit Scripts have a lag time to reporting by the NIPC compared to the other types of 
information. This is because the Exploit Scripts generally take a considerably longer time to 
develop and execute. For instance, a Software Bug might be easy for an individual to 
identify because most software is shared with the user community through alpha and beta 
testing. This is in contrast to Exploit Scripts which are technically more intricate and 
complex as they look to generate a specific type of attack; often on a specific 
softwarelhardware or network configuration. 
The next hypothesis, another variable related to Internet utilisation is used to continue the 
testing of the relationship between cyber security critical infrastructure information and 
Global World Wide Web Pages. 
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US: There is a positive correlation between the number of global World Wide Web (WWW) 
pages and the cyber security critical infrastructure information reported by the NIPC. 
Table 5.5 - Global World Wide Web Pages Correlation Analysis 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
GLOBAL 
WWW 
PAGES 
BUGS 0.7624 
p = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.6335 
P = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.3849 
p = 0.0069 
TROJANS 0.7203 
p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.8735 
p = <.0001 
Panel B: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
GLOBAL 
WWW 
PAGES 
BUGS 0.8322 
p = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.7057 
p = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.1923 
p = 0.1904 
TROJANS 0.7589 
p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.9274 
P = <.0001 
Through the relationship between the Global WWW Pages and the NIPC critical security 
information there are a number of interesting observations. First, there is a strong, positive 
relationship between both of these variables and the critical software Bugs, Viruses. and 
Trojans. The statistical significance for all three of these variables is vcry strong. Also. 
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there is no linear relationship between the Exploit Scripts and the number of Global Web 
Pages. Third, the Probes/Scans variable has a very strong, negative correlation with the 
number of Global Web Pages. For this testing, both tests indicate that the results are very 
statistically significant with a p-value = <.0001. 
When examining the results of hypotheses three, four and five there is a high degree of 
concurrence between the NIPC security infonnation and the various Internet utilisation 
variables. All three of these hypotheses identify the same primary results, as follows: 
1. The critical Software Bugs, Viruses and Trojans reported by the NIPC have a very 
strong, positive and statistically significant correlation with the number of U.S. 
Internet Users, U.S. Residents Online, U.S. Based Internet Host Computers and 
Global Web Pages; 
2. Probes/Scans reported by the NIPC have a very strong, negative and statistically 
significant correlation with the number of U.S. Internet Users, U.S. Residents Online, 
U.S. Based Internet Host Computers and Global WWW Pages; and 
3. The Exploit Scripts reported by the NIPC have no relationship with any of these 
variables. 
In summary, Hypothesis Three through Five are partially accepted, subject to the detailed 
analysis presented above. 
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86: There is a positive correlation between the total value of U.S. Electronic Commerce 
transactions and the cyber security critical infrastructure infonnation reported by the NIPC. 
Table 5.6 - U.S. Electronic Commerce Correlation Analysis 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
U.S. B2B U.S. B2C Total U.S. 
E-Commerce E-Commerce E-Commerce 
BUGS 0.7415 0.8115 0.7246 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.56230 0.6346 0.5471 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.0427 -0.2329 -0.0575 
p = 0.7730 p = 0.1111 p = 0.6977 
TROJANS 0.9015 0.7974 0.8691 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.6242 -0.7983 -0.6180 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = <.0001 
Panel B: Speannan Rank Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
U.S. B2B U.S. B2C Total U.S. 
E-Commerce E-Commerce E-Commerce 
BUGS 0.8322 0.8322 0.8027 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.7057 0.7057 0.6701 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.1923 -0.1923 -0.2010 
p = 0.1904 p = 0.1904 p = 0.1707 
TROJANS 0.7589 0.7589 0.7095 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.9274 -0.9274 -0.9156 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
Based on this analysis, both of the statistical tests indicate that the NIPC critical security 
infonnation for Bugs, Viruses and Trojans is positively correlated with the three categories of 
U.S. Electronic Commerce transactions during the study period. In fact, this correlation is 
very statistically significant for all three of these variables. On the contrary, the Exploits 
have no relationship with any of the three associated variables. The Probes/Scans testing 
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shows that both of these variables are negatively correlated to the u.s. Electronic Commerce 
transaction volume values. These relationships are very statistically significant. 
Therefore, Hypothesis Six is partially accepted for Software Bugs, Viruses and Trojans. 
However, it is rejected for Exploits and Probes/Scans. 
It is important to address the implications of this correlation. With the growth of E-
Commerce comes an increase in the threats of Software Bugs, Computer Viruses, and 
Trojans. With our reliance on Information Technology we must develop an increased 
awareness and risk mitigation strategies about these different threats. Additionally, it is 
logical that modem criminals have found computer crimes to be very profitable with the 
Internet acting as an attractive platform to launch large scale/high impact criminal activities. 
This situation appears to be applicable to both individual consumers and business entities. 
Lastly, additional analyses of E-Commerce information systems and targeted malware attacks 
will be presented as suggestions for further research. 
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87: The NIPC's cyber security infonnation communications is positively associated with 
various macro-economic factors such as: major interest rates, stock market indices, Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation, and unemployment. 
This analysis is divided into two components. Part one contains two key interest rates and 
three stock market indices, as presented in Table 5.7 below. Part two contains four additional 
macro-economic variables for which the statistical testing is shown in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.7 - U.S. Macro-Economic Factor Correlation Analysis: Part One 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
u.s. U.S. S&P 500 DJIA NASDAQ 
PRIME FEDERAL 
INTEREST FUNDS 
RATE RATE 
BUGS -0.7060 -0.7025 -0.6676 -0.5774 -0.5492 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
VIRUSES -0.5622 -0.5591 -0.5826 -0.4773 -0.5261 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = 0.0006 p = 0.0001 
EXPLOITS 0.4220 0.4294 0.4431 0.2494 0.5892 
p = <0.0028 p = 0.0023 p = 0.0016 p = 0.0874 p = <.0001 
TROJANS -0.5945 -0.5933 -0.4605 -0.3099 -0.4073 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = 0.0010 p = 0.0321 p = 0.0041 
PROBESSCANS 0.8379 0.8407 0.8490 0.6305 0.8887 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
Panel B: Speannan Rank Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
U.S. U.S. S&P 500 DJIA NASDAQ 
PRIME FEDERAL 
INTEREST FUNDS 
RATE RATE 
BUGS -0.7862 -0.7842 -0.7227 -0.6190 -0.6214 
p - <.0001 P = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
VIRUSES -0.6649 -0.6790 -0.6254 -0.4880 -0.5666 
P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = 0.0004 p = <.0001 
EXPLOITS 0.2059 0.2163 0.2993 0.2710 0.3877 
p = 0.1603 p = 0.1398 p = 0.0388 p = 0.0624 p = 0.0065 
TROJANS -0.6740 -0.6525 -0.6001 -0.5366 -0.4980 
p = <0.0001 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = 0.0003 
PROBESSCANS 0.9078 0.9016 0.8656 0.7602 0.7633 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = <.0001 
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In this part of the testing, the results are mixed. Bugs, Viruses and Trojans have a strong. 
negative correlation that is highly statistically significant with the first four macroeconomic 
factors. Whereas, Exploits have a moderate, positive correlation that has various degrees of 
significance with the two interest rate variables and three stock market indices. Finally, the 
critical Probes/Scans have a strong, positive relationship with all interest rate and stock 
market index variables. 
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To continue this correlation testing further macroeconomic variable are used to expand this 
analysis. The second part of this section includes correlation analysis with four popular 
variables. This is shown in the following table as follows. 
Table 5.8 - U.S. Macro-Economic Factor Correlation Analysis: Part Two 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
u.s. u.s. U.S. u.s. 
CPI GDP INFLATION UNEMPLOYMENT 
BUGS 0.7809 0.7932 
-0.4654 0.7469 
P = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = 0.0009 p = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.6355 0.6388 -0.4948 0.5838 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = 0.0003 p = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.3089 -0.1909 0.3617 -0.3725 
p = 0.0327 p = 0.1937 p = 0.0115 p = 0.0091 
TROJANS 0.7422 0.8343 -0.3235 0.5880 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = 0.0249 p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.8394 -0.7636 0.5487 -0.8085 
P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
Panel B: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients (N=48) 
U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
CPI GDP INFLATION UNEMPLOYMENT 
BUGS 0.8234 0.8322 -0.4648 0.7893 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = 0.0009 p = <.0001 
VIRUSES 0.7012 0.7057 -0.4413 0.6241 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = 0.0017 P = <.0001 
EXPLOITS -0.1841 -0.1923 0.4325 -0.2100 
P = 0.2105 p = 0.1904 p = 0.0021 p = 0.1520 
TROJANS 0.7733 0.7589 -0.3296 0.6558 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = 0.0222 p = <.0001 
PROBESSCANS -0.9201 -0.9274 0.6051 -0.8684 
P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
The table above produced a variety of results. Bugs, Viruses and Trojans have a strong. 
positive correlation that is highly statistically significant with the U.S. Consumer Price Index. 
Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, and Unemployment variables. Exploits have no 
relationship with GDP. But the correlation with CPI, Inflation and Unemployment is 
negative and strong. Probes/Scans have a strong, positive relationship with the U.S. Inflation 
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Rate. However, this same variable has a strong, negative relationship with CPL GDP and 
Unemployment. 
In conclusion, Hypothesis Seven can only be partially accepted due to the positive correlation 
with most macroeconomic variables and Bugs, Viruses and Trojans. Exploit Scripts have 
mixed results, as does Probes/Scans. In terms of impact, this analysis demonstrates that the 
two most prevalent types of computer malware (e.g. Viruses and Trojans) are associated with 
changes in macroeconomic factors. Therefore, these factors should be considered in building 
predictive models in Information Assurance and Security. The other factors would be useful 
in considering for further research in the future. 
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The following table was developed in order to summarise the main correlation observations from Hypotheses Three through Seven. 
Table 5.9 - Summary of Testing Results for Hypothesis Three through Seven: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients 
Hypothesis/Dependent Variable BUGS VIRUSES EXPLOITS TROJANS PROBES/SCANS FINAL DISPOSITION 
Number Three 
U.S. Internet Users 0.8322 0.7057 -0.1923 0.7589 -0.9274 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 D = 0.1904 p = <.0001 p = <.0001 
U.S. Residents Online 0.8134 0.7057 -0.1923 0.7589 -0.92734 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 p = 0.1904 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
Number Four 
U.S. Based Internet Host Computers 0.8322 0.7057 -0.1923 0.7589 -0.9274 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P =0.1904 p = <.0001 p = <.0001 
Number Five 
Global Web Pages 0.8322 0.7057 -0.1923 0.7589 -0.9274 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
Number Six 
U.S. B2B E-Commerce 0.8322 0.7057 -0.1923 0.7589 -0.9274 Partially Accept • 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 p= <.0001 P = <.0001 
U.S. B2C E-Commerce 0.8322 0.7057 -0.1923 0.7589 -0.9274 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
U.S. Total E-Commerce 0.8207 0.6701 -0.2010 0.7095 -0.9156 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 P = 0.1707 p = <.0001 p= <.0001 
.Vumher Seven 
U.S. Prime Interest Rate -0.7862 -0.6649 0.2059 -0.6740 0.9078 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 P = 0.1603 P = <.0001 P = <.0001 
U.S. Federal Funds Interest Rate -0.7842 -0.6790 0.2163 -0.6525 0.9016 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 p = 0.1398 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
S&P 500 -0.7227 -0.6254 0.2993 -0.6001 0.X656 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 p = 0.0388 p= <.0001 P = <.0001 
Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.6190 -0.4880 0.2710 -0.5366 0.7602 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 p = 0.0004 p = 0.0624 p = <.0001 P = <.0001 
NASDAQ -0.6214 -0.5666 0.3877 -0.4980 0.7633 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 p = <.0001 p = 0.0065 p = 0.0003 p = <.0001 
U.S. Consumer Price Index 0.8234 0.7012 -0.1841 0.7733 -0.9201 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p = 0.2105 p = <.0001 p= <.0001 
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H~thesisIDependent Variable BUGS VIRUSES EXPLOITS TROJANS PROBES/SCANS FINAL DISPOSITION 
Number Three 
U.S. Gross Domestic Product 0.8322 0.7057 -0.1923 0.7589 -0.9274 Partially Accept 
p = <.0001 P = <.0001 p=0.1904 p= <.0001 P = <.0001 
U.S. Inflation Rate -0.4648 -0.4413 0.4325 -0.3296 0.6501 Partially Accept 
p=0.0009 p = 0.0017 p = 0.0021 p= 0.0222 p = <.0001 
U.S. Unemployment Rate 0.7893 0.6241 -0.2100 0.6558 -0.8684 Partially Accept 
<--
p = <.0001 P = ..::.OOOt p = 0.1520 . __ ....P~ <.0001 P = <.0001 
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U8: There is an increase in the number of critical computer security advisory 
communications of the NIPC during time periods of military events; specifically I) the attack 
on the USS Cole Battleship, 2) the War in Afghanistan, 3) September 11th Terrorist Attacks. 
4) U.S. Invasion of Iraq, and 5) U.S. Military Intervention in Liberia. 
After careful consideration, it was determined that an event window approach whereby the 
mean number of the NIPC reported information was reported instances in the event window 
was compared to the mean number of the NIPC reported information outside of the event 
window. This research methodology was discussed previously in Chapter Three. However. 
to re-emphasise some of the most important aspects of this approach it allows a researcher to 
identify, measure and compare basic statistical measurements before and after the event 
window. When using this approach two periods of time are segregated: the event window 
and the non-event window. Furthermore, the month in which the event occurs is included 
within the event window. For each event, the following parameters were calculated: 
1) Mean; 
2) Variance; 
3) Standard Deviation; 
4) Minimum; and 
5) Maximum 
In addition, some of these events were deemed to be ongoing military campaigns which 
continued through the entire data period. As such, inclusion for all subsequent months within 
the study period is made where considered appropriate. Furthermore, this is shown in 
chronological order within the study period. 
The first related military event was a terrorist attack on the USS Cole Battleship in the Port of 
Eden in Yemen which occurred in October 2000. 
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Table 5.10 - Statistical Analysis of the USS Cole Battleship Attack 
Total 
Total Bugs Total Viruses Total Exploits Total Trojans Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
N 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 
Mean 142.58 94.00 51.20 42.33 63.00 68.33 327.96 137.33 3.67 9.67 
Variance 3,835.09 100.67 426.20 13.56 883.20 38.89 90,344.84 122.89 21.42 16.22 
Standard Dev. 61.93 10.03 20.64 3.68 29.72 6.24 300.57 11.09 4.63 4.03 
Min 61 85 6 38 21 60 15 129 0 4 
Max 366 108 117 47 15o ___ ._ ~75 1,168 153 17 19 
- -------
Note: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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The results for the first military event shown in Table 5.10 above indicates that the Mean 
values for Bugs, Viruses, and Trojans are greater during the non-event window. For Exploits 
and Probes/Scans, the Mean values are larger in the event window than it is in the non-event 
window. For the Standard Deviation parameter, the testing indicates a larger dispersion of all 
five variables when they are in the non-event window as compared to the event window. 
The second military event in this study was the u.S. launched War in Afghanistan. This 
action was widely expected by global military analysts and politicians this event began in 
October 2000. The following table presents the event window analysis of this historic event. 
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Table 5.11 - Statistical Analysis of the War in Afghanistan 
Total Bugs Total Viruses Total Exploits Total Trojans Total Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
N 21 27 21 27 21 27 21 27 21 27 
Mean 92.57 176.07 37.86 60.59 74.95 54.30 154.71 441.52 8.05 0.93 
Variance 499.48 3,209.77 127.07 359.06 1,081.28 451.62 1,3315.16 10,803.00 22.14 1.85 I 
Standard Dev. 22.35 56.65 11.27 19.87 32.88 21.25 115.39 328.68 4.71 1.36 
Min 61 68 6 26 32 21 15 26 2 0 
~2' 153 366 57 117 150 104 459 1,168 17 5 
Note: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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The results for the second military event indicated that the Mean values for Bugs, Viruses, 
and Trojans are greater during the event window than they are in the non-event window. For 
Exploits and Probes/Scans, the Mean value is larger in the non-event window than they are in 
the event window. Similarly, for the Standard Deviation parameter the testing indicates a 
larger dispersion amongst the Bugs, Viruses and Trojans during the event window than the 
during the non-event window. Conversely, the SD has a larger dispersion for the Exploit 
Scripts and Probes/Scans during the non-event window that what is noted during the event 
window time period. 
The terrorist attacks of 11 th September 2001 were an event that shocked the United States and 
other nations around the world. This major catastrophe was perpetrated by eleven Islamic 
Extremists supported by AI-Qaeda. This event changed the face of America and forced 
President Bush to embark on a War on Terrorism. For the fourth military event in this 
research study, the parameters are presented in the table below. 
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Table S.12 - Statistical Analysis of the September 11,2001 Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. 
Total Bu~s Total Viruses Total Exploits Total Trojans Total Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
N 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 
Mean 143.42 81.33 52.02 30 65.33 33.33 313.40 355.67 4.09 3.33 
Variance 3,743.89 66.89 400.33 20.67 816.00 113.56 92,493.48 284.22 24.66 0.89 
Standard Dev. 61.19 8.18 20.01 4.55 28.57 10.66 304.13 16.86 4.97 0.94 
Min 61 70 6 25 21 21 15 332 0 2 
Max 366 89 117 36 150 47 1,168 370 17 4 I 
Note: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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The results for the third military study event shown in the above table, demonstrate that the 
Mean values for Bugs, Viruses, Exploits and Probes/Scans are greater in the non-event 
window than they are in the event window. For Trojans, the Mean value is larger in the event 
window than it is in the non-event window. Similarly, for the Standard Deviation parameter 
the testing indicates a larger dispersion amongst all study variables during the non-event 
window. 
One of the more controversial military conflicts of our lifetime is the United States invasion 
of Iraq in order to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein The fourth military event was 
the U.S. Invasion of Iraq in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. Various 
military and news commentators expected after various United Nations hearings. It formally 
began in April 2003 and remains on-going at the current time. This action has been 
organised and led by the U.S. military force, and contains a small compliment of 
multinational forces including British soldiers. The parameters surrounding this event are 
presented in Table 5.l3 below. 
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Table 5.13 - Statistical Analysis of the U.S. Invasion of Iraq 
Total Bugs Total Viruses Total Exploits Total Trojans Total Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
N 38 10 38 10 38 10 38 10 38 10 
Mean 118.92 217.9 46.82 65.20 61.42 70.60 193.13 783.10 5.11 0 
Variance 1,988.02 2,641.49 347.62 355.56 982.40 194.24 18,010.48 72,818.89 23.88 0 
Standard 44.59 51.40 18.64 18.86 3l.34 13.94 134.20 269.85 4.89 0 
Dev. 
Min 61 172 6 34 21 54 15 328 0 0 
Max 220 366 117 101 150 104 523 1,168 17 0 
--_._-
Note: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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For the fourth military event shown above there are some interesting results. Specifically. for 
Bugs all parameters show higher values in the event window. For Viruses and Trojans, the 
Mean and SD are also higher in the event window. Exploits have a higher Mean value in the 
event window, but a higher standard deviation in the non-event window time period. Lastly. 
Probes/Scans have a higher Mean value and SD in the non-event window when compared to 
the event window. 
During August 2003 and at the request of the United Nations, the United States intervened 
militarily in the country of Liberia on a peacekeeping mission. At this time, Charles Taylor. 
the previous President of this country was well known for his malevolent leadership. During 
this event anarchy began to develop and Mr. Taylor was exiled to Nigeria. Table 5.14 
presents a summary of the parameters developed for this event. 
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Table 5.14 - Statistical Analysis of the U.S. Military Intervention in Liberia 
Total Bugs Total Viruses Total Ex :lloits Total Trojans Total Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
'N 44 4 44 4 44 4 44 4 44 4 
Mean 134.09 199.50 49.18 66.75 62.75 69.75 269.30 841.25 4.41 0 
Variance 3,687.58 394.25 404.65 126.19 894.37 102.19 66,454.48 10,10l.19 23.70 0 
Standard 60.73 19.86 20.12 11.23 29.91 10.11 257.79 100.50 4.87 0 
Dev. 
Min 61 172 6 55 21 54 15 711 0 0 
I 
Max 366 228 117 85 150 80 1,168 983 17 0 I 
------
Notc: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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The results for the fifth military event illustrate higher Mean values for all variables during 
the event window except for Probes/Scans. The SD for all variables is higher during the non-
event window. This is an intriguing analysis since the SD parameter values are inversely 
related to the Means when excluding the Probes/Scans from this observation. 
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H9: The number of computer security advisory communications of the NIPC is positively 
associated with an increase during periods of domestic political change and crisis such as the: 
U.S. Presidential Election, Western States energy crisis, severe winter weather storms. and 
Northeast Blackout. 
The statistical parameters are measured throughout this section and begin with a presentation 
of the U.S. Presidential Election which occurred in November 2000. According to U.S. law, 
presidential elections must be conducted on the first Tuesday in the month of November 
every four years. Accordingly, a brief statistical analysis is presented below for this domestic 
political event. 
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Table S.lS - Statistical Analysis of the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election 
Total Bu~s Total Viruses Total Exploits Total Trojans Total Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
N 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 
Mean 142.49 95.33 50.93 46.33 63.24 64.67 327.09 150.33 3.78 8.00 
Variance 3,844.25 90.89 429.97 10.89 883.87 53.56 90,655.15 244.22 22.93 10.67 
Standard 62.00 9.53 20.74 3.30 29.73 7.32 301.09 15.63 4.79 3.27 
Dev. 
Min 61 85 6 42 21 59 15 130 0 4 
Max 366 108 117 50 150 75 1,168 168 17 12 
- --------
Note: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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The results for the final political study event shown in Table 5.15 above indicate that the 
Mean value for Bugs, Viruses, and Trojans are highest in the non-event window. For 
Exploits and Probes/Scans, the Mean value is higher in the event window. The Standard 
Deviation and Maximum parameters for all variables signify higher values during the non-
event window timeframe. 
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The Western States Energy Crisis occurred in July 2002 and gained national attention for the country's troubled infrastructures. Table 5.16, 
presents the corresponding information. 
Table 5.16 - Statistical Analysis of the Western States Energy Crisis 
Total Bu~s Total Viruses Total Exploits Total Trojans Total Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
N 44 4 44 4 44 4 44 4 44 4 
Mean 136.53 172.75 48.25 77.00 63.14 65.50 320.52 266.75 4.25 1.75 
Variance 3,873.98 1,062.69 320.73 574.50 880.35 296.25 94,127.16 3,971.69 24.60 2.19 
Standard 62.24 32.60 17.91 23.97 29.67 17.21 306.80 63.02 4.96 1.48 
Dev. 
Min 61 129 6 57 21 47 15 166 0 0 
Max 366 220 101 
~-
,---IlL ~O 86 1,168 324 17 
--
4 
Note: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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The results for the first political study event shown in Table 5.16 abovc, indicates that the 
Mean values for Bugs, Viruses, and Exploits are all larger during the event window than they 
are in the non-event window. For Trojans and Probes/Scans, the Mean values are larger in 
the non-event window than they are in the event window. The Standard Dcviation 
parameters are larger in the non-event window for all variables except Viruses; which 
indicates the fact that the data is not widely dispersed for Bugs. Exploits, Trojans and 
Probes/Scans. 
In the month of January 2003, a series of severe storms hit the eastern coast of the United 
States. These storms caused severe conditions in many states with local governors enacting 
states of emergency. This situation was quite unique during the research period and was 
therefore worthy of exploratory analysis, as presented in the next table. 
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Table 5.17 - Statistical Analysis of the Severe Winter Storms in January 2003 
Total Bu~s Total Viruses Total Exoloits Total Trojans Total Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
N 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 
Mean 136.36 187.33 49.84 62.67 64.47 46.33 318.29 282.33 4.31 0 
Variance 3,814.59 184.22 410.00 176.22 856.34 160.22 90,497.01 30,694.22 23.59 0 
Standard 61.76 13.57 20.25 13.27 29.26 12.66 300.83 175.20 4.86 0 
! 
Dev. 
Min 61 172 6 50 21 31 15 1 1 1 0 0 
Max 366 205 117 81 150 62 1,168 523 17 0 
_._-
Note: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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Based on the infonnation in Table 5.17 above, the second political event illustrates the Mean 
values for Bugs and Viruses were higher in the event window than the non-event window. 
For Exploits, Trojans and Probes/Scans the Mean values were higher in the non-event 
window timeframe. In the non-event window, the SD and Max are higher for all study 
variables than in the event window time period. The Minimum values are noted to be at their 
highest in the event window. 
Another political event select for analysis is the Northeast Blackout which occurred in 
August 2003. As discussed in Chapter Two, some experts believe that this political crisis 
was started by an information warfare attack. The statistical parameters for this event are 
presented in tabular format below. 
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Table 5.18 - Statistical Analysis of the Northeast Blackout in August 2003 
Total Bu~s Total Viruses Total Exploits Total TrQjans Total Probes/Scans 
Parameter N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW 
N 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 45 3 
Mean 135.49 200.33 49.31 70.67 62.87 70.33 284.18 794.00 4.31 0 
Variance 3,691.63 522.89 396.39 106.89 875.09 134.89 76,076.64 4,538.00 23.59 0 
Standard 60.76 22.87 19.91 10.34 29.58 11.61 275.82 67.36 4.86 0 
Dev. 
Min 61 172 6 61 21 54 15 711 0 0 
Max 366 228 117 85 150 _~O __ 1,168 876 17 0 
~-
Note: EW denotes the Event Window and N-EW denotes the Non-Event Window 
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The results for the third political event shown in Table 5.18 indicate that the Mean values for 
Bugs, Viruses, Exploits and Trojans are higher in the event window. But, Probes/Scans have 
a higher Mean value in the non-event window. Standard deviations are larger in the non-
event window for all five variables. 
In order to provide for a summary of the various military and political events that were 
analysed in this project the table below was prepared. 
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Table 5.19 - Summary of Results for the Military and Political Events 
Event Description Date of Event Bugs Viruses Exploit Scripts Trojans Probes/Scans 
Military Events - Hypothesis 8 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
USS Cole October 2000 N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW EW N-EW N-EW N-EW EW N-EW 
Battleship Attack 
War in Afghanistan October 2000 EW EW EW EW N-EW N-EW EW EW N-EW N-EW 
thru Dec. 2003 
S~tember September 2001 N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW EW N-EW N-EW N-EW 
11 Attacks 
U.S. Invasion April 2003 EW EW EW EW EW N-EW EW EW N-EW N-EW 
of Iraq thru Dec. 2003 
U.S. Military September 2003 EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW N-EW N-EW 
Intervention in 
Liberia 
Political Events - HYDothesis 9 
U.S. Presidential November 2000 N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW EW N-EW N-EW N-EW EW N-EW 
Election 
Western States July 2002 EW N-EW EW EW EW N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW 
Energy Crisis 
Severe Winter January 2003 EW N-EW EW N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW N-EW 
Storms 
Northeast Blackout August 2003 EW 
-L-
N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW EW N-EW N-EW N-EW 
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First, Military Events have mixed results across all five events. The Event Window mean 
figures are higher for Bugs, Viruses and Trojans for the War in Afghanistan, U.S. Invasion of 
Iraq and u.S. Military Intervention in Liberia. And Exploit Scripts has higher mean values in 
during the USS Cole Battleship Attack, U.S. Invasion of Iraq and u.S. Military Intervention 
in Liberia. Lastly, Probes/Scans have a higher mean only in the event window for the USS 
Cole Battleship Attack. 
Second, Political Events also have mixed results for all four related events. The Western 
States Energy Crisis, Severe Winter Storms and Northeast Blackout all have higher mean 
figures during the event window for Bugs and Viruses. For Exploit Scripts higher mean 
values are present in the event windows for the u.S. Presidential Election, Western Energy 
Crisis and Northeast Blackout. Trojans have a higher mean for the Northeast Blackout event 
only. Finally, Probes/Scans have a higher mean only for the u.S. Presidential Election event 
window. 
Finally, Hypotheses Eight and Nine are partially accepted. Also, this research study can be 
used as a basis for similar research studies in the future. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the hypothesis testing and related results for nine detailed hypotheses 
which have been evaluated primarily using FBI and other government data sources. Using a 
detailed research model and project scope the totality of the hypotheses testing provides 
illustration and evidence of the detailed fieldwork, testing and analyses accomplished by the 
researcher over a significant period of time. 
Specifically, the first seven hypotheses were tested using traditional Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients and Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients. The final two hypotheses were 
tested using an event study approach. In all cases this testing was executed according to the 
overall research philosophy, design/model and grounded theory approach presented 
previously in Chapter Three. As is common in academic research a five percent significance 
level was used consistently for all related testing of forty-eight months of data from January 
2000 through December 2003. In the study hypotheses, where the distribution of data was 
not assumed to be normally distributed a goodness of fit test was calculated in order to 
establish the robustness of the statistical measurements. 
Correlation analysis determines whether or not there is a linear relationship between two 
variables. This important statistical measurement simply answers the fundamental question 
about whether or not there is in fact a statistical relationship between an independent and 
dependent variable. Additional testing in future projects can delve more deeply using 
additional quantitative and qualitative analyses. This is because this chapter was a 
preliminary exploration and accomplishment in the area of U.S. cyber security and critical 
infrastructure protection. From this study a number of interesting conclusions can be 
established. 
In order to probe a potential general relationship between software bug reporting testing on 
Hypothesis One found that critical software bugs reported by the NIPC were found to have a 
positive weak correlation with the general software bugs reported by the CERT/CC. In 
addition there was no correlation with the same NIPC data and NIST's reporting of software 
bugs. 
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Second, a similar test was made in Hypothesis Two which looked to validate a correlation 
between the general population of computer viruses and the critical viruses reported by the 
NIPC. While this hypothesis was based on the researcher's professional and academic 
instinct it could not be proven or verified. 
Third, the Bugs, Viruses, Exploits, Trojans and Probes/Scans were analysed to determine if 
there were correlations with various variables that measure Internet utilisation in the USA. 
The results from this testing found a strong, positive correlation with all study variables 
except for Exploit Scripts and Probes/Scans. Therefore, Hypotheses Three. Four and Five 
were only partially accepted. From this testing, that Probes/Scans were a unique item within 
the research study as there was a negative correlation with this variable and all five of the 
CyberNotes data elements. Also, Probes/Scans had no correlation. After follow-up 
procedures, the most important proposition for this issue is to review this in more detail in 
future research projects. 
In Hypothesis Six the value of U.S. electronic commerce transactions was found to be 
positively correlated with a very strong significance to the NIPC's reporting of Bugs, Viruses 
and Trojans. But, there was no relationship with Exploit Scripts and a negative relationship 
with Probes/Scans. This testing confirms with increased electronic commerce transactions 
comes an increase in various, critical cyber security issues. The impact of this can relate to 
the use of Internet technology for business, consumer and government trading habits; as the 
use of e-commerce systems and throughput of transactions comes a corresponding increase in 
critical cyber security issues. 
In Hypothesis Seven, a total of nine macro-economic factors were found to have very mixed 
results. All variables have a positive correlation with Bugs, Viruses and Trojans. The other 
variables (e.g. Exploits and Probes/Scans) demonstrated a positive correlation with the same 
set of macro-economic variables. These results can be subject to further testing and 
considered in such activities as simulation scenarios and heuristic modelling. 
The sixth conclusion that can be drawn from Chapter Five relates to political and military 
events. All of this information can help government and future researchers examine models 
for information warfare attacks and other cyber threats. This testing focussed on a variety of 
mathematical calculations (predominantly Means and Standard Deviations) which found a 
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mixed set of results when comparing the event windows to the non-event windows for a total 
of nine events (e.g. five military and four political). This initial research can help 
government analysts and future researchers understand the vast potential impacts on cyber 
security. Also, it can help establish the potential linkages between traditional and non-
traditional threats to critical infrastructure and other IT systems. 
The researcher was fortunate to have a full four year census of secondary data from the FBI. 
This allowed for the uncommon luxury of not having to perform various statistical sampling 
tests since the complete population of data was utilised. However. the research results were 
limited due to the overall grounded theory approach that was undertaken. Nevertheless. a 
detailed series of suggestions for future research are presented in the following chapter. To 
this end, it is envisioned that a strong research agenda supported by other research projects 
can be undertaken. 
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CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
This research project provided a unique perspective on an emerging area of research in the 
field of Information Technology. It was built upon a variety of specialist subject areas 
including: information systems and information technology, electronic commerce, computer 
security, risk management, nationallhomeland security (including information warfare and 
cyber terrorism) and information technology. The project originated from the researcher's 
academic and professional experiences as an IT auditor, security consultant and educator. 
The Information Age has brought with it magnificent technological advances worldwide that 
have transformed the way many aspects of our business and personal lives. The Internet, 
electronic commerce, and a variety of emerging information technologies have presented 
many exciting advantages to modem society. Simultaneously, the business community and 
individuals also are confronted with increased threats from a number of different groups. 
These adversaries include: traditional computer hackers, cyber terrorists, information 
warriors, social action groups and rogue nations; all of which are bona fide, current threats to 
the United States (Alexander and Swetnam, 1999). Furthermore, the tools and techniques 
used by these malevolent parties present themselves in a variety of ways. 
The major attack methods can be in the form of: vulnerabilities in software and hardware, 
computer mal ware (e.g. viruses, worms and Trojans), probes and scans, exploit scripts, and 
others (e.g. denial of service attacks, information warfare, phising schemes, etc.). According 
to Ohlson (2000), these attacks can cost over seven billion dollars per incident. Furthermore, 
during the period ten year period of 1993 to 2003 the Internet usage in the United States 
doubled. With the growing complexity of attack methods and concurrent growth of Internet 
utilisation; controlling technologies is a major challenge. In fact, this is often done through 
the use of new technologies; but, this by itself is not optimal since organisations and users 
balance the need for security and the ease of use for end-users (Backhouse Et. AI.. 2005, 
Schou and Trimmer, 2004, and Schneier, 2000). 
The government of the United States has been active in the field of computer and infonnation 
security for over 60 years. The National Security Agency (NSA). various other defence and 
law enforcement agencies have departments and special groups dedicated to Information 
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Security and Assurance. In 1998, the U.S. Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP) was established by President Clinton and developed a large number of 
landmark cyber security and national security initiatives. With the development of new U.S. 
government programmes to share cyber security information and warnings in the late-1990s 
about critical infrastructure protection; greater importance of these initiatives are now viewed 
in a post-911 era. As regional and international conflicts continue to grow, the United States 
continues its leadership in the fields of Information Assurance and HomelandlNational 
Security. 
Using a grounded theory research methodology together with and a variety of non-parametric 
statistics this study identified a number of interesting results. A variety of descriptive 
statistics were developed that analysed both the primary and secondary data. Various 
correlation analyses were performed in order to test seven of the nine hypotheses. An event 
window methodology was used to investigate the statistical parameters for the last two 
hypotheses which looked at the major military and political events that occurred from 2000-
2004. This approach supported the researcher's efforts of conducting exploratory research 
where triangulation often deals with combining data sets from different sources (Sawyer, 
2001). This allowed the researcher to revisit these events in various ways. 
One of the major recommendations of the PCCIP was to establish a central command 
structure for cyber security. With this support the National Infrastructure Protection Centre 
(NIPC) was founded in 1999 and developed the CyberNotes newsletters which were used as 
the main source of data for this project. In addition, the FBI organised its InfraGard program 
to develop a very important pUblic-private partnership in Information Assurance. 
While Jones Et. Al (2001) and Whiting and Chabrow (2001) discussed some of the reasons 
why the U.S. Federal Government is eager to forge new relationships with private industry; 
practically this is difficult due to wide range of security issues. Additionally, it was difficult 
for the NIPC to be able to: 1) obtain and analyse security information quickly, 2) share 
information quickly and efficiently and 3) address the general and specific information needs 
of various stakeholder groups; all in a user-friendly format(s). This organisation faced 
formidable obstacles including: technological issues, primitive legal frameworks, and 
resource constraints (Alexander and Sweetnam, 1999 and U.S. General Accounting Office. 
1998). Furthermore, various other government studies and publications through the present 
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continue to amplify the need for more cooperation between the public and private sectors in 
order to protect the national infrastructure from various threats. The major information 
technologies that support information sharing are inter-organisational systems, web 
information systems and government information systems. 
Other important factors affecting cyber security during the study period include a number of 
government actions and initiatives. For instance, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) was established in 2001 by President Bush. This department represented the largest 
single re-organisation of the U.S. federal government in the past fifty years (Lavine, 2004). 
The NIPC was re-organised as part of the DHS, only then to be re-organised once again in 
2003 as part of the US-CERT; a separate entity from CERT/CC. While previous research by 
Rich (2001), Howard (1997) and others explored different aspects of computer security such 
as: Internet security, network security, risk management techniques, economic modelling and 
others. This research project was able to explore a secondary data approach to cyber security 
information related to U.S. critical infrastructure protection. 
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6.2 Conclusions 
The philosophical underpinning of this study was an interpretivist approach. At the 
beginning of this project, four key objectives were established. In the end. all four of these 
were accomplished using a grounded theory research methodology. Inter-dependence deals 
with the discrete reliability of each data set. To help facilitate this, the researcher can identify 
linkage( s) with the theory being formulated and trying to overlap concepts. 
The first objective was to investigate whether there is a correlation between general cyber 
security information and what is determined to be critical by the NIPC. To probe this 
question, the researcher used two categories of CyberNotes data (e.g. Bugs and Viruses). 
First, the NIPC's bugs were analysed with two other very reputable bug reporting 
organisations, CERT/CC and NIST. The results from this project indicate that the NIPC's 
critical bugs are positively but weakly correlated to the CERT/CC bugs, but not associated to 
the NIST bugs. For Viruses, the researcher used another general reporting source in order to 
test a similar theory that the number of critical Viruses is associated with the general number 
of computer viruses. The results of this testing are quite intriguing because they do not 
support the overall notion that critical cyber security information is explicitly related to 
general cyber security information as originally thought. For this objective one hypothesis 
was partially accepted and another was rejected. 
The second objective examined changes in Internet growth and the reporting by the NIPC. 
The premise behind this aspect of the research was that the Internet is continuing to become 
an attractive target for hackers, criminals and terrorists as more individuals connected to the 
Information Superhighway and the E-Commerce business paradigm expanded. Consistent 
findings were documented for U.S. Internet utilisation, the number of U.S. Host Computers 
and Global WWW Pages, U.S B2B E-Commerce, U.S. B2C E-Commerce and Total U.S. E-
Commerce as these study variables relate to software bugs, viruses and Trojans. 
Furthermore, the research findings in this area were impressive since statistically strong, 
positive relationships were evident. However, the correlation testing in this area was not 
proven for Exploit Scripts and Probes/Scans; as these variables had negative and non-existent 
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relationships, respectively. The two hypotheses in this part of the research were partially 
accepted. 
Objective number three was to evaluate a variety of macro-economic factors and see if these 
factors are associated with the five variables of critical cyber security information reported by 
the leading u.s. government organisation in this area. The study had mixed results in this 
area with Bugs, Viruses, and Trojans having a statistically strong, negative relationship with 
interest rates and stock market indices and a strong, positive relationship with CPI, GOP. 
Inflation and Unemployment. As well, Exploit Scripts have mixed results in this area. 
Probes/Scans were found to have a strong, positive relationship with the two interest rates 
and three stock market indices, and a strong, negative relationship with three of the four more 
general macroeconomic factors (e.g. CPI, GOP and Unemployment). The three hypotheses 
in this component of the research were partially accepted. 
Objective four explore the potential associations between military and political events with 
the NIPC's CybeNotes reporting using an event window methodology which is a common 
research design in finance, advertising, public policy and communications. Using the advice 
of other academics in these fields; five military events and four political events were 
analysed. Mixed results were summarised as follows for the military events where higher 
mean figures for Bugs, Viruses and Trojans were found for the War in Afghanistan, U.S. 
Invasion of Iraq and U.S. Military Intervention in Liberia. And Exploit Scripts has higher 
mean values in during the USS Cole Battleship Attack, U.S. Invasion of Iraq and U.S. 
Military Intervention in Liberia. Probes/Scans had a higher mean in one event window that 
being for the USS Cole Battleship Attack. 
The four Political Events had mixed results for all four related events. The Western States 
Energy Crisis, Severe Winter Storms and Northeast Blackout all have higher mean figures 
during the event window for Bugs and Viruses. Exploit Scripts higher mean values are 
present in the event windows for the U.S. Presidential Election, Western Energy Crisis and 
Northeast Blackout. Trojans have a higher mean for the Northeast Blackout event only. 
Probes/Scans have a higher mean only for the U.S. Presidential Election event window. 
The two hypotheses in this part of the research project were partially accepted. 
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In addition to these results, another benefit of this project is that additional ideas for further 
research emerged. While these could not be conducted as part of this project. the major 
suggestions are presented in the following section of this chapter for future consideration. 
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6.3 Areas for Future Research 
This project presented new knowledge in the field of IT Security/Infonnation Assurance and 
has provided a basis for various avenues for further research in the future. For instance. the 
research hypotheses could easily be expanded to look at future periods of time in a longer 
longitudinal study. This can expand on the initial results, findings and recommendation from 
the four year data period presented in this study. Specifically, this type of follow-up study 
can examine additional trends, general findings and other factors in critical infrastructure 
infonnation in the United States. 
In addition, there are a number of other suggestions that can be investigated as areas of future 
research. These ideas are a direct result of the outcomes and design of this project. In this 
regard, six specific recommendations have been developed. 
First, additional empirical research in the fonn of additional data could be used to expand the 
grounded theory approach as a means of perfonning further testing. These variables can be 
collected from both primary and secondary sources. As well, some variables may be 
obtained from other government agencies, consultancy organisations and commercial vendors 
(e.g. anti-virus companies, software development finns) etc. 
Second, a comparative international study that investigates the potential similarities and 
difference between U.S. and non-U.S. critical infrastructure infonnation would be very 
useful. In this regard, it would be effective to adopt a similar research methodology as what 
was used in this project. This type of comparative study could address similar research 
questions that were presented herein; as well as variations that are of interest to the individual 
researcher and/or supporting government entity. 
Third, a quantitative survey of Chief Infonnation Security Officers and other infonnation 
assurance practitioners could be developed. Such a study should focus on how these 
professionals: analyse, utilise and implement the cyber security infonnation (e.g. warnings. 
alerts and newsletters) supplied by government organisations and/or security agencies. 
Furthernl0re. this type of study could be pursued with a large professional organisation such 
as: the lnfonnation Systems Audit and Control Association. Institute of Internal Auditors. 
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SANS or InfraGard. Of particular interest in this type of survey would be how this 
infonnation sharing supports critical infrastructure protection at an enterprise level and from 
a larger view perhaps as it relates to one of the national infrastructures. 
Fourth, a variety of qualitative research techniques should be explored to look at the content 
of cyber security infonnation. Specifically, it would be very interesting to perfonn a detailed 
content analysis as described in the research methodology chapter. Such a study could easily 
use of commercial computer software to explore the qualitative nature of the cyber security 
newsletters published by the NIPC and its successor organisations. 
Fifth, more detailed studies can be perfonned in the areas of Software Bugs, Viruses, Exploit 
Scripts and Trojans. These areas continue to be high risk vulnerabilities for businesses, 
government organisations and individuals. Therefore, additional research which develops 
richer infonnation related to attack methodologies, trend analyses, discovery methods, 
tracking systems and other approaches will be very useful. 
Sixth, further search should be pursued in the area of exploit scripts and vulnerability 
management. In this area, more in-depth analysis in the area E-Commerce systems, operating 
systems, computer hardware and other critical infrastructure components can be analysed. 
By doing so, more infonnation can be explored in order to build predictive models and 
heuristics for infonnation warfare, cyber terrorism and national defence. 
All of the recommendations described above highlights the fact that that the fields of 
infonnation assurance, internal control and risk management are still in their early stages. In 
all, the opportunities for future research are quite extensive. 
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6.4 Final Thoughts 
This research project provided an exciting personal and professional opportunity to the 
researcher to explore and enhance his own skills. He received important support from the 
FBI in the United States and was supervised by Professor Georges Selim, Head of FaCUlty. 
By adopting a grounded theory approach it allowed for exploration of a new area in the 
rapidly emerging fields of cyber security and critical infrastructure protection. All of this was 
done within the requirements, scope and timeframe of the Doctor of Philosophy degree as 
required by Cass Business School, City University. 
Finally, this project has developed new knowledge and insights into research, theory and 
practice within the exciting fields of: information assurance, information systems. risk 
management and auditing. 
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Operating Software 
Name 
D-Forum 
1.0, 1.10, 
1.11 
Vulnerabilityl Patcbes/Workaround I 
Alert 
o workaround or patch 
a ailabl at time of 
publi hing. 
Common 
arne 
D-Forum 
Remote File 
Include 
\ttac"'~ 1 
In nc\\ group 
ano \\cb lIe . 
Pro r of 
\It-. 
Technol-
3 
ogle 
\ndnes 
Brouwer4 
Window 
95/98 T 
4.012000 
Unix 
nix 
oftware 
e 
Gateway 
3.0,3.5 
MDaemon 
2.8,2.8.5, 
3.0.3,3.0.4, 
3.1.1,3.1.2, 
3.5.0,3.5.1, 
3.5.4,3.5.6, 
5.0.7,6.0.0, 
6.0.5-6.0.7, 
6.5.0 
util-linux 
2.11 u, 
2.lln 
Vulnerabilit) / 
A vulnerabIlIty eXI t be au e 
only vlru 'e ,"ith the fir t I 
kb of the content tream are 
detected when e afe I u ed 
with the heck Pomt ontent 
Vectoring Protocol ( VP), 
which could let a remote 
maliciou u er end pecially 
crafted maliclou content that 
will bypa security 
mechanisms. 
A vulnerability exi t in the 
'Form2Raw.exe' UtliJty, 
which could let a remote 
maliciou u er end forged 
mail with poofed header . 
A vulnerability exi t in the 
'mcookie' utility becau e 
cookie may be generated In a 
predictable manner, Whl h 
could let a maliciou u er 
U er obtain root acce 
Patchc Vorkaround 
Alert 
• '0 \\orkaround or patch 
a\ ailable al time of 
publi hing. 
o \\ orkaround or pat h 
available at tIme of 
pubii hmg. 
1andrakc: 
hltp \\ \\ \\ rnandmh t:"ur~ 
ncl en ltp php 
pgrade available at: 
http. prdownload . ~our cfor 
gC.ncl npcup d apcup.d-
J.!! .6.tur gf?do\\ nload 
'Fom12R:l\\ . 
la!llleadcr 
pIing 
'mcoo!-.u:' 
L tllll~ 
\p upsd 
'10K e\\;nl' 
Remote R 01 
Ace. 
J 
Bug di,cu 'L'd 
In Ill: \\ gr )Ur" 
,\nd \\ ebsllc . 
Bug dl'ClI' cd 
In nc\\ 'group 
and \\ebsllc\ 
po ibly c e ute arbitrary 
code. ~ ------~--------~---------+~~------------------~~~----~~----~--~~~---+~--~--~ \ppkh pgradc available at: Bug dl 'u 'cd 
(Jaguar), 
10.2 . 1-
10.2.3 
(Jaguar), 
10.2.1-
10._.3 
Ru 'traq, I ebntaT\ b. 200 
emulator, whIch could let a 
ma liciou u er obtain elevated 
pri ilege . 
ulnerability e il in 
'iDrive' becau e the File 
Prot 01 allo\\ a tem 
admini trator t log n a' a 
normal u er u ing 
admil1l lrallon logm detail , 
\\ hi h could leI a mali iOll 
II ' cr blain cnsill\ c 
In formal I n. 
\ Securil ' I racker \krt 10. 100M)"". I L'bnI3f) .,. _001 
hnp doc~ . mfoupplc com ar TruBluc In nc\\ 'gr up 
tide html')artnum 016, n\ lr nment and \\cb ile . 
pgrade a\ allable at: 
http doc mfo .appl lorn ar 
t1de.hrml')urtnum 016 ' 
Vanablc Thcre 1\ no 
Pm lkge c rlOlI code 
alation required. 
dmmltrator 
Logm 
Bug di,cu cd 
In nc\\ I!TOUp 
and \\\.:b ile , 
~ /0., landr,lk" l inl! "L'lInt\ l I'dalL' \d\ i N\, \ 10K'. \- 0): ,016. I ~bmar: 14. ~l 0 . 
L'L'lIrtt) 1I,IL'kl:r \krt ID. 100610 .Ilhnlar: 1-. 00 
II ,1.lh·, III '. ll'Urtl) \d\ I llf •• J 'hm,lr: 14, _lO , 
\('r ll l lint) t p l.lk'. 617l) . I L'~nt.lT\ 14. ~ll03 
\endor 
prehum 
Technol-
.le 
Benjamin 
Low 10 
Bhara! 
\lcdlratta 
Operating 
nix 
nlX 
Windows, 
Unix 
Unix 
Window 
95/98/NT 
4.0 
MUltiple 
oftware 
arne 
erver 
1.0.7, 1.1.2 
l1P-UX 
Bastille 
B.02.00 .00 
eGI-Lite 
2.0 
Gallery 
1.3.3 
Bison Flp 
erver 
V4R2 
Vulnerabilit) / 
A vulnerability exi t becau e 
failed authentication anempt 
are nollogged and the number 
of failed authenticatlOn 
attempt to the admini trallve 
interface i not limited, v,hich 
could let a remote malicious 
user obtain unauthorized 
acce 
A vulnerability exi t in the 
Ba tille Hardening System 
when used in conjunction with 
the HP-UX operating ystem 
and the Sendmail daemon, 
which could let a remote 
malicious user obtain 
sensitive information. 
A vulnerability exi t in the 
e cape _ dangerou _char 0 
function becau e pecially 
craned input can be ubmillcd 
thaL wi II bypas the code' 
ecurity filLering mecham m , 
which could Ict a rem tc 
malicious u er e ecutc 
arbitra command. 
A vulnerabilit exi t when 
the 'temp' and 'album ' 
directorie arc created and the 
way image files are managed 
due to un are file permi i 
which could let a mal!ciou 
u er obtain en iti e 
information. 
Multiple vulncrabilitie e i t: 
a remote Denial of ervlce 
ulnerability e i t when a 
mali iou u er ubmit 
e ceptionally long FTP 
command uch a ' wd' or 
'Is'; and a ulnerability e i t 
when a 'Is' command is 
i ued u ing the haracter 
equ n e' .. I' . \ hich ould 
let a remote maliciou user 
nllmen 
Patch "orkaround I 
Alert 
'0 \\orkaround or pat h 
a\ ailable at lime of 
publ ishing. 
pgrade available at 
http w\\,\\ oftware.hp.com 
cgl-
bin \\depo1..p3.r.ier cgl cgl d 
i playProductlnfo.pJ'lproouc 
t 'umber. 86 49:1.A 
o workaround or patch 
available al llmc r 
publi hlDg. 
o workaround or patch 
a\ ailable at Lime of 
pub Ii hmg. 
o workaround or patch 
available at time of 
publi hing. 
Bu\.!.trnq , cbnl<1r'1 1_. ~OO, 
'I lle\\ ktl-P,ld,Jrd ampa!), I.:cunt) Bullct1l1. lIP B . 0_0. -~-t". J eoruaT) 13. _OO~. 
III Bu~lrn 1, I chru,lr'I 11 . 2001 
II I.'Clint 11 , ld~er "krt I [ 10 )h(166. horuJl) I 0, _(10~. 
I' InHnUI1~' ,\,,1\ 1"01), F ~l"1nlal) I • 2l o~ . 
I' BlIglra I . I d1fU.Il) 1(',. _00.1 . 
#.00 -III 
ommon 
l glO 
RecordlOg 
Basl1l1c 
·endmai1. r 
Informati n 
DI clo. ure 
GJ Lilt;: 
1:$ aflc 
danger u 
chars) 
alief) 
P rmi Ion 
ulLlple 
VulnerabilItIes 
Bitch 
falformcd 
RPl 
-
MR ' PLY 
Denial f 
en Ice 
in n~\\ gr 111fl 
and \\ eb Ile . 
Thl:rc I n 
l!\.ploll . JI: 
rcqlllrl!d. 
in nt:\\gr liP 
and \\ eb'ltl: . 
Vulnl mbll It) 
can be 
e plolteu \ la a 
web br )\\ 'l.'f 
In nc\\ ,groups 
and "eO I!~S . 
10\\ Bug dlsclIssed 
M~dlum 10 nl:\\ sgrotlp" 
anti \\\;b"ik . 
( I ,,!tum There 1\ no 
II e ploll Cl tic 
'>enslll\ \; rcqutrl:u. 
in onnLl-
lion .tn 
be 
obtain .. u 
npt 
( heela 
Technol-
IS 
ogle 
Window 
oftware 
arne 
Absolute 
Telnet 2.0, 
2.11 
heetaChat 
6.5.10 
Vulnerability/ 
1m act 
A buffer 0\ erflow 
vulnerabilityexi t due Lo 
insufficient bound checkmg 
when the LiLle bar i et by the 
client, which could let a 
remote malicious user execute 
arbitrary code. 
A vulnerability exi t 
encrypted Yahoo. 
authentication credential are 
stored in a local file, which 
could let a malicious u er 
obtain sensitive infonnation. 
CI.CO Multiple All Cisco 
IOS ifIP 
routing is 
disabled. 
A vulnerability exist becau e 
it i po ible to make arbitrary 
remote modification to the 
)'~tcms 16 
CPanel" Unix CPanel 5 & 
prior 
isco lOS routing table if IP 
routing i di abled, which 
could let a remote maliciou 
u er cau e a Denial of eryice 
or intercept c mmunicati 11.. 
Multiple vulnerabilitie exi 
a ulnerabilitye i t in the 
'gue tbook.cgi' cript, \.\ hich 
could let a remote maliciou 
u er execute arbitrary 
command ; and a 
ulnerability e ·i t In 
Openwebmail, which could let 
a maliciou u er obtain ro t 
I~ BlI~tr, q. h:bmary 6, _003 . 
I Btl'traq I ~brll.\f) I), _00-" 
I" ( IS '0 r IL'lli , ' OIIL'l'. _ ~O 4. r· ~ bmaf) 10. _OO~ , 
I HlIgtlaq. Ilbrll.\f) IQ . .. lilt . 
Patche '\\ orkaround 
Alert 
pgrade a\ allable at : 
hnp \\ w. I lal ofm r 
net telne[ beta fiv.are hI 
ml 
o workaround or patch 
a\ailabJe at time of 
publi hing. 
i co report that you 
prev nt the target router 
from actIng upon 
received I MP redire t 
pa ket u mg the 
fI 110\\ 109 con liguratlon 
command: 
Router on fig)#n ip 
icmp redirect 
o \\ orkaround or patch 
a ailable at time of 
publJ hing. 
Bar Burler 
\ erno\\ 
Internal 
Bro\\ r 
Plainte t 
Pa. \\ord 
Di.- loure 
Redirect 
ROLltIng Table 
. 10dilicalIOn 
P nd 5 
'gucstb ok.cgl 
pen" cbmail 
ulncrabllltl ~ 
~ Icdlum 
If 
llmmlllll-
C'utllms 
l: In 01: 
d 
O1a) be 
~ ploitcd II log 
the (heda hal 
cd 
to ncwsgroup ... 
and \\cb~tlc . 
:\ptollcnph 
hu\c bl:cn 
publt ht:d . 
[)otBr' 
Eggheads 
Dc\clop-
men! 
Tcarn ll' 
Operating 
tern 
Unix 
Multiple 
nh. 
oftware 
arne 
BotBr 0.1 
Eggdrop 
IR bot 
I. . 10-
1.6.13 
IIM220dp 
DL 
Modem 
1.0 12 
Multiple vulnerabilities exi 
a vulnerablltty ex! t In the 
I foo .php3 ' cnpt due to the 
way the IphpinfoO ' function 
I u ed, which could let a 
remote maliciou u er obtain 
sensitive information; a 
vulnerability exist becau e 
the configuration file doe n't 
have the proper PHP file 
exten ion, which could let a 
remote malicious u er obtain 
en itive information; a 
vulnerabilityexi t in the 
'system.php3' script due to 
insufficient anitization of 
u er- upplied data, which 
could let a remote maliciou 
user execute arbitrary 
command ; and a 
vulnerabilityexi t in the 
lexec.php3' cript due to 
insufficient anitiLatl n of 
u cr-supplied data, \! hlch 
could let a remote malic IOU 
u er exe ute arbitrary 
command. 
A vulnerability e i ts when 
linked to a botnet, whi h 
could let an unauth nzed 
remote maliciou u er can u e 
the bot a a pro y. 
configurati n web interface 
because no auth nti ation i 
required, whi h could let an 
unauthorized remote 
maliciou u er obtain \ eb 
ulnerability e·i t when 
canning a directory path of 
e e i e length, \ hi h could 
let a maliciou u r e ute 
ith 
, S-:curJt\ ,. )ClI .... I ehruaf\ 1 ". ~OO~ , 
,II Bugtr.':l. I d rU.IT\ \), 2(lO 
':11 Bu .tl.lq , I ~11(1111) 11 •. OO~ 
Patcbe ~7orkaround I 
Alert 
I ' 0 \\ orkaround or patch 
a\ ailable at time of 
pubIJ hlng. 
\\ orkaround or patch 
availabl at lime r 
publi ' hing. 
pgrade a\ atlable at : 
http WW\\ nodl2 .com dO\\ 
nload download .htm 
1 1 II 111 .
' 
I ~lInt\ \ hi Of\ (l . 10 ll1 . llhrtl.lr) Ill , _ll03 . 
nauthon/cd 
Pr \) 
cimini trati n 
I nterracc 
D32 
Antl\ Irtl 
Lo al Buner 
0\ rOo\\ 
~ pi It 
hl \\~b br m r. 
\: 'clued) 
lfigh 
Bug dlSCli ,ct.! 
111 new\group 
ant.! \\ cb it-: 
llincrablitty 
ma be 
e plolted u ing 
an IR client. 
Bug dl cu\\etl 
In new group 
am.! \\ cb\,t~ . 
There i no 
c ploit code 
r~qlllr~d . 
Bug dl\cu ...... ct! 
111 n~\\ gr up 
and \H:b ... IIC 
Pro t 01 
G. 23 
J md()rs 
release 
palchesu , 
'l 
RtdHOI 
rfll!a~e,\ 
PIIIC/t16 
Gupla 
Technol-
, '7 ogle -
(l11npany 
Operating 
System 
Windows, 
nIx 
Unix 
Wi ndow 
98IME T 
4.0/2000, 
P 
Uni 
oftware 
arne 
PHP- uke 
5,6,6.0 
Fileutils 
4.0, 4.1 , 
4.1.6 
SQLBase 
8. 1.0 
HP TIP-UX 
11.0 
Several vulnerabilities exi t: a 
vulnerability exi t in the 
'admin' ookie Variable u ed 
during the authenticatIon 
process due to insufficient 
sanitization of cookie based 
data, which could let a remote 
maliciou user obtain 
sensitive information' and a 
vulnerability exist because 
user-supplied data is 
insufficiently sanitized when 
SQL queries are constructed, 
which could let a remote 
malicious u er execute 
arbitra code, 
A race condition 
vulnerabili ty e ists in 
various utilities, which could 
let a maliciou s user delete 
the whole fil esystem. 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerability exi t \ hen the 
'EXECUTE' command i 
u ed, \ hich could let a remote 
ated 
ulnerability exist in the 
'di able' uti lity when Iri ng 
of e ces i e length a par ed 
a th '-r' command line 
argument, \ hich could let a 
mali iou u r au e a 
memory corruption and 
p ibl cx.ecutc arbitrary 
cdc. 
,~ Buglraq. cbnl 'lf') 20, 2003 , 
" e 'unlCtlll1, lnn:h 15. 2002 , 
Patche \ 'orkaround 
AJert 
TO workaround or pal h 
a\ atlable al time or 
publi hing. 
Patch a \ a ilable for 
4.1.6 at: 
http: //mail.gnu.org pipcrm 
ailfbug-fileutils 20 2-
larch/OON40,html 
Caldera: 
ft p:flftp,caldcra ,com pu b u 
pdatc I p n inu \ / 
Mandrake.' 
http://\\,,\\ ,mandrakesc u 
rc,neti e ad, i oric 12002 
101\.. .\-2002-
03I.php?dis=8. J 
RedHal: 
ftp: f/updatcs,rcdhat.com/6, 
2fen/o I RP 1 lfilcutil -
4.0 
o workaround r pal h 
a ailablc at time r 
publi hing, 
HP ha announced that 
the fixe upplied for a 
previou lp \'ulnerabiltty 
al 0 fix the de cribed 
i ue, er are ad\ i ed 
to appJ Ih ne e a1)' 
fixes uppHed in lhe 
HP B 020 -213 
aldera lnll'mallOn,ll, In'. Seunl) \d\1'.,ol'), ' \-_002-01 ,', I, ~ la~ I. , 2002 . 
1.1ndrnkc t Il1l1\ SCl'ltrll\ l ptiall: \ h ]';01'\, \1DK \. ,00') OJ 1, \la~ 16. 2002, 
'I' Rl'd T 1.11 1m Rl'd llat \\.'\.unl) \th I of'). RIIS \-_00 :01 --05. Ilbrual') 12 . ... 003. 
d\\ \HJ\ Inll.'lltgcncl' Imha p\ t. ltd \U\ 1'11'\ r ~hrua!) J n 20(l~ , 
Bl\I.'trlq, Itblll-I!) I .200 . 
ookie 
\ 'anable 
QL ue!) 
anttlzat ion 
F ilcutil 
R ace 
ondition 
AN-1002-
0·B5 
Bum r 
Overtlo,", 
HP-UX 
'di able' Local 
Buffer 
0\ erDo\\ 
c ccul d) 
'tcdium 
Jligh 
ted ium 
High 
(High if 
arbitral') 
cod\: can 
b{ 
C\c(utcd) 
Bug di,cu,'cd 
in nc\\ group' 
and " b~ i t(' . 
Bug dlscus'ocd 
III nC\\. ... group ... 
nd w bIll! , 
Bug dlscu \l:J 
111 nc\\ group 
and \\Cb\IIC\ 
Hewlett 
Packard 
Company 
lIewlett 
Packard 
Company 
11 
lIel\lclt 
pJekard 
Compun 
t ompan\ 
, ' 
Operating 
System 
Unix 
Unix 
Unix 
Unix 
nix 
oftware 
arne 
HP-UX 
10.0 1, 
10.0,10 .1, 
10.8-10.10, 
10.16, 
10.20, 
10.24, 
10.26, 
10.30, 
10.34, 
11.04, 11.0, 
l1.l1 , 
11.20, 
1 I .22 
HP-UX 
10.01, 
10.0, 10.1, 
10.8- 10. 10, 
]0.16, 
10.20, 
10.24 , 
10.26, 
10.30, 
10.34, 
I 1.04, I 1.0, 
11. 1 I , 
11 .20, 
J 1.22 
HP-UX 
10. 0 I , 
10.0, 10. 1, 
10.8- 10. 10, 
10. 16, 
10.20, 
10.24, 
10.26, 
10.30, 
10.34, 
11.04, 11.0, 
I I. I I , 
11 .20, 
11.22 
lIP-U 
11.0 
llP-
11.04, 
11.0, 11.11. 
11 ._0 
Vulnerabilityl 
1m act 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerability exi t in the 
'landiag' and 'lanadmm' 
utilities, which could let a 
malicious u er obtain 
unauthorized acce 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerability exists in the 
'stmHont' utility which could 
let a maliciou u er obtain 
elevated privilege. 
A vulnerability e i t in the 
' rs.F3000' binary, which 
cou ld let a maliciou u er 
obtain unauthorized acce or 
cau e a Denial of ervice. 
A buffer overflow 
ulnerabilitye i t in the 
' rep' utility due to in uffi ient 
bound checking of command 
lin argument, which could 
let a maliciou u er execute 
arbitrary code \ ith the 
pri ilcg ofthe up ru"er. 
buffer 0 effio\'·,' 
ulnerability e ' i t whcn an 
cAces. i\ amount or data i 
redir ted into \\ all as a 
me. sage intended t bc 
broadcast. \\ hi h ould let a 
rcmote mohcl liS user e,ecute 
arbltrur, c.: de. 
Patche :\"orkaround ' 
Alerts 
Workaround: 
Change the perrO! lon, 
on the affected binane 
by I uing the follo\\ mg 
command: 
chmod 5 
' U r bin landiag 
chmod 55-
'u r ' bin lanadmin 
Patches a\ ailable at: 
hnp Itrchp.com 
Patch PH 15423 
-
Worka round : 
For TfP-UX II tern . 
it i ad"i cd to remo\ e 
the ctuid bit or [mHont 
by i uing the rollo\\ ing 
command: 
chmod 5 5 
u rlbinl tmHont 
Workaround : 
Remove the execute 
perrnis ion on the 
affected binary by 
i uing the foil wing 
command: 
chmod 444 
lu r lib II en eruco 
del cr en 'hp r .F 000 
Pat h a ailable at: 
hnp . hpc ·o.uluc euu ftp pu 
b hp nurror u -
uppon.exremalhpcom 0 
0_ 00 11 X 'PH E 23003 
o v,orkaround or pat h 
available at time of 
publi hing. 
~" Il c\\ ktl-P.Il'h..lrJ (l11pan~ ~ cClInt) 
1(1 I k\\ ktt Pacj...nd (ompan\ l'ClInt) 
11 Ilc\I kit F lI:k,ud ~ltnPJn~ , ecunt) 
\' ~t:l'lll it) Ill~lI", I l'Imt.lf) 20, >03 
'\0302-A3. foebruaT) 12.2003. 
\ Bm'lt Iq. F brutln • _0 n. 
Bulkttn, liP BL \0302-241. ·l:bn.13T) 12.200 .. 
Bulletin. 1\ P B 0: 02-240. I dm]:!!,) 1_. 20t)'. 
landla£ 
lanadm:n 
BuITer 
0\ erno\\ 
HP-
tmklont' 
BufT r 
\ erno\\ 
nauthorized 
HP-UX rep 
Burfer 
0\ erflo\\ 
\\ all 
Mc, age 
Burft:r 
,ern \\ 
kdlUm 
1.0\\ 
1cdiu!11 
( !\kdiul11 
it ~IClCS'" 
can bt: 
obtatnc.:d) 
High 
d 
In ncwsgr )liP 
and we ltv •. 
Bug dl,cused 
111 nc\\sgrc liP'" 
and websltes 
Bug dp; u "t:d 
tn ne\\ ... group 
and \\cb .. lte . 
Vendor 
Hewlett 
packard 
Company 
florde lS 
Su5E 
ffleaw.1 
I ./6 pale' 
Jlyper 
mail l7 
Drhia" 
/I\UI.'.\ 
18 upgrade 
Operating 
System 
Unix 
Unix 
Unix 
Software 
arne 
HP-UX 
10.10, 
10.20, 11 .0, 
ll.ll , 
11.22 
IMP 
2.2-2.2.8 
Hypermail 
2.1.3,2.1.4, 
2.1.5 
Vulnerabilityl 
1m act 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerabilityexi ts In the 
' rpc.yppas wd' 
implementation, which could 
let a maliciou u er obtain 
elevated privilege . 
Multiple SQL injection 
vulnerabilities exj t due to 
insufficient anitization of 
user-supplied input in SQL 
querie , which could let a 
remote malicious u er 
corrupt the databa e. 
Several buffer overflo\ 
vulnerabilities exist: a 
buffer overflow 
vulnerability exist in the 
parsemailO function , \ hich 
could let a remote maliciou 
user execute arbitrary code; 
a buffer 0 erflo\ 
vulnerability e i t in the 
'mail' CGI component when 
a reverse DNS lookup i 
performed if the ho tname is 
of excessive length, which 
could let a remote maliciou 
user e ecute arbitrar code; 
and a vulnerability exist in 
the mail CGI program, 
which could let a remote 
malicious u er end e-mail 
a maliciou u er exe ut 
arbitrary code with ele ated 
pri iJege . 
AJert 
J TP-C'X 10.20 and 1l.22 
ystem are ad\i ed LO 
download a replacement 
rpc.yppa swd binaT) 
a\ ailable at: 
ftp yppas5.) ppas a hprc.e 
temal.hp.com 
or 
ftp yppas!.) ppa :a 19~ 1 
01951 
Patche a\ailable at: 
http. Itrc hp com 
Patch PI INE 2 102. 
Patch PI INE 2 103 
Upgrade available at: 
http: //,,, \\ .hord c.orgtimp 
3.11 
Debian: 
http :// ecurit) .debian .org 
pool/update I main l ilimp/ 
Debiall: 
http :// ccurit) .debian.org/ 
pooVupdates/main/h/ h) pt'r 
maill 
Patche a\ ailable at: 
ftp: 'al " " om\ are lbm.l.: om a 
1"( eti "e~ ~ecuril) llbl l_e fi 
tarZ 
14 Ilc\\ klt-P,] 'Llrtl omraJ1;. ~ccun(;. Bullctin. liP B 0302-2 .. C. r cbnlUf) J 2 200_. 
1~ cbtan SCCllIlt;. \lh 1"'01). D \ __ )-2, Januaf) J 5, 200 ... 
1(1 SuS SL'Lun!, \nllOllllccnH.:nt. 'u~ l - ' \ " 003 .000,. r cbmuf) 1,. 200: . 
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·rpc.ypp \\d' 
Burr r 
0\ erl1o\\ 
Horde 1 IF 
Databa c File 
Q Injection 
H}permail 
R mote 
Buff r 
O\'erflo" 
' " arne: 
\ -2003-
0057 
IX libTM 
Burrer 
O,ernO\\ 
Medium 
It igh 
High 
Bug di u"cd 
in n " gro up 
and" b it , . 
Proof of 
one pt 
npl it ha, 
been 
publi h d. 
Bug di CII\\cd 
in n " group .. 
and" cb it 
\pl oit hu 
b en 
publi hcd. 
Bug Ji,cu . ... cJ 
In nc\\ gr up 
anti \\t:b Ill:" . 
IB\'1 
Lotu ~ I 
fB\1 
Lotu 42 
Windows Domino 6.0 
T 
4.0/2000, 
nix 
ulnerabiJityl 
1m act 
A buffer 0 erflo'W 
vulnerabIlity ex) t 'When a 
HTTP redirect re pon e J 
performed, which could let a 
remote malicIOus u er execute 
arbitrary code. 
A buffer 0 erf1 0w 
vulnerabilityexi t in the 
's View amelF oldemame' 
options of the Pre etField 
parameter due to the way 
client-suppl ied reque t 
Patche \ orkaround ( 
.\Jert 
ear 
pgrade a\ adable at: 
http .... w\\]4.ofmar Ibm 
com webapp download ear 
eh) p?q &ear 'pf & 
dt &go ) ' f'S 1: D· 
DM T R VRJ6.. T\ T 
-
& 
R dire I Bufr r 
\ertlo 
LOlu . D mmo 
Web en er 
tcs 
Vle\\ 'ame 
-
Foldcmame 
BulTer 
parameter are hand led, whIch "ertlo\\ 
Window 
NT 
4.0/2000, 
Unix 
Window 
NT 
4.0/2000 , 
ni 
Lotus 
Domino 
erver 5.0, 
6.0 
ote 
lient 6.0 
Ind 
could let a remote mal iciou 
u er execute arb itrary code. 
A vulnerability exi t due to 
in uffi cient anitiza ti on of 
U er reque t , which ould le t 
a maliciou u er obtain 
en itive information. 
A bu ffer overno 
ulnerab ilitye i 
' InitializeU ing er 
ame' method when an 
o erl y long alue i 
ubmitted, \ hi h ould let a 
rem te maliciou u er e ecute 
arbitrary code. 
Multiple vulnerabili tie e i t: 
a ulnerabilitye i t in th e 
delMediaFil eO fun tion, 
\ hi h could let an 
unauthorized maliciou 1I r 
d I te media file ; a 
llln rab ilit e i t in the 
manageMedi aO fllncti n, 
whl h could let an 
lInallthori/ d malici u u er 
delete r modi f \ arioll fil e. ; 
and a \ ul nerabdl t) e i ts in 
'al t't ag ora ne\\ s artl Ie due 
t IIl sllfii ient 'anlt lla tlon or 
ome lI T 1 L tag. , \\ hlCh 
)tild I I a mu1tclOll u \:f 
e, ecli le .I rbi trall . de 
~Il IS ' t n\\ arc In"lgh l \~curi ! \ Re ear h \ lh I:-.on , 
~ I (, t'll\\ Ire in'lgh l _l'l'uri !\ Rl' eJrlh \ J\ I" 11') 
~ , BUl.!lr.lq I ~blllar) I ~. _lln . 
~ 1 1\ ITl' 111"ldll " l'(Unl) Re e.lrlh ,\I.h I'llI') • 
• } I 1-1 . ()) ' . 
o workaround or pat h 
available at lime of 
publl hmg. 
Patch a\ailable at: 
http \\ w\\ .bergamoblog Il 
modules php'lnamc Do\mlo 
ad 'd _ op gem lid -l 
Vulnerability 
DomIno DOl 
File lei . ure 
Lotu i 'Ole" 
ctn e 
ontr I BulTer 
\ ern \\ 
Indy few 
delMedlaFtle ) 
File DeletIon 
1 • _OO ~ . 
17.20U3. 
R 17022 00 " f c bruul) 
i ~ * 
High 
1 dlUIll 
lligh 
(High if 
arbitrur) 
de ~ n 
h 
C l'cutl'd) 
\ uln rab lht 
h:h npr J In 
th p nd 
olh r public 
medl . 
d 
In ne\\ gr lUp 
and \l' b III: . 
\ 'lI lnerJb ll ll~ 
ha appeared III 
the pre \lnd 
other publtc 
medIa . 
Bug dl I: u''oed 
In ne\\ .. gr mp 
and\\eb Ill.: . 
Vuln r.lb ilil) 
c n be 
e pl)lted'laJ 
\\ eb bro\\ ,er. 
\ 'uln'rablltt) 
ha apPl'ar,'d III 
thc pre" and 
other public 
mcdia. 
Bu 1 di!'.cus'ed 
1Jl nc\\ group 
and \\ eb., ltc . 
\ulnerabdlty 
has apPl.:ilTcd In 
the pre., and 
other pubil • 
media 
d 
1Jl 111.:\\ group 
and \\l:b lie . 
There I n 1 
e ploi l de 
rel1ulrcJ 
Dtblon 
,,/ea\el 
46 patch 
OpmPKG 
rr/(aH'1 
paflh 47 
lOA 4K 
Jun k 
bu tcr49 
lpJ(rade 
noll' 
aruilable 
Unix 
Unix 
oftware 
arne 
Vulnerability/ 
DHCPD A r emote Denia l of enice 
3.0.1 1 r c l- vuln er a bili ty exi t in 
r c IO 'dhcr ela 'when a rna liciou 
bootp p acket i ubmi tted. 
edric 
Emai l 
Reader 0 .2, 
0.3 
Internet 
Junk 
buste r 2.01 
Two vulnerabilitie exi t: a 
vulnerability exi t in the 
' email.php' cnpt, which 
cou ld let a remote maliciou 
user execute arbitrary code: 
and a vulnerability e I t in 
th e 'emailreader execute 
_on_ eachyage.i nc.php' 
script, which could let a 
remote mali ciou u er exe ute 
arbitra code. 
A vulner a bilit ex i t in the 
C ON NECT m ethod, ' hi ch 
could let a r e mote m a liciou 
u er make unauthorized 
connec tions to arbitrary 
ports. 
Patche :\ orkaround 
Alert 
Debian: 
http: securil) .dcbian .org 
pool update~ main dhcp 
3f 
OpenPKG: 
http :// ~\ IH\.openpkg.org c 
curit) IOpenPK ",.\-
2003.012-dhcpd.html 
o workaround or patch 
a\allable altlme of 
publt hing. 
Lpgrade al'ai/able Of: 
http ://intcrncl.junl..bu\' r. 
com/ijb.hlml 
I\ D £ ~ 1 .52 Unix KDE 2.0, 
2.0.1 , 
2.1 -2.1.2, 
2.2-2.2.2, 
3.0-3.0.5 
Multiple vulnerabiliti e 
due to a failure to prop 
quote pa rameter of 
pgr ade a\ a il a ble a t : 
http: //dol\ nload.l..dc.org ~t 
abl 13.0.58 
If(/rl' 
putelWI 
rfi(!UI/,d H 
I 
in truction pa sed to a 
command hell for 
execution, which could let a 
local/ r emote maliciou u er 
execute arbitrary 
command . 
ulnerability e i t becau e 
the in lude path for a 
configura tion file can be 
pc ified, which ould let a 
ma li IOU u er e ' ute 
arbitra 
4~ uglraq, Janu31') 15, 2003. 
4 ~ Dcblan c 'un! t1\ IS I) . D 24 -I , J a nl! 3~ 2 ,2 03 
Debiall: 
http: // ecuri', .d('bian.org 
poolfupdat main l !'de 
dminl 
Conectil'a: 
ftp: f' atualilll oe .concctil a 
.com.br l 
o \\orkaround or pat h 
a\ ai lable at time of 
publ i hing. 
4' pcnPK 1 l:cunt. d\ I ~ ~ , penPK - \ -_003 01 _, cbrual) 19, _0 3. 
4~ ugtraq. hbrua~ 9, _003 
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P It I 
dhcr la~ 
tran u 
'i' ct" r'" 
Pa '" t 
Rmt 
Denial of 
Remote File 
In lude 
\ ulnerabtlitie· 
Pro\ ) 
na uth or iL d 
onn ction 
KD 
Pa r nm et r 
uotin g hell 
omm a nd 
E\Ccution 
\ ' Name: 
\ \ ' -2002-
1393 
Kletu Ilt t. PIIP 
Remote File 
Inclu I n 
High 
High 
in n( \\ 'l.!r up 
a nd \Hthit t: " 
E pi it hJ' 
b l:n 
publi,h(d . 
SUI! dl ~u 'J 
In nl:\\ cr 1Up 
and \\ b Ill: 
Proof llf 
)neept 
e pll)11-. ha\ c 
been pllblt hni. 
Bug di\cu , d 
in nc'''grou P' 
a nd II eh \ it , . 
T here i\ no 
e \ploit code 
req u ired . 
Bug JI cu ed 
in nl: \ 'roup 
and \\dhltt: . 
Advanced 
Server, 
SPI-SP3, 
Datacenter 
Server, 
SP I-SP3 , 
Profe -
sional, 
SPI-SP3, 
2000 
Server, 
SP I-SP3 , 
Terminal 
Services, 
SP1-SP3, 
NT 
Enterprise 
Server 4.0, 
SPI-SP6a, 
NT Server 
4.0, 
SP1-SP6a, 
NT 
Terminal 
Server 4.0, 
SP I-SP6a, 
NT Work-
tahon 4.0, 
P I-SP6a 
Vulnerability/ 
1m act 
A buffer overflov 
vulnerability exi t in the 
command prompt (cmd.exe) 
becau e paths that contain 
more 256 character are not 
handled properly, which could 
let a maliciou u er execute 
arbitrary code. 
• ' 0 workaround or pal h 
available at lime of 
publi hing. 
Operating 
System 
Windows 
95/98/MEI 
NT 
4.0/2000, 
XP 
Software 
Name 
Windows 
2000 
Advanced 
Server, 
SPl-SP3, 
2000 
Datacenter 
Server, 
SP1-SP3, 
2000 
Profes-
ional, 
SPI-SP3, 
2000 
Server, 
SP] -SP3, 
2000 
Tenninal 
Services, 
SP I-SP3 , 
Windows 
95, SR2, 
Windows 
98, SE, 
ME, 
Windows 
NT 
Enterpri e 
Server 4.0, 
SP I-SP6a, 
NT Server 
4.0, 
SP J-SP6a, 
NT Work-
station 4.0, 
SP 1- P6a, 
XP I-Tome, 
SPI,XP 
Profes-
sional, SPl 
-
VulnerabHit) / 
1m act 
A buffer overt1ow 
vulnerability exists in 
'ricbed20.dl' when a Rich 
Text Fonnat (RTF) file 1 
created that contains a large 
amount of data as an attribute, 
which could let a malicious 
user possibly execute arbitrary 
code. 
Patcbe :\ orkaround 
Alert 
' 0 \\orkaround or patch 
avaIlable at time of 
pubh hing. 
l).+n·~ "lllll \,lIlnlr.lblh(~ ,lOnOlllll.:~rn~n!. 001, hbnIJf) 1(, . .200' 
"n\ln! ~, 
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ommon 
!tribute 
BuOi.:r 
0\ erflo\\ 
lficr()soft 
upaates 
II . 60. bu elm I' 
\lOlilla 62 
(oll/?ctil'a 
rrit'(J\{'S 
PUI(',,~I 
Operating 
System 
Window 
95/98/ME/ 
T 4.0/2000 
Windows 
95/98/ME/ 
NT 
4.0/2000, 
XP, 
MacOS 9.0/ 
9.0.4/ 9.11 
9.2/ 
9.2.1 /9.2.2, 
MacOS X 
10. , 
BcO 5.0, 
Unix 
oftware 
Name 
Internet 
Explorer 
5.0.1,5.0.1 
Pl- P3, 
5.5,5.5 
SPl&2, 
6.0,6.0 
PI 
Mozilla 
Browser 
0.9.3-0.9.9, 
1.0, 1.0.1, 
1.1; 
Galeon 
Browser 
1.2.4-1.2.6 
Several ulnerabilitie 
a vulnerability exist 
becau e it is po ible to 
bypa s the eros -domain 
security model that Internet 
Explorer uses when using 
dialog boxes, which could let 
a malicious user execute 
arbitrary code; and a 
vulnerability exists becau e 
it is possible to bypass the 
cross-domain security model 
that Internet Explorer 
implements when using 
showHelp 0 functionality, 
which could let a malicious 
user execute arbitrary 
commands. 
Bulleti" has been updated to 
i"clude information about 
the availability of a hot fl.'!: 
that resolve a non- ecurity 
related is ue cau ed by the IE 
6 version of this pate" that 
could affect some u ers. 
U"der certain condition -, tlte 
issue could call e some mer 
to be unable to authenticate 
to certain Internet web site -
such as ubscriptiol1 ba ed 
sites, or AtfSN e-mail. 
A vulnerability exi t in the 
implementation of the 
JavaScript 'onUnload' cent 
handler becau e reque ts 
that the handler launche 
have the wrong referer, 
which could let a maliciou 
user obtain sensitive 
information. 
Frequentl} a ked 
que tion r egarding thi 
vulnerability and the 
patch can be found at: 
h ttp: /'\\ \\ ... ~. micro~oft .com I 
techne tree\ ie\\ default.a 
p?url=, technetsecurit) Ibu 
Beti :\1 03-004.asp 
, ate: Report ' indicate 
Ihal thi patch may flot 
install correct(r through 
the Window Update 
website. U er are 
encouraged to do .... nload 
and install the patch 
manually. 
,vote: TIIi .. hot fLX 
correct a I'el)' pecific 
nOli-security issue, alld 
the ecurit), patch 
discllssed in this 
Security Bulletin wa\. 
and still is. ef/ectil'e in 
removing the 
l'lIll1erabilitie ·. Vore 
illformatio", including 
detail of hall' to obtai" 
the hot fix are al'ai/able 
at: 
http: //ww\\.microoft.com/ 
\\ indowslie/don nload Icri! 
icaI!813951 /default.a p 
RedHat: 
ftp _ updates redhat.Cll ll1 
Mandrake: 
http: //\\\\\\.mandra''e~('cu 
re.n en/ftp.php 
Conectil'a: 
ftp: //atualizacoe .conecti~ a 
.com.brl 
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ommon 
"arne 
Intern t 
E\plorcr 
ro -Domain 
\ "ulnera-
bilitic 
\ , ' -200 -
1318 
tonlla 
On nload 
Ref r r 
Information 
Lcakag 
\ ' arne: 
\N-2002-
1126 
\tedium 
.\ua k 
d 
in 0 " gr up, 
and \\b,j(t _ 
Pr(l()f(~l 
(lnt 1" 
/!xploit hun 
bet'" 
publi,/1( d. 
Bug discu,~ d 
in oc" gr up 
and" b it 
Proof of 
onccpt ha 
b 0 
publi h d. 
Vulo nlbilit) 
ha app ar d 
in th pr, 
and oth r 
publi m dia. 
\endor 
\Iocilla 64 
(onectiva 
,deale.\ 
J 65 palc I 
\Iultiple 
\endors 
16 
emler/iva 
,e/eu.le.\ 
~ , palelr 
Operating 
S stem 
Multiple 
Windows 
95/98/MEi 
NT 
4.0/2000, 
XP, 
MacOS 
9.0/9.0.4/ 
9.1/9.2/9.2.1 
MacOS X 
to.x, 
Unix, 
BeO 5.0 
oftware 
arne 
Mozilla 
Browser 
0.9.7-1.0' 
Galeon 
Brower 
1.2.4-1.2.6 
Mozilla 
Brower 
0.9.5-0.9.9, 
1.0; 
Netscape 
6.2-6.2.3; 
Opera 
Software 
Opera 
Web 
Browser 
5.12.6.0, 
6.0.1; 
Galeon 
Browser 
1.2.4-1.2.6 
Vulnerabilityl 
1m act 
Multiple vulnerabilitie exi t 
that have been patched. 
These ulnerabilitie could 
let a maliciou user cau e a 
Denial of ervice, obtain 
eositi e information or 
cau e arbitrary code to be 
executed. For a complete list 
of the e vulnerabilitie , see 
http://mozilla.orgireleasesim 
ozi1la 1.0.1Isecurity-flXe -
1.0.1.html. 
A vulnerability exi ts when 
GIF image files are handled 
that have the width field et 
to zero, which could let a 
maliciou u er cau c a 
Denial of Ser ice or 
potentially execute arbitrar. 
code. 
Patche . (\ orkaround I 
Alert 
' pgrade a\ailable at: 
http: /w"" .molilla.orgl 
relea es 
RedHat: 
fto updales.r<::dhat com 
Mandrake: 
http: //,,,,,,.mandrai.:c ccu 
re.De en/ftp.php 
Coneeriva: 
ftp: /IatuaJizaeoc .eonccth a 
.eom.brl 
Mozilla : 
http: //''I'l\ .moliIJa.oq!/rel 
casesl 
et cape: 
http ://ehanncl .n heap .eo 
m/ns/brOl' cr IdOl, n Joad.j 
p 
COlleetiva: 
ftp: //atuaJizaeoe .eoneeth a 
.eoOl.brl 
M Rllg.lr.1 I. Sq Ic.:rnbcr 1~ . 20(L 
to (l1Jll 11\. L tllli '-'cl:unl\ \nnounl't.;ml'lH. I A-200. :5( . I'l'brual) I~ . 2001. 
toto ~l'l'l fit am. Sq11Cmbl'r ( . 2002 
I, It \1 Inll '-CUIfII\ \nn \1m l'!l1l'nt. ( I \ -200: :.5<> . Il'bnIlH) D . 20 ' l II 
PI 
'1orill a 
'Iultipl 
\ uln r -
bilitie 
it 
\cn\ith e 
informa-
tion i 
ollt incd 
and m'h 
if 
llrbitraf') 
code cnn 
b 
(Iligh if 
nrbilran 
code i, 
(' ('culed) 
Bug dhcu\\cd 
in 11 \<\sgroup' 
Ilnd" b~it ,. 
Proof of 
one pi 
c'Ploit ,crip! 
ha~ b en 
publish d. 
Ifore 
updates 
, d71, /llue 
'J. "4 
Vore 
upJate.\ 
;\\Iu:d -s, 
Operating 
System 
MacOSX 
10.2, 
Unix 
oftware 
arne 
Apple 
MacO X 
10.2 
(Jaguar), 
10.2.2; 
Easy 
Software 
Products 
CUPS 
1.0.4, 
1.0.4-8, 
1.1.1, 
1.1.4-5, 
1.1.4-3, 
1.1.4-2, 
1.1.4, 1.1.6, 
1.1.7, 
1.1.10, 
1.1.12-
1.1.15, 
1.1.17 
Se exist: 
vulnerabilityexi ts in the 
HTTP ser er component of 
the Common UNlX Printing 
System (CUPS), which could 
let a local/remote maliciou 
user obtain root privileges; a 
race condition exi ts in the 
creation of 
letc/cups/certsl<pid>, which 
could let a malicious user 
create or overwrite any fiJe 
as root; a vulnerability 
exists because printers can 
remotely be added to CUPS 
by sending a specially 
crafted UDP packet; a 
remote Denial of ervice 
vulnerability exit due to 
negative length memcpyO 
calls; an integer overflow 
vulnerability exists in the 
image handling code,' hich 
could let a maliciou u er 
obtain elevated privilege ; a 
buffer overflow 
vulnerability exi t in the 
strncat fu nction call in the 
setup of the 'options' tring, 
which could let a malicious 
user obtain root acce ; a 
vulnerability exi ts because 
CUPS improperly checks 
for zero width images in 
filters /image-gif.c, which 
could let a malicious user 
execute arbitrary code; and 
a vulnerability exists 
because the return values of 
many file and socket 
operations are not checked, 
which could let a malicious 
user cause a Denial of 
Service. 
M iD ,F , CClIri t) \d\ i~)f), Decl:mbcr 19, _ 02. 
Patcbe 
~: 
http: I" ,\ .info.appl .cpm 
Ikbnum/ 
bttp:IIWW\\.CUp .org, oft \ 
are.htm1 
-!!...b 
ftp: // ftp. u e.com pub u e 
seo; 
ftp: // ftp. co.co!IlJpub upda 
tes/Open Linu. 
Debian: 
http: // ecurit) .debjan .or~ 
poo update Imain c cup ~ 
s/ 
Mandrake: 
http: //\''H~.mandra''c('cu 
re.ne en/ftp.php 
RedHat: 
ftp: /!update .redhat.com 
Debian; 
http: // ecurit) .debian.org/ 
pool/updates/main! CUPS) 
Information regarding 
Apple updates available 
at: 
http . doc~. lnfoapple .com (l r 
tl Ie hml1 ')artnum 6179 
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('lcl ' It" 
~luJtiple 
Vulnerabil· 
itie 
A -2002-
136, 
CA~-2002-
136, 
1 -2002-
1369, 
\ 1' -2002-
1371, 
\ 1 -2002· 
13 2, 
A -2002-
uln. 
A. -20 2-
1J84 
(HiCh i( 
rlJ ! 
CCl\ 
n hI: 
in nc\\ ' or up, 
nnd \\l:b,IlL" 
\pl oih h:1' 
Ill)PIJP 
17 
uke 
Operating 
System 
Windows, 
Unix 
Software 
arne 
myPHP 
uke 1.8.8 
_ final_7, 
1.8.8 
A eros -Site Scripting 
vulnerabilityexi t in the 
'Iinks.php' script due to 
insufficient anitization of 
HTML code, which could let 
a remote maliciou u er 
execute arbitra code. 
Patche ;\'orkaround ' 
Alert 
o \\ orkaround or patch 
a\ ailable at tlme of 
publ i hing. 
clgear78 Multiple FMl14P A Directory Traversal 
vulnerability exists in the 
web-configuration interface, 
which could Jet an 
unauthorized remote 
malicious user obtain 
sensitive information. 
o workaround or patch 
a ailable at time of 
publishing. 
'ethack 79 
Open 
Webmail 
lp!:rade 
nil'll 
ul'ai/able 
II 
Opcra 
nOware 
, 
O[ll:ru 
oltwarc 
1 
Unix 
Unix 
Multip le 
Multiple 
Nethack 
3.4 .0 
Open 
Webmail 
1.70, 1.71 
Opera Web 
Browser 
6.0.5 
win32,7.0 
win32 Beta 
1&2 
Opera Web 
Brower 
6.0.5 
win32.7.0 
win32 Beta 
1&2.7.0 
win32, 
7.01win32 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerability exist when a 
specially crafted command 
string is submitted to the 
nethack binary, which could 
let a malicious user execute 
arbitra code. 
A vulnerabili ty ex i ts during 
the authentication process 
when an invalid u erna me is 
entered, which could let a 
remote maliciou user 
obtain sensitive information. 
A buffer overnow 
vulnerabi lity exist when an 
URL is submitted that 
contains a pecially crafted, 
long u emame, hich could 
let a remote maliciou u er 
execute arbi trary in tTU tion . 
A Denial of ervice 
vulnerability ex; t in 
'opera.PluginCont t.' 
77 ugtraq. Fl.:bruol') _0, _003. 
, Hugtraq . F~brl.lnl') 10, _003. 
7</ Bugtraq, Fcbru, 1') R 200 .. 
'\1 • ccuntcalll 0\ cmbl.:r _4. _002. 
I SL'Cunt h) 1I'o. I ~hrual"\ 12.200.\ 
, S\:l'lIf1h I lllS. I L'bru'll') Ill. 200J. 
~, ~k III II n I Sl'CtIl i t) \lh 1\01"\. 1<.: bru;ll') 10, .20() \. 
o workaround or patch 
a ailable at time of 
publi hing. 
Upgrade al'ai/ah/e ar: 
http: //open\\ebmail.orgfop 
en" ebmail/do)\ nloadJ 
Upgrade available at : 
http : www.opera.com down 
loadlindex.dl11l ?opsys \ Ind 
ows&lng en 'platform WI 
ndow~ 
Tcmpora r 
r. '<.: 1(; l f 
nIl14P 
Director) 
Tra\ersal 
I ethack Local 
BulTer 
0\ c rfl 0\\ 
pen 
W ebl\tai l 
1 nvs lid 
n ern ame 
Opera 
emame 
Remotc BulTer 
\Crno\\, 
Opera 
opera.Plugin 
onl tali e 
ethod Denial 
Of ervice 
't('dium 
in ne\\ ,group 
and \\ eb tic 
\ 'ulnaabtlll) 
CJn be 
e ploiled \ 1;1 ~ 
\\ eb bw\\ n . 
Bug di'ClI ell 
III nc\\gr lip 
and \\ eb Itc,. 
\pl It ,cnp! 
ha\ c becn 
flllbll ·hed. 
d 
in n \) ~group' 
s nd " cb, itc, . 
\'uln('rab il it) 
esn be 
c\ploitcd 'in II 
~Hb bro \) r. 
Bug dl\Cllctl 
n pl 
explOIt h~" 
bcen published . 
\ eodor 
Oracle 
Corpora-
M lion 
Oracle 
(orpora-
~s 
1100 
Oracle 
(orpora-
lIon~h 
Oracle 
('orpora-
Iionh 
Or,lele 
(orrum-
Iion~ 
Operating 
stem 
Windows 
T 
4.0/2000, 
XP, 
Unix 
Windows 
NT 
4.0/2000, 
XP, 
Unix 
Windows 
NT 
4.0/2000, 
XP, 
Unix 
Window 
NT 
4.0/2000, 
P, 
Uni' 
4.0/2000, 
, P, 
ni 
oftware 
arne 
Oracle 9i 
Application 
Server 
9.0.2 
Oracle8 
8.0.6, 
Oracle 8i 
8.1.7.1, 
8.1.7, 
Oracle9i 
9.0,9.0.1.3, 
9.0.1.2, 
9.0.1,9.0.2, 
Oracle9i 
Relea e 2 
9.2.2, 9.2.1 
Oracle8 
8.0.6, 
Oracle 8i 
8.1.7, 
Oraclc9i 
9.0,9.0.1.3, 
9.0.1.2, 
9.0.1, 9.0.2, 
Oracle9i 
Relca c 2 
9.2.2,9.2.1 
Oracle8 
8.0.6. 
Oracle 8i 
8.1.7, 
8.1.7.1. 
Oracle9i 
9.0, 9.0.1.3, 
9.0.1.2, 
9.0.1,9.0.2, 
Oracle9i 
Relea e 2 
9.2.2,9.2.1 
Release 2 
9.2 .2.9._.1 
A vulnerability exi t in the 
'DA V' functionality due to a 
format string error in the 
'mod_day' module. which 
could let a remote maliciou 
u er execute arbitrary code. 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerability exists in the 
'TO _ TIMESTAMP _ TZ' 
function, which could let a 
malicious user execute 
arbitrary code. 
A bu ffer overflow 
vulnerabilityexi t in lhe 
'TZ_OFF ET' function. 
which could let a maliciou 
u er execute arbitrary code. 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerabilityexi t in the 
'ORACLE.EXE' binary due to 
insufficient bound checking 
on eternal data. which could 
leI a mali iou user e ' ecute 
arbitrary code. 
A bu ffer erflow 
uillerabilit e i t in the 
ME' function due 
tin" u rti iellt bound 
che king on u er·. uppli d 
input, which ould let a 
maliciou. user \,;:\c ute 
arbitrary c de. 
,4 ( rack Se\.·un(~ \len ;15_. ('bruil!") I\. 200J 
~~ Or.leie SeclInl \len 150. F\bruaf\ II. 200~ 
\kn 49. '~'bn.I.If) I I. 200.1 
\len 51. f d1ruJI") I I. _00_ 
UrIt) \lert "I 1I.:0l1.lill") II. _Ott 
Patche\\ orkaround 
:\.Iert 
\ orkaround and upgrade 
mformation a\ ailable at: 
hnp: om oracle com deploy 
ecunl) pdf 20U3alen52 pd 
f 
Oracle has made fi 'e 
available. Admini trators 
can download the 
patches at : 
http. metalm\.. .oracle com 
b entering Bug lumber 
2642439. 
a ailable. dmini Irator 
can download the;: 
pat he at: 
http metalinkoracle.com 
by ent ring Bug umber 
2642267. 
available. dmini Irator 
can do\ nload the 
patche at: 
http· merulm\.. .oracle .com 
b entering Bug umber 
2620726. 
available. dmini tTator 
can download the 
patch at: 
http metahn\.. oracle ~'l)m 
by ent ring Bug umber 
_642117. 
\ pplt(.ation 
en er 
D \ ' PL'ELl 
Formal tnng 
rode 
Dalaba. e 
en er 
TO Tl fE 
T\\[P TZ 
Buller 
\ erfl \\ 
Database 
en er 
TZ FF -T 
BlIller 
O\erflo\\ 
Buffer 
O\erflo\\ 
BulTer 
\erllo\\ 
High 
High 
\ ' uinerabl li l) 
ha .lppcJn.:J III 
lh> pre, nd 
ther publt • 
meJla. 
Bug l.1I eu ~eJ 
In ne\\ gr up 
:lnd \\eb,llc . 
\ ' ulnenbilit) 
ha. arpearcd 111 
thl' rm: ... . J.nd 
other public 
media 
ha arpeafcd It) 
the pre' and 
other rllbhc 
medw 
Bug dlscu ... ed 
In ncwsgr UP' 
and \\l'b Itl:' 
Vulnerablllt) 
hus appeared In 
the pre and 
I her publiL 
media. 
Bug di u' l:d 
10 ne\\',gr UP' 
and \\eb ... lle . 
\'ulnl:rabllll) 
has appeared 111 
lhl: prl:' und 
olhl:r punlll: 
llll:l.ha . 
Vendor 
plfpR9 
RtdHal 
rt/ea.\e.~ 
90 palC" 
Ifore 
PQt("e~ 
'tfea\ed~J 
'1 9J 
I 
phpBB 
Group96 
Po\udis 
Teamll'J 
Operating 
System 
MacO X 
to.x, 
nix 
Windows, 
Unix 
Windows, 
Unix 
Unix 
Wind ws, 
Unix 
Uni 
Software 
Name 
PUP 4.1.2, 
4.2.0-4.2.3 
PHP 4.3 
pbpBB 
1.4.0-1.4.4 
phpBB 
2.0.0-2.0.2 
php-board 
1.0 
Po adi 
0.50.4 -
0.50. 
Vulnerabilityl 
Tm act 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerability exists in the 
wordwrapO function , whieh 
could let a remote malicious 
user cau e a Denial of 
Service or execute arbitrary 
code. 
A vulnerability exists in PHP 
COl SAPI that make option 
for preventing direct acce to 
the CGr binary usele s, which 
could let a maliciou u er 
execute arbitra code. 
A vulnerability exi t in the 
'auth.php' script due 10 
insufficient anitization 0 r 
null chara ter . which could 
let a malicious u er obtain 
sensitive information and 
po iblye ecule arbitrary 
PHP code. 
A vulnerability exists due Lo 
insufficient anitization of 
II er-sllpplied input hen a 
SQL query icon tmcted, 
which could let a remote 
arbitTa 
A vulnerability exi ts becau e 
u er information i tored in 
flat file and acces is not 
suffi iently re tricted, which 
could let a remote maliciou 
u er obtain sensiti e 
infom1ation . 
A remote Denial of en/ice 
ulnerability e ists due to the 
way c rtain DNS querie are 
read b the erver. 
Patehe " 'orkaround I 
Tpgrade avaiJable at: 
http: . '"'' i\.php.net do, nl 
oads.pbp 
RedHat: 
ftp: lupdate .rrdhaLco 
Engarde: 
bttp:llftp.eDgardeIiDU\.org 
Ipub/eDgarde! table/updat 
esl 
Mandrake: 
http://\\ w". mandra ke ecu 
re.ne en/ftp.php 
SuSE: 
ftp://ftp. u e.comlpub/su e 
/886!update/8.lIrpml 
OpenPKG: 
ftp : ftp .openpkg.org release 
12 t UPD 
PGP Group: 
hnp. \\'w,,\ .php net down loa 
d php 
o workaround or pat h 
available at time of 
publi hing. 
o orkaround or patch 
a ailable at lime of 
publi hing. 
o workaround or patch 
a ailable at lim of 
pubJi hing. 
Upgrade available at: 
http : prdownloads. f.net po 
adt:. 
N'I Buglra . Dl:ccmb r 27. _00_. 
IlII Red 1131, Inc. Red lIn! ecunty -2003:017-0 . Febmary 4.2003 . 
<1\ <n ,ardc t:curl: Linux ccun! dvisol). E -2 03 _19-00', Februal) 19.2003 . 
-n 1antlral-.c lll1UX ('emit pt!. te d\ is f). 10K \-_ 03 :019. Februuf) _0, 2003 
'11 1I ... CCUllt) \nnounct:!11Cnl, - .\ :_ 3: . Februaf) 18. _003 . 
<I~ PIT? ccunl) ,\J\ i:. H). rebrual) 17,2003 
'I~ Opcn rr-.c; Sl:cun l\ lh i. 01). pen PK)- \-_00_ 0 10. \: bru'H) I '. _ 03. 
'/Il Bugtraq hhruar;. _0, _00. 
II' 1311glrilq. I ~·bnl.ln 2l, _00_ . 
\I~ S~'LlInl# Flll'Us Il:bru.ln. I~, 20()' 
11'/ S • ' tl I J I I · I-.CI \ k rt. 1 (l1604 . T cbnlan - _()(1 .~ . 
• \;l 
,' IP 
",ord\\rap 
Buffer 
" erllo\\ 
CV am: 
C \ -2001-
1396 
Exe ution 
PITPBB 
uth .PITP File 
Di clo ure 
PllPBB2 
Page_ I leader. 
PI)P QL 
Inje tion 
PIIP-Board 
er Pas word 
Disclo ure 
Remote 
Denial of 
en ice 
lIi!!h if 
arbi r r) 
o c c n 
hl 
r-.kdlU!11 
High 
(High if 
arbitrar) 
codean 
be 
C\cculcd) 
Bug discu,,-cd 
In ne" group 
• nd \\ CbSllc . 
Bug di'icu ... sed 
In nc\\ sgroup" 
nd \\cb",tcs 
\' u I nerabllll) 
can be 
cxpl IteU \ iJ J 
web browscr. 
Bug d,scu,sl;t! 
In ncw"gr lipS 
and \>\ cbs ties 
E plol! S flpt 
ha!'t been 
publi hed. 
can be 
e plollcu, 13 J 
\\ cb bro\\ ~I;r 
Bug Ji cu"scu 
10 m.;\\ ,group .. 
anu \\cb..,th.!s . 
~fandrake 
tlSue~ 
IIP1:rade 
1;1 
Po tgre 
QL IO) , 
10-1 
lfandrake 
i\lues 
up!:'ode 
16f 
Po~tgrc 
IIQL I06 , 
107 
UUlldroke 
i\.lue.! 
~gxrod{' 
Unix 
Unix 
oftware 
arne 
Po tgre 
QL 6.3.2, 
6.5.3, 7.0.3, 
7.1-7.1.3, 
7.2,7.2.1 
Postgre 
SQL 6.3.2, 
6.5.3, 7.0.3, 
7.1-7.1.3, 
7.2.1 
Postgre 
QL 6.3.2, 
6.5.3,7.0.3, 
7.1-7.1.3, 
7.2-7.2.3 
Vulnerabilit)1 
1m act 
A buffer 0 erflow 
vulnerability exi t in the 
date parser due to 
insufficient bound 
checking, which could let a 
malicious user cause a 
Denial of ervice or execute 
arbitrary code. 
Several buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities exist: a 
buffer overflow 
vulnerability exists with the 
TZ environment variable, 
which could let a malicious 
user cause a Denial of 
Service or execute arbitrary 
code; and a buffer 0 erflo' 
vulnerability exi ts , ith the 
SETTlMEZO E 
environment ariable, which 
could let a maliciou u er 
cause a Denial of er ice or 
execute arbitrary code. 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerabilityexi ts in the 
' path_addO ' function due to 
in ufficient bounds 
checking, which could let a 
maliciou u er cause a 
Denial of ervice or e ecute 
arbitrary code. 
PatcheslWorkaroundsl 
AJerts 
RedHat: 
ftp: //updates.redhatcornl 
Conectiva: 
ftp: /latuaJizacoes.coDecti,,·a 
.com.brl 
Debian: 
http: //securit).debian.orgl 
pool/updates/maio/p/postg 
resql 
SuSE: 
ftp: //ftp.su e.comlpub/su e 
Mandrake: 
http: //wW\,,.mandrake ecu 
re.net/en/f . h 
Red Hat: 
ftp:/!updates.redhatcoml 
Conecti a: 
ftp: /!atuaJizacoe .conecti\ a 
.com.brl 
Debian: 
http: // ecurit) .debian.org 
pool/update Imain/p/po tg 
resql 
....!L...fu 
ftp: //ftp. u e.com publ u e 
Mandrake: 
http://,,,~,,,, .mandrake ecu 
re.ne en/ftp.php 
RedHat: 
ftp: /Iupdate .redhal. oml 
Conectiva: 
ftp: /Iatualilacoe .cone tha 
.com.brl 
Debian : 
http: // ecurit) .d bian.org 
pool/update 1m in /p 'po~tg 
re ql 
UondraAe: 
ndra"e e u 
111(1 RuJ Ilat. Inc Red Jlat _' l:curit~ \d\1 01), RJI \-20 3:001-16. Janllal) 1-1. _003 . 
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1111 Rl.'d Ilal,lnL' Red 11,1l"~ lInl~ ' \lhl')1) RII \ · 00,\ (HlI·I(I, !.lnull") 14._0W 
III Rl'ull.II , llll Red II,,! "l'llllll) \ hIS1f) . RII" \·_lO\ ,OIO-1O J.lllll I) 1 ._O( 
1(1 :\ 1.lIt Ir.lkL (lIll. llun!) l pd,I!~ \t! \I' .. ( I") \ \DI\. \.' O~ : l (l ~ ·I , I ~ ruu!) L,_( 
P , III II 
Common 
Overflo\\ 
CYE arne: 
C ~-2002-
1398 
En,ironment 
& ET TJ IE 
ZO E 
Environm ent 
Va riable 
Buffer 
OverflOH 
\ amc: 
A -2002-
1~02 
Ri k* 
Lon /High 
(High if 
arbitrar) 
code i 
executed) 
Low/High 
(High if 
arbitrar~ 
code i 
e ecuted) 
(lligh if 
arbitrar)-
ode i 
e ecut d) 
-\ttacks 
Bug discu d 
in n \\ group\ 
and \\ b it 
Ifandrake 
Iwe.1 
upgrade 
Po tgre 
QLI12 
I/andrake 
1\\UI'I 
"lKrade 
, J 
Postgre 
QL II~ 
IIul/drake 
II\ U£'.\ 
unJ:rade 
I ' 
oftware Vulnerability/ Patche /Workaround / 
1m act Alert 
everal buffer 0 erllow Red Hat: 
vulnerabilitie exist: a ftp:! update .redhat.cOmJ 
buffer overflow Conecti a: 
ulnerability exists in the ftp: l!atualizacoe .conecth a 
path_encodeO' function , .com.br! 
Debian: 
which could let a remote 
http: // ecurit) .debian.org, 
malicious user execute 
arbitrary commands; and a 
pool/updates!mainJp po tg 
buffer overflow 
resql 
vulnerability exits with the Mandrake: 
' circle yoly' function , http://w \,~.mandrake eeu 
which could let a malicious re.netlen!ftp.php 
user cause a Denial of 
Service or execute arbitrary 
code. 
Multiple Postgre A buffer overflow Upgrade a aiJable at: 
SQL 6.3.2, vulnerability exists in the in http: //M,,, .po tgre qJ.org 
6.5.3, 7.1 , cash _ wordsO fu nction R edHat: 
7.1.1 , 7.1.2, because overly long queri e ftp: l!update .redhal.eom! 
7.2 are Dot handled properl. Conectiva: 
which could let a maliciou ftp: l!atualilacoe .. conecth a 
.com.br! 
user execute arbitrar code. Debian: 
http : //securit~.debian.org 
pool/updates!main/p/po Ig 
resql 
~ 
ftp: l! flp. u e.com/pub su e 
.'\-fandrake: 
Multiple Postgre A buffer overflo\ 
QL 6.3.2, vulnerability exi t in the ftp: l!update .redhat.com/ 
6.5.3,7.1, repeatO function , which Conecti a: 
7.1.1 , 7.1.2, could let a maliciou u er ftp: l!atualizacoe .coneclh a 
7.2,7.2.1 execute arbitrary code. .com.brl Debian: 
http: // ecurit) .debian .org 
poollupdal Imain p po tg 
re ql 
~ 
ftp: /!ftp . u c.com/pub! use 
Mandrake: 
IUQ Rc d IInl In ', R~d Iial c unt) \d\ I, 1') , RIl \-20 3 0 1-1 6. Janual')' 14.2003. 
110 Rc d 11.11 1 n Rcd 1Ial ~Cunl) \d\ I )1"" RII \ -2003 0 I -10, Janusf) 14. 2003 . 
III IJlldrlJ..c [InU\ Sl.:clInt\ pdak \d\lsof) . 1\1DK~ \ -200_,06_-1, ' cbruaf) 12.2 03 . 
II' tl ( ) tlm irl' u Luh~ \U\ '" )f) , 0\000 I. \ lIgu I 19. _00_ 
1and 11l111\ cClInl\ pdUll: \d\ 1')f) \1D" \ -~002 . 06_-I . rl.:brual) IM • .2l O~. 
1 rdrLu 1 .1[, \ lh I"l)~ () 000.\ Aligu t _0, _00 "1 . 
I I 1 Inti "l:Utrll~ pJ,llo.:t\O" If) . r-..1D" \ -~0020(l2-1 . d1l1.111) 1_. 200 .... . 
I' .1 
Common 
Rit.. 
(Hillh if 
arbitrar) 
0\ erflo\\ c d i 
ecutcd) 
High Bug discu, cd 
in n " gr up 
and" cb it 
0\ erOo" 'ploit ha~ 
b en 
V arne: publi h d. 
A. -2002-
1397 
Po tgre QL Hijlh d 
Repeat 
Function 
Buffer 
OverOow 
VE am : 
A '-2002-
1400 
bluel 
upgrade 
, . 
oftware 
arne 
Postgre 
QL 6.3.2, 
6.5.3, 7.1 , 
7.1.1 , 7.1.2, 
7.2, 7.2.1 
Vulnerability! 
1m act 
A buffer 0 erllow 
vulnerabili ty exi t in the 
IpadO and rpadO fun ction s 
because 0 erl large integer 
arguments are handled 
properly, which could let a 
maliciou user cause a 
Denial of Service. This 
vulnerability only affects 
data bases that were created 
using special international 
encodings. 
Patche lWorkaround ! 
Alert 
R edHat: 
ftp ://update .redhat.coml 
Conectiva : 
ftp: l/atuaJizacoe .conecth a 
.com.brl 
Debian: 
http :// ecurit).debian.orgl 
pooUupdate Imai nlp 'po tg 
resqJ 
SuSE: 
ftp :// ftp. u e.comlpubl u e 
Mandrake: 
R \RLAB Windows FAR 1.65, 
1.70 bela 
1&4 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerability exist due to 
insufficient bounds checking 
when di rectory paths are 
RedUat 
119 
Palche.\ 
noll' 
milable 
1)1, 111 
T 
Unix Linux 7.1 , 
7.2, 7.3, 8.0 
par ed, which could let a 
maliciou u er cau e a Denial 
of Service. 
A vulnerability exist in the 
' pam_ auth ' module when 
running the 'su ' utili ty in 
conjunction, which could let 
a maliciou u er obtain 
elevated privilege . 
RedHat: 
ftp: //update .redhat.com 
A-fal1drake: 
http ://,,,,,, .mandrake ecu 
re.ne en/ftp.php 
Rcdllat '22 Unix Linux 7.2, 
7.2 ia64, 
7.3,8.0 
A vulnerability ex i t in the 
' u eradd ' utili ty due to a 
failure to et ecure 
Upgrade availabl at: 
fip , updates redhat.com 
Linu .0 
i386 
perrm ion for a new u er' 
mail spoo l directory, which 
could let a maliciou u er 
obtain en iti e information. 
A vulnerabili ty e i t beeau e 
the ' umLnet' ut ility in 
kernel-ut i I pa kage wa 
incorrec tl y hipped etuid 
root, which could let a 
maliciou u er obtain e\e\ ated 
privi lege. 
Upgrade a\adable at: 
ftp. update .redhat.comO 
en 01386 kemel-uub-2.4-
2 i3 6 rpm 
11/\ ~l ( ) 1on.lrcd Labs \d\ ISO 0\0004, \ugust _0. _002. 
t J1 IJndr,lkc Ltnll\ l:cllnl pdalt: d\ I. I). IDK -200_:06_-1. Februal) 12. 2 3. 
II llunllam. r cbnlMY 15, _ 03 
11<1 Buill\. ~lCl1nt) \ Lh I ... I). _00212140 0 I. Febmal) 4,2003 
11(l Rl III I Inl: Rcu II Jt ,C'unt) \d\ I '1"\ . RII'-. \-2003 '035-1 . ebruar;. 12,2003 . 
111 1 n l kl t11l11 e\.urll\ puatc \U\I 01"\ ~fDK \-~00301 , l"ebruul"\ I . _Oll~ . 
]I I. 1m RlU IIJI cllmt\ \U\j 01"\. RII \-200~ : O: -06. F ' hma 1 .2 Lt. 
111.1 Ill\. Rt.:d 11.11 \ll'llnl) \U\I l)n RII \-110, :0-6-0 , J 'bru f) 7. 0 3 
Pu l 21 (' 
F R File 
lanager 
Demalof 
en tee 
P \ I 
pam_ " auth 
le\ atcd 
Prhilege 
\ E amc: 
\ -2002-
1160 
Red ll at 
u erndd 
Inse ure Mad 
p 01 
Perml Ion 
V ' 'arne: 
A -2002-
1509 
er Mode 
Ltnux el ID 
In lallatl n 
0\\ 
~Icdium 
tedIum 
in ne" gr up 
and" b itl: . 
Bug dts ' U ld 
10 nc\\ drouP 
and \\t:b til 
Pro r of 
in n " group 
and" b itc' . 
Proof of 
In new'igrOllp" 
and websllt: , 
There IS n 
explOIt dt: 
reqUI red 
10 nc\ ... ..,gr up 
and \\(;b Ill: . 
TIlerl I" no 
c plott odl 
rt:qulreJ. 
Operating 
System 
Windows 
95/98/ME/ 
T/2000, 
XP 
Window, 
Unix 
oftware 
Name 
rypto 
Buddy 1.0, 
1.2 
Sage 1.0 
beta 3 
Vulnerability/ 
1m act 
Multiple vulnerabilitie exi t: 
a vulnerability exists becau e 
the passphra e encryption 
algorithm generates 
predictable ciphertext for 
specific sequences of 
characters, which could let a 
malicious user obtain 
ensitive information; a 
vulnerability exists because 
the user-supplied passphrase 
is not used to encrypt files, 
which could let a malicious 
user obtain sensitive 
information; and a 
vulnerabilityexi ts because 
passphrases over 55 
characters in length are 
truncated, which could result 
in a user having a fal e en e 
of securi . 
Several vulnerabilitie exi t: a 
vulnerabilityexi t in the 
Content Management y tern 
when a reque t i made for a 
nonexi tent module, which 
could let a maliciou u er 
obtain sensitive information; 
and a Cros -Site cripting 
vulnerability exi t due to 
insufficient anitization of 
input ubmitted in URI 
parameters, which could let a 
malicioll u er e ecute 
arbitrary HTML or cript 
code. 
Patcbe IWorkaround / 
Alerts 
o workaround or patch 
available at time of 
publi hing. 
o workaround or pat h 
a ailable at time of 
publi hing. 
P.I 'I: __ of 
Common 
arne 
CT)ptoBudd} 
MUltlpl 
Pa phrase 
EncryptlOn 
uinerab1l1lLe 
age 
Path 
\nael... 
~kdlllm Bug dl'cu \:d 
llij!h 111 ne\\grour. 
anti \\ eb'lles 
(High if Pro )f r 
arbitrary oncerl 
code can l:"rIOLts ha\ c 
be been rubll' .. hed . 
ecuted) 
r 
Vendor 
un 
'liero-
, terns, 
• 126 JnC. 
Jeffy 
lo!rware 
also 
~,ected 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Sun 
\hcro-
\\~krns, 
Inc. I' 
.... 
Operating oftware Vulnerability! 
System Name Impact 
Windows, Java Web A vulnerability exists 
Unix tart 1.0, because the Java Secure 
1.0.1 , Socket Extension (JSSE), 
1.0.1 _01, Java Plug-in, and Java Web 
1.0.1 _02, Start incorrectly validate 
1.2; the digital certificate of a 
JRE web site, which could let 
(Linux untrustworthy web sites be 
Production authenticated for SSL 
Release), transactions. 
(Solaris 
Production 
Release), 
(Windows 
Production 
Release) 
1.3, 
1.3_1.3, 
1.3_02, 
1.3_05, 
1.3.1, 
1.3.1 _01, 
1.3.1 _03, 
1.3.1_05, 
1.4,1.4.1; 
JSSE 
1.0.3; 
SDK 
(Linux 
Production 
Release), 
(Solaris 
Production 
Release), 
(Windows 
Production 
Release) 
1.3_02, 
1.3_05, 
1.3.1_01 , 
1.3.1_03, 
1.3.1_05, 
1.4, 
1.4.0_02, 
1.4,1.4.1; 
Jeff)' 
4.2.4-4.2.6 
111 olari A remote Denial of ervice 
2.5. 1, ulnerability exist \ hen 
2.5. I 86, 
-
proce ing maliciou packet 
2.6. ent to a Ii tening RPC 
2.6 6. ervice. 
-
7.0, 
7.0 x 6, 
.0. 
. 0 x86. 
9.0 
I." Sun ~01) l\kr1 , "00 ' I . htnWll) _1. 20tH . 
m ~ l unt 1\ )Cll'o , hbruul) 6. _001 
I un sn AlaI ollficalt n. "062t>. pcbruan I . _(103. 
PatchesfWorkarounds! 
AJerts 
Upgrade a ailable at: 
http ://ja\a.sun .com!produ 
cts/jsse/index- t 03.html 
or 
http ://ja\3.sun.co mlj 2se, 
Jetty upgrade available 
at: 
http: //prdownJoads.sourcef 
orge.netljetty/Jetty-4.2. 7-
src.tgz?downJoad 
Patches available at: 
http : sunsoJ\"e un com pub 
-
Cgl findPatch pJ'lpatchld 10 
5402&re\ 41 
Patch) 05402-41 , 
Patch 105401-41. 
Patcb 106943-2 .. t, 
Patch 106942-24 . 
Pat b 10 2 - 7. 
Patch 10 2 -36. 
Patch I 13319-04 
IPl P.I '\; 2.' ll/ , 7 
Common \tta 
Name ill k+ Sc ript, 
Sun ;\Iedium Bug di u ~d 
J SE!Java in ne" oroup 
Plug-I Java and 1\ eb ite,. 
Web tart 
Incorrect 
Certificate 
Validation 
Sun Solari Lo\\ Bug c.h.,cus",l:U 
Remote in nl:\\ .,group 
Denial or and \\Cb.,tk 
en i c 
242 
II tem , 
r 
110 
nco 
Sun 
updates 
bulletin IJ I 
Unix 
Windows 
98IMEfNT 
4 .0/2000, 
XP 
oftware 
olari 2.6, 
2.6_x86, 
7.0, 
7.0_x86, 
8.0, 
8.0_x86, 
9.0, 
9.0 x86 
Solaris 2.6, 
7, 8, 9 
Norton 
AntiVirus 
2002 
Vulnerabilit)1 
1m act 
A vulnerability exist in the 
mail program due to a 
problem with the handling of 
opening mail pool files, 
which could let a malicious 
user obtain sen itive 
information. 
A remote Denial of Service 
vulnerability exi ts in the 
' in.ftpd ' daemon. 
Temporary patche available 
and updated 
relieflworkaround section. 
A buffer overflow 
vulnerabil ity exi t when an 
e-mai l mes age with a 
compressed file that include 
a file wi th an unu ually long 
filename i recei ed, which 
could let a maliciou u er 
execute arbitra code. 
Patchesl\Vorkaround 1 
Alerts 
Patche a ailable at: 
hrtp un olve sun com 
Patch 109267-05, 
Patch 109266-05. 
Patch 109254-07, 
Patch 109253-07, 
Patch 111875-06, 
Patch 111874-06, 
Patch I 14134-0 I , 
Patch 114133-01 
http: // uno''e.un.comlpu 
b-cgilretrie\ e.pl?doc 
=f alert%2FSOUO 
Product update 
containing the fi \ ha\ e 
been di tributed "ia 
Li eUpdate. 
l nh cr- Multiple Lynx 2.8.2 
rel.l- 2.8.4 
reI. I , 2.8.5 
dev.8 
A vulnerability exi t when 
carriage return and line feed 
(CRLF) character are 
included in the 
commandline, which could 
let a maliciou u er make 
Patch a ailable at: 
ftp:/Il) m .. isc.orgfl) n\2.804 
patche I I) n\2.8.4rel.1c.pat 
ch 
lit} of 
"'ansa 133 
Ifore 
pO/fllel 
rtleused 
11/, IH 
\1 unl 
\flning, 
Inc, I\~ 
nl 
cript that use Lyn for 
downloading file from the 
wrong site on a web erver 
with multiple virtual 
ho ts. 
vulnerabilityexi t becau e 
in alid chunked encoded 
HTTP reque tare 
in ufficientl handled, \ hich 
could let a malici u u er 
12<l un(sm) krt ollficallon, 50751. FcbnlLlf) II. 2003 
Il(1 ' un(ll1) \Iert, 50240. Januaf) 27, _003 
I \ I , t1n( Ill) , \ lert. 50240, T ebruJf) 6, 2003 
II' , ~ J\ I\I'>Of\ )61,februllf) 19,_00~ 
III Ih I q. J\ugu'>l 19, 2002 , 
ELink: 
http: //elink.or.cz/do'' nloa 
dlelink -O.4pre I S.tar.bz2 
Debian : 
http: // ecurH) .debian.orgl 
pooUupdat Imain/ l/l) n\-
1/ 
~ 
ftp: /' ftp. co.com/pub upda 
te IOpenLinu\ 
Tru tix: 
ftp: //ftp .tru H\.netJpub r 
u tho/update I 
RedHat: 
ftp: /!update .redhat.coml 
OpenPKG: 
http: //\\\\\\.openpkg.org/ e 
curit) /OpenPKG-
2003.011-hn .html 
o workaround or patch 
available at lime of 
publi hing. 
114 R 11.11 IIll Rl'J lIal "'~ UrIl) \lh ISOf\ R 11'" \-200: :0 .. 9-06. J\:bru If) I .... 200 \ , 
P nP '\llUfll\ \J\I"l)f\ , pcnP" 1-\\-100 Oll , hbrullf) 1 .2mp. 
un! 11 1 ehru,\f\ I", ~O()3 . 
#'-: 1I0 -o,t P "l 24 f 
Common 
enice 
orton 
nll\lru. 200_ 
mad canner 
Buffer 
\ ernO\\ 
L)", 
ommand 
Line R 
RLF 
Inj ection 
ef\ er 
hunked 
[n odmg 
Information 
Leakage 
0\\ 
High 
I dium 
In n \ ~nup 
and \\lb l k . 
in n \\ gr up 
and \\ b,it 
m ne\\ grlHlp 
anJ \\ l'b, Ill" . 
Bug di'lcu, cd 
in nc\\ .. group .. 
and \\ cb'it ". 
'pi it .. ript 
ha b cn 
pubJi hcd. 
In n\:\\ I!fllUP' 
llnd \\ eb lie . 
oftware Vulnerabilityl Patche IWorkaround I Common 
ame 1m act Alert Tame ruk 
Two ero s-Site Scripting Debian: \\) \,.f High Unix vulnerabilities exist: a http . ecunty.debian.org po ro - He 
vulnerability exi ts if frame 01 update main w \\3mmee cnpting 
w3mmee support is enabled due to RedHat: 
ftp . ·updates .redhat.com O.3.p23.3, insufficient sanitization of 
w3mmee- HTML tags, which could let a W3M: 
sl remote malicious user execute http: prdownload . ourcefor 
O.3 .p23.3 arbitrary code; and a ge.net w3m w3m-
'-2002-0.3.2.2. taLgz?down load 
vulnerability exists due to O(!enPKG: 134 inadequate sanitization of http: .\\'W\\ openpkg.org ec 
IMAGE tags, which could let unty OpenPKG-SA-
a remote malicious user 2003 .009-w3m.hrml 
execute arbitra code. 
*"Risk" is defined by CyberNotes in the following manner: 
High - A high-risk vulnerability is defined a one that will allow an intruder to immediatel gam 
privileged access (e.g., sysadmin or root) to the sy tern or allow an intruder to e ecute de r alter 
arbitrary system files. An example of a high-risk vulnerability i one that aJIow an unauthoriz d u er 
to send a sequence of instructions to a machine and the machine re pond \ ith a command pr mpt \\ ilh 
administrator privileges. 
Medium - A medium-risk vulnerability i defined a one that ill allo an intruder imm diale a '$ 
to a system with less than privileged acce . uch vulnerability will allow the intruder th pp rtunity 
to continue the attempt to gain privileged acce . An example ofm dium-ri k \uln rabiltty I' a en r 
configuration error that allows an intruder to capture the pa word file . 
Low - A low-risk vu lnerabi lity i defined a one that will pro ide infom1ation t an intruder that uld 
lead to further compromise attempt or a Denial of ervi e (Do ) atta k. It hould be n ted that \ hile 
the DoS attack is deemed low from a threat potential , the frequency of thi type of alta k I very hIgh. 
Do attack against mission-critical node are not included in thi rating and an attack f thl nature 
should instead be con idered to be a "High" threat. 
Recent Exploit Scnpls/I'echniques 
The table below contains a representative ample of e ploit ript and How to uide , id ntified 
between February 10 and February 2 1, 2003, Ii ted by date of cript, cript name , cript de ription, 
and comments. Items Ii ted in boldface/red (if any) are atta k ript Itechnique for which end r ', 
ecurity ulnerability listservs, or Computer Emergency Re pon e Team ( ERT) ha e not publt hed 
workaround or patche , or which repre ent cript that maliciou u er are utilizing. During lhl 
period 17 ript, program, and net-news me age containing hole or e ploit ere identified. te: 
At time, cripts/technique may contain name or content that may be con idered offen i e. 
Date of cript 
(Rever e hronological cript Name cript D cription 
Order) 
In nc\\ gr up 
and \\cb i l' . 
Th ' n: 1 nl 
c ploll C d~ 
rcqulr d. 
February _ I, 2003 Tcp an3 .txt 1 Il andbook 1 
Ft'bruar~ 20. 2003 
D ' R-cpanel.c 
Dc R-ncthuck.c 
I:cunt) \d\ 1',(1) , D~ \ _-i9- I, cbntul") II , _003 . 
~cllnt~ \d\ 1,,01") . 0 \ ~50-1. Il:bn.hll") L. ~003 . 
I:l llnt\ \lh l"Of\ . 0 \ _5 1- I, I cbntaf\ 14.2003 . 
1m Rl.'d I tal l: Unl\ \lh 1" )1") , RII ' \ -"00.:0 -i-20. horu 7. 211() 1, 
l' \l.' I.' Unl\ \lhl If\ , )r~nPI\. J- \-_00 ~ . tl09 . l l.'hru T) I .~O(l\ . 
Date of cript 
(Reverse Chronological cript arne cript De cription 
Order) 
February 20,2003 PHPBBAuto electFi hAttacker.php Exploi t for the PHPBB2 Page_Header.PI fP SQll nj tlOn 
vul nerability. 
February 20, 2003 PHP ukeAuto electFishAttacker. E 'ploit for the PHP, ' uke Search En inc SQL Inj~ orion 
php \-ulnerabilit) . 
February 20, 2003 Webmail_local.pl Script that nploit the CPanel 5 Op n, cbmail 
, ulnerabilit\. 
February 19, 2003 Gobbler-l .8alpha.tar.gz A tool that i de igned to audit \ anous pc t ofDHC? 
networks. from detecting if DHCP i running on a n t\\ o r~ to 
perfonn ing a denial of en I e aLta L G bbler alo e r lOl t 
DHCP and Ethernet. to allo\\ di tnbuLed poole d port ' lJnn lng 
wi th the added bonu of being able to nlfrthe rep l) from a ~ 
spoofed host. 
February 18, 2003 Absolute _ uk2.pl Perl cript that e ploit th b olute TelneL Title Bar BulTer 
Overflow vu Inerablll t) . 
February 18, 2003 Xperly abbse_ma s.tar.gz Yaba e 1.5.0 and belo\\ remote ' anner e'.pl It LO 11 \\ hi h 
takes advantage of a bug in an mclude named Pac~agcs .php 
February 16, 2003 Bitchx-353.c Script that e~ploit th Bitch"\ \lalformcd RPL 
N \MREPL \ Denial of ~en ICC' ulncrabllit\ . 
February 13, 2003 Udp-remote-fin al. tar.gz A utility that demonstratc ' a Imple UD? bJchloor \\ hi h 
allows for remote program e,"eCUllOn on a L nt'" sen cr. 
February II , 2003 Smtp can-OA.tar.gz A t I to gue . \\ hi h MT I. u ed b scndtng se\t::ral "spl.:l.:l .11" 
MTP reque t and b c mparing err r codl.:s returned \\ Ilh 
those m the fi ngerprint database. 
February 10, 2003 0302 17_ 06unex p.tgl Scn pt that e'. plOl t th Opcr, U crname Remote Bliner 
Overfl ow \ ul nerability. 
February 10, 2003 Nethack.pl Perl cript that e ploit th !'icthack l.ocal Buffer 0, uno 
,ulnerabilit\·. 
February 10, 2003 Nethacker.c Script that e ploit th Bit h:\ Malformed RPL_ 
N \l\1REPL \ Denial of ~en icc, ulncrabilih. 
February 10, 2003 06une p.c Script that e ploi t the Opem l Jsername Rem te Burrer 
O\ erflo\\ \ ul nerabtllt) . 
February 10, 2003 TIl unR l.zip Remote roo t e plolt for Real en r 8 n 'iC\ I.:ral Wmdo" 
platfo rms. 
Trends 
• y terns are being compromised through the e 'ploitation of null or weak default ' a ' pa word in 
Microsoft QL erver and Micro oft Data Engine. 
• Propagation of QL' lammer' or 'Sapphire' maliciou code i till cau ing' aried le\ I of network 
degradation acro s the Internet and the compromi e of vulnerable machine. 
• NIP ha i sued an advi ory regarding the propagation of an QL \\orm The elf-propagating 
• 
maliciou code exploit mUltiple "ulnerabilitie in the Re olution en ice of Micro oft QL ncr 
2000. Thi "orm activity appear to hne cau ed "ariou level of net\,'ork degradation acro the 
Internet. In addition to the compromi e of' ulnerable machine; the apparent effect of fhi fa t -
pr ading, ,iru -like infection ha oven, helmed the \\ orld' digital pipeline and interi red" ith \\ b 
bro" ing and delh el} of e-maiI.Formoreinformation.ee , iru ection, W R 1 LP 1 -'3-'. \ 
de cription and IPC Ad\ i or) 03-001.1, located at: 
http: //www.nipc.gov/warning /adYiorie /2003/03-001.1update.htm. For patch information. 
• http: //www.microoft.com/ ecurit) / lammer.a p 
• http: //\H\\,.microoft.com/technet/ ecurit) /bulletin/ l\1 2-061.a p 
• http: //\HH\.micro oft-com/technet/ ecurit) /bulletin/ 1 02-039.a p 
The RT/ ha relea ed an advi or) regarding a buffer ovcrOo,"\ \ ulnerability in th e 
l\1 icro oft \\lindo" hell. For more information, ee Bug, Hole & Patche tabl entr) , 
" \\ indo" . . P \\ 1\1 \1 P3 Buffer 'erOo,," a nd RT It \d, i or) \ -2002-1, I cat ed a t : 
hU p """.ccrLorg ad\ i. orie' -2 02-37.html. 
l' 
I 
• The CERT/CC has released an advisory regarding multiple vendors' implementations of the 
secure shell (SSH) transport layer protocol contain vulnerabilities that could allow a remote 
malicious user to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the SSH process or cause a 
denial of service. The vulnerabilities affect SSH clients and servers, and they occur before 
user authentication takes place. For more information, see Bugs, Holes & Patches table enm' 
"Multiple Vendor SSH2 Implementation" and CERT® Advisory CA-2002-36, located at: . 
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-36.html. 
• The CERT/CC has received reports of increased scanning for NetBIOS services. Probes to 
port 137/udp may be indicative of such activity. 
VlIUSes 
The following virus descriptions encompass new viruses and variations of previously encountered 
viruses that have been discovered in the last two weeks. The viruses are listed alphabetically by their 
common name. While these viruses might not all be in wide circulation, it is highly recommended that 
users update anti-virus programs as often as updates become available. NOTE: AI limes. viruses mal' 
contain names or content that may be considered offensive. . 
BAT.Junkboat.Worm (Alias: I-Worm.Junkboat) (Batch File Worm): This is a worm that uses the 
KaZaA-file sharing network and mIRC to spread. It also creates the file C:\Love Me.vbs that has the 
ability to e-mail the BAT .1unkboat. Worm to all addresses in the Microsoft Outlo~k Address Book. 
VBS.Caser@mm (Alias: VBS.Casechange.A) (Visual Basic Script Worm): This is a mass-mailing 
worm that spreads using Microsoft Outlook and IRC and copies itself across mapped drives. The worm 
attempts to overwrite several files on your system. The e-mail will have an attachment with a .vbs file 
extension. 
VBS/Cian-C (Aliases: I-Worm.Thery.b, VBS_CIAN.C, VBS.Cian.C@mm, VBS.Cian.C) (Visual 
Basic Script Worm): This is a worm which spreads via mIRC, P2P file sharing networks, and e-mail 
attachments. It appends itself to files with the extensions VBS or VBE and infects Word and Excel 
documents. Infected Word and Excel documents are detected as OF97/Cian-C. Upon execution, 
VBS/Cian-C drops several copies of itself to the system folder as Winstart.vbs, Wininst32.vbs, 
Winnt32.vbs, and Winnet32.vbs. The worm also drops itself to the Windows folder as Netlnk32.vbs 
and Conversation.vbe. VBS/Cian-C then sets the following registry entry in order to run itself on 
startup: 
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ Winstart 
="Wscript.exe C:\<Systems>\Winstart.vbs %1" 
It drops two macro scripts, evade.jpg and evade.gif, to the system folder. The worm then uses these 
scripts to create the infected Excel Document Personal.xls in the Excel startup folder and infects the 
Word Document template. Personal.xls and the infected Word Document template will infect Excel 
and Word documents under the Microsoft Office environment. The infected Office documents can 
spread separately as viruses and via e-mail, however they will also drop and run a copy of VBS/Cian-
C. It lowers the security settings under Microsoft Office by modifying the following registry entries: 
• HKCu\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Version>\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM=" 1 " 
• HKCu\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Version>\Excel\Security\Level=" I " 
• HKCu\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Version>\ Word\Security\Access VBOM=" 1 " 
• HKCu\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Version>\ Word\Security\Level=" 1 " 
VBS/Cian-C then proceeds to append itself to files with the extensions VBS and VBE found in various 
folders. In addition, VBS/Cian-C targets the numerous folders that are the file sharing folders of 
various Peer-to-peer file sharing applications. VBS/Cian-C replaces files with the following extensions 
with copies of itself, preserving the filename but adding an additional VBS extension (e.g. . . 
filename.mp3.vbs). It then attempts to modify script.ini in the mIRC folder so that the miRe che~t WIll 
automatically send a copy of the worm to users joining the same IRC channel. The message sent IS 
"Remember this funny conversion I had on IRC?" and the file is Conversation.vbe, detected as 
mIRC/Cian-C. Finally, VBS/Cian-C sets the following registry entry as infection mark: 
• HKCu\Sofware\Zed/[rRlfj\VBSlEvade\ = "VBSlEvade.A by ZedI[rRlfj" 
VBS.DLetter@'mm (Aliases: VBSlDeathLetter. \,BS/Grimgram(~fMM) (Visual Basic Script 
Worm): When executed. the worm attempts to send itself to all the recipients in the ~icrosoft Outlook 
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address book .. The e-mail will hav~ a subject that is randomly chosen from a predetermined list and an 
attachment wIth a .mht file extenSlOn. VBS.DLetter@mm also spreads using the IRC mIRC and 
KaZaA-shared folders. ' , 
V~S.Gpre~ier~~m (Visual Basic Script Worm): This is a mass-mailing worm that is written in the 
VIsual Bas~c Scnptmg (VBS) language: When it is executed, it copies itself to the \Windows\System 
folder and mfects ~II the HT~L files WIth the VBS.CandyLove virus. VBS.Gpremier@mm mails itself 
to all the contacts m all the MIcrosoft Outlook Address Books. The e-mail would have the following 
characteristics: 
• Subject: NO estimado Bill G. 
• Attachment: gpremier.vbs 
V~S~MrCopy.Worm (Visual Basic Script Worm): This worm spreads by copying itself over all the 
eXlstmg .vbs and .vbe files found on all the local drives and mapped network drives. When 
MrCopy.Worm is activated, it adds the value, "WinUpdate" = "Wsrnpt.exe %System%\Mr. 
Worm.pps.vbs %," to the registry key: 
• HKEY _LOCAL _ MACHINE\SOFTW ARE\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 
Next it copies itself as %System%\Mr. Worm.pps.vbs and copies over all the .vbs and .vbe files found 
on all the local drives and mapped network drives. 
W32/Axam-A (Aliases: I-Worm.Axam, W9S/MaxaP2P.A, W32.HLLW.Maax(ii'mm. 
W32/Maax@MM, W32/MaxaP2P.A) (Win32 Worm): This is an e-mail and peer-to-peer worm. The 
worm may also be found in the numerous folders commonly shared by popular peer-to-peer 
networking software. It will also be copied to the Windows startup folder and 
C:\Windows\Application Data\. The following registry entry will be created to run the worm when 
Windows starts up: 
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\sysaxam32 
A new file type named spitmaxa will be created via the registry entry HKCR\Spitmaxa and the registry 
entry HKCR\.exe will be modified so that EXE files will be run as the file type spitmaxa. This will 
cause the worm to be run whenever the infected user attempts to run an EXE file. When run. 
W32/Axam-A will display a message box. On the second of the month a message box will be displayed 
containing the text "Apa yang membuatkan seseorang itu lalai? Jawapannya ada pada anda sendiri. 
Dengarlah nasihat dari Axam Virus ini." The virus author Melhacker claims to be based in Malaysia 
and the text displayed in the message box above is written in the Malay language. Translated it reads 
"What makes a person careless? The answer is in yourself. Listen to the advice of the Axam Virus." 
The file Autoexec.bat will be modified to display " ... -= AxAm WOrm PreSenT =- ... " when executed. 
W32/Axam-A contains functionality that is intended to delete a large number of files and format drives 
C: and D:, but this will never work. 
W32.Blitzdung@mm (Aliases: I-Worm.Blitzdung, WORM_BLITZDUN.A) (Win32 Worm): This 
is a mass-mailing worm that was originally written in Java. A converter tool was used to convert the 
worm to a Win32 Portable Executable (PE) file. It attempts to send a copy of itself to all the contacts 
found in the Yahoo! Messenger log file. It can also spread through any mIRC channels that you visit. 
The worm tries to copy a file infected with W32.EIKem.4926 into the Windows folder. 
W32.HLLW.Discoball (Alias: W32IDiscobaU.Worm) (Win32 Worm): This is a worm that spreads 
through network shares. The existence of the file Mdbole.exe, Seg32.exe or Wins.exe is a sign of a 
possible infection. 
W32.HLLW.Oror.D@mm (Aliases: I-Worm.Roron.4999.c, W32/Roro.V@mm, 
W32/Roron.AA@mm) (Win32 Worm): This is a mass-mailing worm and a variant of 
W32.HLLW.Oror@mm. This worm attempts to spread through e-mail, mIRC, KaZaA. network shares, 
and mapped drives. It also attempts to terminate and remove various security products from the 
infected computer. This threat is written in the C++ language and is compressed with UPX. The 
uncompressed size is about 160 KB. 
W32.Kwbot.C.Worm (Win32 Worm): This worm attempts to spread itself through the KaZaA and 
iMesh file-sharing networks. The worm also has a back door Trojan capability that allows a malicious 
user to gain control of the compromised computer. 
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W32.Kwbot.D.Worm (Win32 Worm): This is a variant ofW32.Kwbot.C.Wonn, with the following 
differences: -
• This variant was packed using a run-time compression utility. 
• The file name has been changed to Winsys.exe. 
• The registry entry is named Winsys. 
Everything else, including the functionality, remains the same as the W32.Kwbot.C.Wonn. 
W32/Proget. worm.b (Aliases: W32.Proge, W32IProget-B, Win32.HLL W .Proget.b) (Win32 
Worm): This is a floppy wonn virus that creates thousands of 10 byte files on the local system. When 
run, the worm copies itself to the WINDOWS SYSTEM (%SysDir>lo) directory, keeping the same 
filename as when it was run. It creates a registry run key to load itself at startup: 
• HKEY _LOCAL _ MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\ 
Run "%FileName%" = %WormPath% 
Once installation is complete, the worm exists. Upon reload, the wonn is run from the SYSTEM 
directory, which activates its propagation routine and payload. The virus has a payload to create a 10 
byte file in each directory on the local system using a random 8 character followed by the extension 
aaa. The content of the file also contains 10 random characters. This action happens each time the 
system is rebooted, which can result in thousands of files getting created, filling up the hard disk over 
time. Each minute, a copy of the worm is saved to the A:\ drive. 
W32.Yalat.Worm (Aliases: I-Worm.Haelp, W32IYalat.worm) (Win32 Worm): This is a wonn that 
attempts to spread by using MAPI and by copying itself to shared folders. It also attempts to stop the 
processes of some antivirus programs. Due to bugs in the code, the wonn does not work as intended. 
W32.Zokrim@mm (Win32 Worm): This is a mass-mailing wonn that uses Microsoft Outlook to 
send itself to all the contacts in the Outlook Address Book. The wonn displays a message when run. 
The e-mail has the following characteristics: 
• Subject: SMS for YOU by Valentina 
M M· k ( ) . fi V I . """ • essage: If 0 Z IS crazy or a entma ........ .
• Attachment: Vale.exe 
W32.Zokrim@mm is written in the Microsoft Visual Basic programming language. 
W97M.Babals.B (Aliases: Word97.Babals, W97M/Bablas.DY) (Word 97 Macro Virus): 
When W97M.Babals.B is executed, it attempts to infect the Microsoft Word Nonnal.dot template. 
Once that happens, the virus will infect any documents that you open or close. 
W97M.Cian.C@mm (Word 97 Macro Virus): This is a mass-mailing macro virus that infects 
Microsoft Word documents. This macro virus has a VBS script inside itself that it inserts and executes 
on the system. 
W97M.Hopel.A (Word 97 Macro Virus): This is a macro virus that infects Microsoft Word 
documents when you click Open, Close, Save, New, or Exit. This virus has many different payloads 
that it can execute on Exit. If an infected document is double-clicked, the virus saves the infected 
document as C:\Windows\Command\Nt.txt. W97M.Hopel.A also overwrites the Autoexec.bat file 
with a non-ASCII character. 
W97M.Tang (Word 97 Macro Virus): This is the macro module ofW32.HLLW.Tang@mm. It 
infects Microsoft Word documents and templates. 
W97M.Tolu (Word 97 Macro Virus): This is a Microsoft Word 97 macro virus that infec~s Microsoft 
Word documents and templates. The virus displays an illustration with a message when an mfected 
document is opened. 
W97M.Trug.A (Word 97 Macro Virus): This is a macro virus that infects Microsoft Word 
documents when they are opened or closed. W97M.Trug.A attempts to hide its malicious actions and it 
may delete several files from the system. 
WORM LOVEGATE.B ( Alias: LOVGATE.A, W321Lovgate.worm, WORM_LOVGATE.A. 
I_Worm~Supnot) (Internet Worm): This malware is both a worm and backdoor program. To 
propagate, it drops copies of itself in network shared folders and subfolders. As a back door. it opens a 
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port, 1016 by default, allowing remote maliclOu u er to a ce and manipulate the affe'ted 
It end a notification to either of the follo\\ 109 e-maJi addre e. 
• 54 10ve~fe comaJi .net 
• hackerlI7® 163 .com 
\ tem. 
Worm/ Machine.lRC (lRC Worm): Thi i an Internet worm that prea thr ugh the u-e orth 
mlRC network. If executed, the worm create numerou ne,\ file. ddltlOnalh, s ~ that It gel. run h 
time a user restart their computer the following file get modified : -
• C:\Windows\Win.ini 
load= 
10ad=C:\Windows nf\In ystem.exe C: Window Inf\lnt' y tern e\e 
The following registry keys will also get added : 
• HKEY_CLASSES_ROO CL 10 {050E D20-5BB -IIDI- I J-
OAOC90F273I } \InProcServer32 
@="C:\\WTNOOW \\IN \IN \M BVM60.DLL" 
"ThreadingModel"="Apartment" 
• HKEY _CLASSES_ROO TypeLib\{ 000204EF-0000-0000- 0 0-
000000000046} \6.0\9\win32 
@="C:\\WINDOW \\INF\\J \M B M60 .DLL" 
• HKEY _LO AL_MACHIN \ oftware\ L hell pen mmand 
="\"C:\\WINDOWS\\INF \1 F\\MIR . nn t" 
WORM_TANG.A (Alia e : Win32/Gant. @ mm, I-Worm,Tanger, \\J2.H I W.Tang a mm, 
W32/Gant MM) (Internet Worm): Thi memory-re ident \." ml propagates In \'an us \\ s. It 
sends it elf via e-mail to all addre e Ii ted in th Mi r ft uti k. addre b k.. \ ia Inlt:met Relay 
Chat (IRq, mapped network dri e ,and ia p pular peer-to-peer file- hanng applJ atlOn such as 
KaZaA, Morpheu , Grok ter, and other. ide from carrying ut \'ari u pr pagall n routmes, the 
wonn al 0 infects batch file. It code al 0 indicate that it ha capabilitle. to Infect \\ rd and ' \cel 
documents. This malware i de eloped in i ual Ba i and run on \ ind \\ 9 -,9, T. _0 0, M£ 
and XP system. It usually arri e UPX-compre ed. 
97M. ian.C@ mm (Excel 97 Macro Virus): Thi i a rna -mading rna r VIruS th t Infe ts 
Micro oft Excel spreadsheets. Thi macro iru ha a B cript in ide ll. elfthat It in, rts and 
ex cute on the ystem. 
X97M.Tang (Excel 97 Macro Virus): Thi 
Micro oft Excel Spread heet . 
the macro m dule f 2.HLL . ang(a mOl . It tn eets 
Trojans 
Tr ~an ha e become increa ingly popular a a mean of obtaining unauthorized a e to mputer 
tern, Thi table in lude Trojan discu ed in the la t i month, with ne\ item added on a 
cumulati e ba is. Trojan that are co ered in the current i ue of yber ote are It ted In b Idface r d 
Following thi table are write-up of new Trojan and updated er ion di covered In th lat two 
\ e k . Readers hould ontact their anti- iru endor to obtain pecifi informati n n Tr ~ans and 
Trojan ariant that anti-viru ofu are detect . ote: At time, Tr ~an rna ontain name ' or ontent 
that rna be on id r d offi n i e. 
Trojan Ver ion )bcr otc I u # 
AdwarcOroppcr-A \ .furrcnt ""U( 
Bad,door. \mltls ]iA J) bcd'ote-.-2003-0 I 
Bad,ooor.;\s\;]Stn.D 0 i:.) ber~otc,-_003-0 I 
Backdoor. \s .. n .. in.E r (urnnt Issue 
Bnck.door B~as!l 1\ '\ C\ bd\o!l:<;-_OO~-tL 
Backdoor.Bcast) .8 B ( \ bcr'\oh.'s-200~-03 
Bar"dom Bmbot , \ (urn-n! )"uc 
Backdtwr I~P '\ \ C\ bcr'\olc~-20()3-03 
Trojan ersion ) ber, ·ore I u t:t I Backdoor.Colfuser N/A C,,'ber'\" Oles-~003-0 I 
Backdoor.Cow N/A C) ber'\;ote.,-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.Cybspy N/A C, ber'\;ole:.-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.Dani N/A Current h~Ul 
Backdoor.Deftcode N/A C)- ber'-.otes-2003-0 J 
Backdoor.Drator N/A C'l ber~otes-_003-0 I 
Backdoor.FTP. Casus N/A C) ber~olc~-2003-02 
Backdoor.Hethat N/A C\ berNole:,-100J-0 I 
Backdoor.Hipo N/A Current hsue 
Backdoor.Hitcap N/A Current Issue 
Backdoor.Hornet N/A C) berJ\ole~-_OOJ-O I 
Backdoor.IRC.Aladinz N/A C) berNolI::s-2003-02 
Backdoor.lRC.Cloner N/A Current h,ue 
Backdoor.IRC.Zcrew N/A Current h~ue 
Backdoor.Khaos N/A Current h\ue 
Backdoor.Kilo N/A Current )\\ue 
Backdoor.Krei N/A C} berNotc,,-2003-03 
Backdoor.Lala N/A C) bcrJ\olcs-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.Massaker N/A C) bcr1\otc-;-_OOJ-02 
Backdoor.NetDevil .B B C" berNotcs-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.NclTrojan N/A Cybl:rNolcs-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.Ohpass N/A C) berJ\ olc~-1003-0 I 
Backdoor.OICQSer. 165 N/A CyberNolc<;-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.OICQSer.1 7 17 CyberNolcs-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.Optix.04.d 04.d Current h~uc 
Backdoor.OptixPro. J O.c 10.c CYberNotcs-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.Remohak. 16 16 CyberNotes-_003-0 I 
Backdoor.RemoteSOB N/A C) bcrNotcs-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.Rcphlex N/A C) bcrNotcs-200J-0 I 
Backdoor.SchoolBus.B B Current Is"ue 
Backdoor.Sdbot.C C CybcrNoles-2003-02 
Backdoor. Sdbot.D D CyberNotcs-2003-03 
Backdoor. Serpa N/A CyberNote~-2003-03 
Backdoor.Servsax N/A CYberNotes-2003-0 I 
Backdoor.SilvcrFTP N/A Current h ... ue 
Backdoor.Sixca N/A CvberNotes-"003-01 
Backdoor.Snowdoor N/A Current Is~ue 
Backdoor. Talex N/A CyberNotes-2003-02 
Backdoor.Udps. lO 10 CyberNote~-2003-03 
Backdoor. Up rudoor N/A CyberNotes-_003-0 I 
Backdoor. VagrN ocker N/A CyberNotes-2003-0 1 
Backdoor.VrnL N/A CyberNotcs-_003-0 I 
Backdoor.Xcnozbot N/A CybcrNoles-200J-O J 
Backdoor.Xeory N/A C) berNotcs-2003-0J 
Backdoor.Zdemon N/A C)- bl:rNolcs-2003-02 
Backdoor. Zix NA Cyb~rNotc\-200J-02 
Backdoor.Z \TOP NA C\berJ\oks-200~-03 
Bnd,door- \ OK NA C, berx"ott:,,-200J-O I 
BDS AntlPC N \ C\ bcrl\otcs-2003-02 i-=-
N \ C, bcr'\l1tc,-2003-02 8-DS Backslnb 
BDS r \ oluI '\i \ C, ber'\o(c,,-200J-03 
Il(l~ - il raml'~l't =",. \ (urnnt ",ur 
Trojan Ver ion C)ber. 'ote I ue # 
Downloader-BO.dr.b N/A C" berr-.:otes-2003-01 
Downloader-BS N/A C" ber'\otes-2003-0_ 
Exploit-IISlnjector N/A Cy berNotes-1003-03 
TRClBackdoor.e E CyberNotes-2003-0 I 
IRC/Backdoor.f f Cyber~otes-2003-0:" 
IRC/BackdooLg g CyberNotes-2003-03 
IRC/Flood.bi N/A CyberNotes-_003-03 
IRC-Emoz N/A CyberNotes-_003-03 
IRC-OhShootBot N/A C, berNotes-~003-0 I 
JS .SeekerJ J CyberNotes-_003-0 I 
JS/Seeker-C C Current hsue 
Key) og-Razytimer N/A C, berNoles-1003-03 
Key Log-TweakPan N/A C) berNotes-2003-02 
MultiDropper-FD N/A C, ber1\otes-2003-0 I 
Pac N/A Current Is,uc 
ProcKill-Z N/A C)bcrNot~s-2003-03 
PWS-Aileen N/A Current "',ue 
PWSteal.A1Light N/A C)ber~ot~\-2003-01 
PWSteal.Rimd N/A CyberNotes-2003-01 
PWSteal.Senhas N/A C\ bcrNolc~-2003-0.\ 
PWS-Tenbot N/A C) berNoles-2003-0 1 
QDel359 N/A C\ berNolC\-_003-0 1 
RenameLc N/A CyberNolcs-1003-03 
Tcllafriend.Trojan N/A (urrcnt h,uc 
TRiFake.YaHoMe. l N/A C, berNole\-2003-01 
Tr/SpBit.A A (urrent I\,ue 
TRlWinMx N/A C) bcrNote'i-_OO3-0_ 
Troj /Dloader-BO N/A Cy ber'\ otes-_OO3-02 
Troj/Manifest-A NA C\ ba"1otl:,-1003-03 
Troj/Qzap-248 N/A C\ berNote ... -1003-0 1 
Troj /SadHound-A N'A C" bcr'l0Ies-2003-03 
Troj/Slanret-A N/A CyberNoleo.,-1003-03 
Troj/TKBot-A \ Current h\ue 
TROJ JBELLZ.A A C, berNotes-2003-02 
TROJ KILLBOOT.B B C" ber'\ otes-2003-0 I 
Trojan.Dasmin NA C \ berNole~-2003-0 I 
Trojan .Dasmin.B B C) ber'\, Oles-2003-03 
Trojan .DownloadeLlnor NA C" ber""lotes-2003-02 
Trojan.ldly N / \ Current J<"uc 
Trojan.lvanet N .-'1.. C\ berl'. otc'i-200J-02 
Trojan.KKiller NA C\ bd\otes-200}-O I 
TroJan.Po ldo .B B C) ber'\otes-_OO}-02 
rrojan.ProtcBo) 1'1\ Current I"ue 
TroJun.PSW. Plalan.5. \ ".J \ C~ ber'otes-:~OO}-O 1 
TroJan . PWS.QQPass. D 1'. \ C\ bCr'OI~\-200~-O. 
Tr lan .Qrorager N \ C) b~r 0Ic.,\-2003-02 
I- --"- -
1'. \ C\ ber'\olc,-2003-U2 Trojnn .Qroragl:r Dr 
Trojnn .Q\\ e 1\, \ C, bl:r:-"l)h:~-.!on3-0_ 
rropnSnag ".J \ C\ bu I'l)lcS-.OOJ -Il .. 
Tr )Fll1 l nbl )c l-.c~ \ C\ bCrl'tHCS-2003-0 I 
C\,bCrI'Olcs-.O(lJ-O-~. 8 \ 8S t-. loon B 
C vbcr ~otcs-':OO 3-0:' >- ~/,\ \ ' 13 StaltPagl: 
\\Jl.Bl'npao.1 rojun ~/A ('u rrent Issue 
I 11'( (\ hl" Ilk ... {lO ~.( 
Trojan Version C~ber~ote I u 11 
W32.Socay.Worrn N/A C" berNotes-_OO3-0_ 
W32.Systentry.Trojan N/A C" berNotes-2003-03 
W32.Xilon.Trojan N/A CyberNotes-2003-0 I 
W32.Yinker.Trojan N/A Current Issue 
W32/Igloo-15 r.. /A Current Issue 
Xin N/A CyberNolcs-2003-03 
AdwareDropper-A: This is an Adware dropping Trojan. When run it in tall a la romedla Fla -h 
"card," and three Adware DLL files that are Internet Explorer BrO\ er Help r Object, de luned to 
di play advertisements, track the URLs visited on the sy tern capture typed ear h tnng", ;nd alt r th 
browser's default start page. These DLL files are not considered to be maliciou , but are lik I) u ' ed fi)r 
marketing purposes. As the main installer executable does not contain an end u er Ii n e agreemem 
(EULA), it is considered malicious. The following message i believed to ha\e been P I ~D t a 
number of users . 
• From: cupid@valentines-ecard.com 
The message links to an executable file named card.exe. When run. a Fla h" ard" I di plaed The 
executable extracts several files to disk: 
• %Program Files%\Valintine Day ard\Valintine Da ard unlO tall "\ 
• %Program Files%\ Valintine Day ard\ alintine Da ard \'alsda) .e\.e 
• %Start Menu\Program %\Valintine Day ard\ nin taJl.lnk 
• %Start Menu\Programs%\Valintin Day ard\ alintin Da) ard.lnk 
• %Sy Dir%\HmePge.d ll 
• % ysDir%\HotLink.dll 
• % y Dir%\lEBrw.d ll 
Backdoor.Assasin.E: Thi Trojan is a ariant of Backd r. a in . It gi\ e a mal! IC us u. ~r 
unauthorized acces to the compromi ed computer and attempt to temlJnate the tl\ e proct:sses of 
varioll firewall. a well a anti iru and ecurity produ t . Thi \anant aJ.., attempts t spreJd Ihelr 
acro the network hare. Backd or.A a in . i written in the BrIand elphl pr grammlng languagl: 
and i compre ed with UPX. 
Backdoor.Bmbot (Alia: W32/C ult.Worm): Thi i. a ba kd r Tr ~an that allo\\s a mallcl us u 'cr to 
gain control of your computer by u ing Internet Ria) hat JR). fal e err r mc<;sJg I. dlspla)cd J!' 
Backdoor.Bmbot i not e ut d fr m the ° '0 temO,o f Ider. 
Backdoor.Dani (Alias: Backdoor.Dani,20): Thl i a ba kd r Trojan that I ' wntten m thc MI r It 
Vi ual Ba i progranulling language. It \er\\ nt the Wmd \\ r gl tf) edit r pr gram 10 ated In 
%W indir% \R gedit.e 'e with a cop f it elf. Th Tr jan all \\ unauthonzed a est an mlt.:Ll d 
omputer. 
Backdoor.Hipo: Thi i a typical Ba kd r Tr ~an that allo\\o a maltci u U er t gain acccs'> t and 
n;m tel ntr I an infected c mput r. The Trojan i wrinen 10 the DelphI programming languag\! and 
mpre ed \ ith P 
Backdoor.Hitcap: Thi i' a Ba kd r Tr Jan thai gl\ ' a malt I us u - r unauth ril'ed J ' \..'\!" to) ur 
c mputer. It c 11, I. t r two mp nents: 
• n eClitable file : The e utable fil I PUl:k \ I . ). 
• .dll til : The .dll fil is pa ked \\Ith P 
Backd or.IR . loner \lia e : Backdoor.lR . loner, Bf\. R IR 
Bnckdoor: I R I loner): ThIs IS a bal kd r1 r Jan (hat lI"~ 1111 R I 
mall I us user It allt\\ S the.: mallcl liS lI . er [) g.1in full nlr I \ d) ur 
Buckdoor.lR ,Len'" ( \1i1l~(!I: IR Flood,bi. Bllckdoor.l R 
1 O. ~. R, I R (. L ~ R, 
nHllullllle.: \\ Ilh J It;:l { Il 
mpuII: r. 
Ihat b sllntlnr It) Iher b,} kd ))r IR Ir Jan, "U h ,} I J kd )r IR 
II Is \\ntlc.:11 ,is an lR "l:rtpl ani U"~S till: I11IR Ill'nt I) lonne t t thl. Inlcrnd, \ h rc IIIl 111 
rna 11 'I HI S II "l'f {) r I h pre l'n e I hI: 111,11 Il I )lIS user (,,111 "I: nd \ aril 1I l )mlll nd II thl: III I: t I 
and take full control over it. An infected computer can also be used to launch a ping flood attack 
against another computer at a specified IP address. 
Backdoor.Khaos (Aliases: BKDR_KHAOS.A, Backdoor.Khaos, Backdoor.Win32IKhaos): This is 
a backdoor Trojan that gives a malicious user unauthorized access to your computer. It usually arrives 
as the file, Server2.exe. By default it opens port 6969 for listening. Backdoor.Khaos does not 
automatically install itself, as some other program usually installs it. As a result, even if 
Backdoor.Khaos is installed, in most cases, it will no longer run after you restart your computer. It is 
written in Microsoft Visual Basic 5 and it requires that the Visual Basic (VB) run-time libraries be 
installed on your computer in order for it to execute. 
Backdoor.Kilo: This is a backdoor Trojan that uses an IRC channel to contact a malicious user. 
Backdoor.Kilo is written in the Delphi programming language and is packed with UPX. When 
executed, it copies itself as %System%\Njgal.exe and adds the value, "Boot Manager 
%System%\Njgal.exe," to the registry key: 
• HKEY _LOCAL _ MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 
Next it opens ports 6711 and 6718 and creates the file, %System%\Boot.dat. 
Backdoor.Optix.04.d (Aliases: Backdoor.Optix.04.f, Backdoor-RS): This is a backdoor Trojan and 
a variant of Backdoor.Optix.04.c. It is a Delphi application packed with UPX, vO.76.I-l.20. By default. 
it listens on port 5151. Backdoor.Optix.04.d attempts to terminate or close any processes of. or 
windows belonging to, various programs. These programs include antivirus and security programs. 
Backdoor.Optix.05 (Aliases: Backdoor.Optix.50, Backdoor.Win32/0ptix.5_0): This is a back door 
Trojan that is a variant of Backdoor.Optix.04.c. By default, it listens on port 5151. The Trojan attempts 
to terminate or close any processes or windows belonging to various programs, including antivirus and 
security programs. 
Backdoor.SchoolBus.B (Alias: Backdoor.SchooIBus.c): This is a backdoor Trojan that copies files to 
different locations on your computer and then runs those files. When these files are run they attempt to 
delete various Windows files and send system information to malicious users. 
Backdoor.SilverFTP (Aliases: Backdoor.SilverFTP.10, Backdoor:Win32/SilverFTP.l_0): This is 
a back door Trojan that gives a malicious user unauthorized access to your computer. It copies itself as 
%Windir%\Wincfg32.exe. When Backdoor.SilverFTP runs, it copies itself as 
%Windir%\Wincfg32.exe and creates the value, "Windows Config Loader 
%Windir%\Wincfg32.exe," in the registry key: 
• HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 
so that the Trojan starts when you start Windows. After the Trojan is installed, it notifies the client side 
and waits for the commands from the remote client. These commands give a malicious user full access 
to the file system of the infected computer. 
Backdoor.Snowdoor (Aliases: Backdoor.Snowdoor, Backdoor:Win32/Snowdoor.A): This is a 
backdoor Trojan that opens TCP port 5326 or 5328 on the infected computer. The Trojan allows . 
unauthorized access to an infected computer. It is written in the Delphi programming language and IS 
packed with UPX. 
DoS-iFrameNet (Aliases: HTML_CRINET.A, Trojan.VBS.lFrame, VBS/DDoS-iFrameNet): .This 
Trojan exists as a VBScript in an HTML document. It attempts to open hundreds of TEL NET sessions 
by creating an iFrame with the source being a Telnetll address. 
JS/Seeker-C (Aliases: Trojan.JS.Seeker.b. JS/Seeker.gen.a trojan): This is a maliciou~ script. The 
script attempts to modify Internet Explorer settin~s. such .as the Start Page and Searc~ settmg. It . 
appears that the script has been designed to do thiS to redirect ~ffic to websltes (typically the we~slte 
redirected to will be pornographic. but there is no reason why It could not be another type of website 
desiring more business). The Trojan writes to registry values under: 
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer. . . 
JS/Seeker-C does not forward itself to other users. but has to be deliberately Installed on a website or 
forwarded via e-mail from a malicious user. 
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Pac (Alias: Trojan.Win32.Pac): This Trojan has been reported in the wild. It is a new P2P (peer-to-
peer) worm, backdoor, and DoS (Denial of Service) attack tool. The worm travels from one system to 
another as an EXE bun~le that. acts as a dropper. When the dropper is run, it activates the embedded 
P2P worm. The worm Installs Itself to system as SYSTEM32.EXE file. It sets a hidden attrib t t 't 
til T . til d . . u 0 I S 
.1 e. 0 s~rt Its 1 e unng every WIn ows session, the worm creates the following startup keys for it 
In the RegIstry: . 
• HKEY _LOCAL _MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion Run 
"SystemSAS" = "system32.exe" 
• HKEY _LOCAL _ MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices 
"SystemSAS" = "system32.exe" 
Being active the worm copies itself to shared folders of popular file sharing clients KaZaA and i\fesh. 
The worm changes the size of its files to make them match (to some extent of course) the size of 
software packages it tries to fake. Anyone connecting with KaZaA or iMesh client to an infected 
computer will discover these fake files. If at least one of these files is downloaded and executed by 
another pers~n, that computer also becomes infected. The worm has backdoor capabilities. It is 
controlled vIa a bot that the worm creates in the specific channel on an IRC server. A malicious user 
can obtain system information, upload, download, execute files on an infected system, and update the 
worm's file to a newer version. The worm can be used to perform a DoS (Denial of Service) attack. It 
can perform a SYN flood attack. 
PWS-Aileen: This password-stealing Trojan attempts to retrieved cached passwords on the local 
system and e-mail them to the author. When run, it expects the filename of the Trojan executable to be 
nudeAileen.scr. If this is the filename, the Trojan copies itself to the %TEMPOo directory as 
dancingBaby.exe. Regardless of the filename, a registry run key is created to load the Trojan at startup 
(whether it was copied to the % TEMP% directory or not). 
• HKEY _LOCAL _ MACHINE\Software\M icrosoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\ 
Run\dancingBaby = %TEMP%\dancingBaby.exe 
It tries to create an HTML document, strTempHtm.htm. and load it. This document contains a form 
with an action that points to a remote mailer script on a trellix.com web page. This results in cached 
passwords getting mailed to the Trojan author. 
Teliafriend.Trojan (Alias: Tellafriend): This Trojan was created by ZeroPopUp. Once installed, it 
sends an e-mail message to all the contacts in your Windows and Microsoft Outlook address books 
directing them to download them to download the installer from the host's website. (For the program to 
be installed, you need to agree to install it by clicking Yes when you see the dialog box shown below.) 
TrISpBit.A: When executed, TrISpBit.A drops numerous files in the C directory. The Trojan installs 
only .LNK tiles for http websites. On these websites a user is prompted to download dialer software: 
TrojlTKBot-A (Aliases: Backdoor.IRC.Demfire, IRC-Sdbot.dr trojan, Backdoor.Tkbot): This is 
an IRC back door Trojan principally targeted at computers running Microsoft lIS version 4 or 5 on 
Windows NT/2000 and exploiting the "Web Server Folder Traversal" security vulnerability. A 
description and patch for this vulnerability can be found at Microsoft Security Bulletin MSOO-78. 
When executed. the Trojan creates the folder \<Program Files>\Microsoft\Update\DLL\tk and copies 
thirty files into this folder. Two of these files. rundll.exe and rnstaskmgr.exe. will be started up as 
services using the clean application FireDaemon.exe which is also packaged with this Trojan. 
Rundll.exe is the server component of a commercially available FTP server application. Mstaskmgr.exe 
is a modified mIRC client that works in conjunction with the mIRC script in the tile task.cofto form 
the core of the backdoor capabilities of this Trojan. The Trojan listens on a particular IRC channel 
waiting for a connection from a malicious user. ~ maliciou~ user who conn~ts to this channel ~iH b~ 
able to issue commands to TrojffKBot-A that WIll then be mterpreted as actIons to run on the \"Ictml s 
computer. These commands include being able to ~plo.adldown.load files to an~ ~ro~ the victim's 
machine. remotely running executables and accessmg mformau~n about.the vlct~m s computer. The file 
vrnz.exe also installed in the main folder. contains a self extractmg archIve that If executed WIll create 
the fold~r \<Windows>\System32\Microsoft\Crypto into which a further thirteen tiles are copied. The 
service svhost is then started from the file scvhost.exe. The tile sc"host.exe contains an IRe file server 
application. 
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Trojan.ProteBoy (Alias: Trojan.Win32.Proteboy): This is a Trojan Horse that deletes th ' 
b ku fil I , . . M' ft· . . e registry ac pies. tiS wntten m ICTOSO Visual BasiC version 6 and is packed "'I'th I 'PX Th . 
. '" " " v . e eXistence 
of the file ProtectBoy.com IS an mdlcatlon of a possible infection. 
Trojan.~dly: This is a Trojan that attempts to gather system information, including your dial-up 
networkmg user name and passwords, and send them to the malicious user. When it I'S evec ted 't 
. . If 0/ S 0/ \M ... u , I 
copies Itse as 10 ystem/O satc132.exe and adds itself as a reference to Msatcl32.exe to the registnJ 
key: ~J 
• HKEY _LOCAL _ MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\RunOnce 
Next ~t crea~e~ the file, %S~stem~\ldleULexe. The Trojan uses this file, which, by itself. does not 
contam mahclous code. ThIS TrOjan also sends information to a variety of Web sites. The Trojan may 
also be able to download content from these Web sites. 
W32.Benpao.Trojan: This is a Trojan horse that steals user password and other information. It also 
modifi~s the r~gistI?' suc~ that o~ening ~y .chm, .exe, .ini, .reg, .txt, or .scr file will result in executing 
the TrOJan. It IS wntten m the Visual BasIC programming language and is packed with UPX. vO.76.1-
1.20. 
W32/Igloo-15 (Aliases: Backdoor.Igloo.15.b, Win32/BearBritney.A worm, WORM GOOL-A. 
Kazoa.C, W32/Gool.worm, Win32.1gloo.15.trojan, W32/Gool.worm.dg, Win32.1gl~o.OO.config): 
This is a backdoor Trojan and Internet worm which spreads via file sharing on KaZaA networks and 
via IRC channels. When first run W32/lgloo-15 copies itself to the Windows System folder as 
Explorer.exe and RealWayToHack.exe and creates the following registry entry so that Explorer.exe is 
run automatically each time Windows is started: 
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\EXPLORER = 
%System%\EXPLORER.EXE 
W32/lgloo-15 runs continuously in the background, listening on a port, allowing a remote user (using a 
client program) to gain access and control over the computer. The worm creates the folder 
%Windows%\Sys32 and copies itself to this folder using various filenames. The worm makes the 
folder %Windows%\sys32 shareable on KaZaA networks by setting the following registry entries: 
• HKCU\Software\Kazaa\LocaIContent\dirO = 012345:% Windows%\sys32 
• HKCU\Software\Kazaa \LocalC ontent\dir I = 012345: % W indows% \sysJ 2 
• HKCU\Software\Kazaa\LocaIContent\dir2 = 0 12345:% Windowso~\sys32 
• HKCU\Software\Kazaa\LocaIContent\dir3 = 012345:% Windows%\sys32 
• HKCU\Software\Kazaa\LocaIContent\dir4 = 012345:% Windowso o\sys32 
• HKCU\Software\Kazaa\LocaIContent\dir5 = 012345:% Windows%\sys32 
• HKCu\Software\Kazaa\LocaIContent\DisableSharing = 0 
It also drops and runs %System%\Explorer.vbs, which infects the mIRC initialization file mirc.ini. 
Each time a mIRC session is started mirc.ini is loaded automatically and sends the worm to any users 
who join any of the current channels. W321Ig100-15 may terminate selected anti-virus or firewall 
applications and also sets the following registry entry: 
• HKCu\Software\Microsoft\lnternet Explorer\Main\RegisteredOrganization = 
http://www.crash.com 
WORM IXAS.A (Aliases: I-Worm.Ixas, W32/Ixas(ii MM, W32/GvoWFI.A@mm) (Internet 
Worm):-This nondestructive, non-memory resident worm propagates via e-mail using MAPI 
(Messaging Application Programming Interface) or SMTP (~imple ~ail Transfer Protocol). Upon 
execution. it drops a copy of itself using a random filename I~ th~ Wtndows system f~lder. The file 
name is the base file name of the dropped copy of the worm. I.e. If the dropped copy IS ypacww.exe. 
then the e-mail addresswillbeypacww@delfi.It.This worm exploits a known vulnerability affecting 
unpatched Internet Explorer-based clients. which is co~monly known as Automatic Ex~ution of 
Embedded MIME type. This vulnerability enables e-mail attachments to execute automatIcally WIthout 
the recipient opening or double-clicking it. This worm runs on Windows 95. 98, \tE. 1\T. 2000 and 
XP platforms. 
WORM YAHA.K (Aliases: Win31IYaha.K, I-Worm.LentJ~.i, Wln31~aha.K(a mm. W31/Yaha-
K, W31.Yaha.K@mm. W31IYaha.k): (Internet Worm):,~hlsmas~-mallmg woml uses Its,own 
SMTP . e to propagate via e-mail as an attachment. mailIng Itselt to addresses retneved from the 
, Ii t dengmt m's Wt'ndows Address Book (WAB). Yahoo \1essenger. \tS1\ and ,1\ET \ksscngcr 
m ec e sys e , '," h·' "HT ,. 1 Services, and files found in all directones With extensIOn names contammg t e stnng , t 
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randomly selects the contents of its e-mail subject line, message body, and attachment name from 
preset information in its code. Because of its very smart stealth and anti-anti-virus technique, most 
common A V software can't detect or clean it. Like the other Y AHA worm variants, this mal ware also 
terminates certain processes from memory that are related to popular antivirus and security software. 
This variant exhibits the following payloads: 
• Displays a message box 
• Swaps the left and right click mouse functions 
• Drops a hidden non-malicious text file in the Windows desktop 
• Hides files and folders in the Personal folder (usually C:\My Documents) 
• Modifies the Internet Explorer home page. 
This worm launches a DoS attack against a particular site and terminates the Task Manager under 
Windows NT, 2000, and XP.1t runs on Windows 9x, NT, 2000, ME, and XP. 
W32.Yinker.Trojan (Alias: Trojan.Win32.Yinker: This Trojan creates a new user named Yinker 
and adds this user to the Administrator group on Windows NT4.0/2000IXP. W32.Yinker.Trojan also 
stops and restarts the Telnet service. 
NIPC CyberNotes #2003-04 
SUPPLEMENT 
TWO 
CYBERNOTES 
MONTHLY 
and 
ISSUE LEVEL 
FREQUENCY 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
~ 
-c: 
o 
:!! 
>. 
.c 
"C 
<II 
t: 
o 
c.. 
<II 
c::: 
f/J 
Ol 
j 
CO 
!9 
o 
I-
0/) 
OJ 
::> 
0/) In 
OJ-u 
::> II) In _ 
~ ra 
II) "8. 
Z :J 
• • 
r---~-~---;;;;;~~iiii Oec.oJ 
. .oJ 
. 
I~II od ~ 10 .ltlqUJ 
'1 
--:j 
-! 
'1 
-. 
l 
~ 
1 
....l 
--J. 
.....J 
.....-J 
~ 
~ 
.....I 
~ . 
-;;;.....,.j 
~ 
~ 
• 
• 
Oct.()3 
Sep-03 
Aug-OJ 
JuI~J 
J.....ro 
.oJ 
Apr.oJ 
1 r.oJ 
Feb-OJ 
J 
'~2 
"~2 
Ocl~ 
5 p-02 
Aug-02 
Jul~2 
Jun-02 
, y~2 
Apr~2 
M r.{)2 
F tr02 
J n-02 £; 
c 
Doc~1 ~ 
.ot 
Oct~1 
Sep-Ol 
Auq.Ql 
J 
J 
ul~1 
urH>l 
),.o1 
Apr~' 
______ .~ :a.:: 
------3· ~ 
---------·tu~ 
--____ - .. 11 , 
---.... ; ~ 
o 
.'!: 
.2 
Co 
)( 
W 
1'0 
... 
o 
.... 
I 
I 
t 
8 
.... 
sUJeu pelJoda~ JO JaqUJnN 
I 
I 
, 
i 
I 
I 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
! 
i 
I 
1 
~ 
Oec-OO 
. -00 
Oct-OO 
1 
Sep-03 
Aug-{l3 
Juf~3 
Jun-03 
I 
I 
I 
: 
t 
" 
ay-OO 
Ajl(-OO 
/o.ar-OO 
FetHlJ 
Jan-03 
Dec~2 
ov~2 
S 
Ocl-02 
ep-02 
ug-02 
ul..Q2 
A 
J 
J un~2 
y-02 
A 
~I 
pr..Q2 
(-02 
b..Q2 
n-02 -5 
F 
J 
10 
c 
o 
ec-Ol l: 
o 
-01 
Oc(..Ql 
Sa ~1 
g·Ol 
~1 
~1 
y-Ol 
(-01 
(-01 
Au 
Jul 
Ju 
Ma 
Ap 
Ma 
Fe b..Ql 
~1 
Occ-OO 
-00 
.()() 
ep-OO 
Ja 
Oct 
S 
A ug..QO 
-00 
un..QO 
Jul 
J 
I 
Apr 
F 
J 
8 
W I P lJod ~ 10 J.qwnN 
~. 
t 
i 
-
J n-«l 
{ r~ 
F 
J 
o -02 
ov-02 
0 ct-02 
e~2 
uQ-02 
S 
A 
J ul-02 
Ju "-02 
ay-02 
A pH)2 
\ ",-02 
Fe 
J 
0 
n-02 -£; 
c: 
o 
c-Ol :E 
0 v-01 
Oc {-Ol 
Se 
Au 
~ 
g-01 
-01 Jul 
Jun -01 
Me y-Ol 
-01 Apr 
I r -01 
Fe b-Ol 
J n 
Dec 
,. 
Oct 
S 
A 
Ju 
Ju 
, 
A$lI 
., 
F 
J 
o 
.s: 
... 
c: 
o 
~ 
>-
.c 
"'C 
~ 
o 
a. 
G) 
~ 
if) 
G) 
if) 
2 
:; 
~ 
o 
t-
8 
~ 
U> 
., 
U> 
2 
:> 
'0 
~ 
E 
::J 
Z 
Iii 
;§ 
• ~
c 
Dec-G3 
-G3 
Oc\.()3 
Sep-(O 
AL.<]-03 
JIA-G3 
Jtn-03 
F 
J 
S 
A 
J 
J 
• 
F 
J £ 
C 
~1 ~ 
Oct 
S 
I ~,
l ~ 
• 
! : 
~ 
1 
ct 
I 
• 
f 
\ Ju 
J 
• 
-o 
I 
I 
I 
.s 
c: 
o 
:E 
>-
..0 
1/1 
c: 
III 
U 
1/1 
CII 
..0 
e 
Q. 
~ 
0 
t-
0 II) .. 
WIlli JMIUOdtrtj ,0 
Nov 
Ocl 
S 
A 
JlA 
J 
May 
Apt 
Mar 
F 
J 
Dec 
Nov 
Oct 
S 
-
A 
JlA 
J 
-
Apt 
'" 
F 
-
J 
-<11 
S 
A UQ-<Il 
J 
J ....01 
1 A 
y-<ll 
1 F 81>01 
j J tn-<Il 
! 
! 
JlA 
J 
i 
J 
j 
J 
0 
L.(') 
N 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
! 
o 
N 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
, 
I 
o 
~ 
N 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
.-
I 
T 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
j 
1 
T 
l 
i 
, 
1 
I 
j 
I 
l 
l 
Dec-03 
J 
J 
F 
J 
J 
{)1 
Sep-01 
Aug-01 
u-01 
tnD1 
M3y.{l1 
Apr{)1 
tv'w{)1 
F etr01 
Ja1..01 
o 
iii 
.0 
~ 
Z 
~ 
"' .JIJ 
Z (J 
>-
.0 
1:1 
~ 
8. 
8! 
"' g> .., 
ID 
". 
$ 
a 
I-
, 
Q; 
.D 
E 
" z 
., 
" .; 
z 
u I 1; -n ~ 
0 
Q. 
.. 
a: 
II 
Q. 
5 
(f) 
'" 0 ~ 
w 
j! 
0 
.... 
] 
E 
:J 
Z 
.. 
:J ] 
Z 
U 
~ 
'0 
~ 
o 
a. 
.. 
0:: 
III 
c: 
'" .0' 
t::. 
] 
o 
~ 
=-25 
=-2-
=-23 
=-22 
=-21 
=-20 
=-,9 
=-18 
=-17 
=-'6 
=-15 
=-,. 
=-13 
=-'2 a: =-" §§ 
;>(Il3.«I 
2OCn-02 
~, 
2002.e!1 
2002-25 
201]2.l!4 
200213 
201]2.22 
"-Ql 
.0 
E 
:::J 
Z 
Ql 
:::J 
(/) 
!E. 
z 
u 
>-
.0 
'0 
~ 
o 
Q. 
Ql 
D:: 
(/) 
Ql 
(/) 
2 
:> 
~ 
o 
... 
j 
I 
o 
" 
:::: 
i 
T 
i 
21::1'n-25 
3ll:> 
2Il::e23 
22 
2Il::e2 
20 
21::1'n-19 
:iIlll-'8 
2Il::e 17 
1=;1 )3C1I 
~o 
2IX)3.()II 
~ 
I 1 I 
I 
o 
.. 
QI 
~ 
E 
:J 
Z 
III 
:I 
I/) 
!!! 
z 
0 
>-~ 
'C 
~ 
0 
Q. 
QI 
a: 
I/) 
c: 
"' U (/) 
... 
I/) 
III 
~ 
0 
.. 
Q. 
S 
0 
~ 
co .. 
2003-25 
2003- J 
2003-23 
2003-22 
2003-2 
2003-20 
2003-19 
2003- 8 
2003- 7 
2003- 6 
2003-15 
2003- J 
2003-13 
2003- 2 
2003-
2003- 0 
2003.()9 
2OO3-Oe 
~ 
.! 
E 
~ 
• j 
Z 
U 
I.. 
Q) 
.0 
E 
:J 
Z 
CII 
:J 
III 
~ 
Z 
U 
>. 
.c 
III 
E 
~ 
I.. 
CII 
.s: 
o 
J9 
o 
I-
I 
I 
N o 
;p 
J.: 
(5 
• 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,-
r 
: 
i 
: 
i 
r 
i 
I 
f 
f 
i 
I 
I I 
I I 
I 
I 
1 . 
I .. 
i 
I . 
~ 
( 
. 
I 
t ' , 
; 
I . 
1 
~, 
o 
"-
III 
.0 
E 
:l 
Z 
z 
o 
